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Executive Summary
“Pres ident  Obama and I  bel ieve  that  the  subjug ation o f  women is  a  threat  to  the  national 
secur ity  o f  the  United States .”  
S ecretar y  o f  State  Hi l lar y  Cl inton,  March 2010 1  
“ Thos e  sub j e ct  t o  g en d er- b as e d  abus e s  are  o f t en  c aug ht  b e t w e en  t arg e t i ng  b y  t e r ro r is t 
g roups  and the  State ’s  counter- terror ism measures  that  may fa i l  to  pre v ent ,  inv est ig ate , 
prosecute  or  punish  these  acts  and may also  perpetrate  new human r ights  vio lations  with 
impunity .” 
U. N .  S p e c i a l  R a p p o r t e u r  o n  t h e  p r o m o t i o n  a n d  p r o t e c t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  a n d 
fundamental  f reedoms whi le  counter ing terror ism 2
A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism provides the first global study of how the U.S. 
government’s (USG) counter-terrorism efforts profoundly implicate and impact women and sexual 
minorities.  Over the last decade of the United States’ “War on Terror,” the oft-unspoken assumption 
that men suffer the most—both numerically and in terms of the nature of rights violations endured—
has obscured the way women and sexual minorities experience counter-terrorism, rendering their rights 
violations invisible to policymakers and the human rights community alike.  This failure to consider either 
the differential impacts of counter-terrorism on women, men, and sexual minorities or the ways in which 
such measures use and affect gender stereotypes and relations cannot continue.  As the USG leads a 
world-wide trend toward a more holistic approach to countering terrorism that mobilizes the 3Ds—defense, 
diplomacy, and development—and increasingly emphasizes the role of women in national security, the 
extent to which counter-terrorism efforts include and impact women and sexual minorities is set to rise.  As 
the ten-year anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001 approaches, now is the time for the USG and 
governments the world-over to take stock of, redress, and deter the gender-based violations that occur in 
a world characterized by the proliferation of terrorism and counter-terrorism and the squeezing of women 
and sexual minorities between the two.
A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism provides a roadmap for this effort.  It represents 
the culmination of over three years of primary and secondary research into the gender dimensions and 
impacts of the USG’s counter-terrorism policies domestically and abroad, drawing on scores of interviews 
with USG and foreign government, non-government, academic, and inter-government entities; regional 
Stakeholder Workshops in the United States,3 Africa,4 Asia,5 and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)6; 
and extensive secondary research (see further Methodology below).  Where appropriate, the Report also 
draws on comparisons with the United Nations’ (U.N.) and foreign governments’ (including the United 
Kingdom’s) counter-terrorism strategies and their gender and human rights aspects and outcomes.  While 
the Report’s findings and recommendations are primarily directed to the USG, the patterns documented 
and lessons learned will nonetheless resonate with, and be relevant to, those foreign governments and 
inter-governmental institutions which often emulate or participate in the USG’s approaches to countering 
terrorism.  
As a starting point, Section I outlines what it means to take a gender approach to counter-terrorism and 
terrorism, scrutinizing the USG’s current emphasis on women in national security, and presenting ten 
overarching recommendations to ensure that women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 
(LGBTI) individuals are the beneficiaries rather than casualties of the USG’s counter-terrorism measures.  This 
overview does not squarely address the USG’s claim that promoting gender equality counters terrorism—a 
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question that is beyond the scope of this Report—but does demonstrate that the failure to take account 
of gender cuts against both counter-terrorism and equality goals.  While A Decade Lost takes up this and 
other questions in respect of two of the most invisible stakeholders in national security—women and sexual 
minorities—it (1) devotes significantly more attention to the former, in large part because of the dearth 
of information on the latter; (2) locates the focus on gender in the broader context of the USG’s focus on 
Muslim communities; and (3) examines how the gender features and impacts of the USG’s counter-terrorism 
efforts relate to gendered patterns in failures to protect women and LGBTI communities against terrorist 
violence. 
Sections II-VII analyze USG counter-terrorism measures that the USG identifies as such in six areas: 
(1) development activities to counter the conditions that lead to violent extremism; (2) militarized 
counter-terrorism efforts; (3) anti-terrorism financing measures; (4) tactical counter-terrorism in terms of 
intelligence and law enforcement measures and cooperation; (5) border securitization and immigration 
enforcement; and (6) diplomacy and strategic communications.  Each section begins with a brief description 
of the contours of the USG’s efforts in the area, then identifies and analyzes the role of gender in its design, 
implementation, outcomes and assessment, before going on to highlight gendered impacts and make 
specific recommendations about how USG counter-terrorism efforts should integrate a gender and human 
rights perspective to help rather than hinder equality.  
Section VIII summarizes and offers initial insights into how to overcome the challenge of measuring 
counter-terrorism activities both in terms of gender impacts and efficacy, stressing the urgent need for tools 
to measure both outcomes as ultimately effective counter-terrorism measures should protect the whole 
population from terrorism, including particularly women and LGBTI individuals who are regularly its victims. 
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Methodology 
 
A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism is based on a series of Regional Stakeholder 
Workshops held in Fall 2010 covering the United States, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA); scores of in-person and telephone interviews that took place from 2010 to 2011 with U.S. 
government (USG) and foreign government officials, USG implementing partners, inter-governmental 
entities (including the United Nations (U.N.)), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academics; and 
extensive secondary research, building on CHRGJ’s support of the Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, 
U.N. Doc. A/64/211 (Aug. 3, 2009) on gender and counter-terrorism.
Regional  Stakeholder  Workshops
Each Stakeholder Workshop was attended by individuals with a range of geographic and substantive 
expertise—in areas such as women’s rights; lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) rights; 
development; defense; national security and human rights; intelligence and law enforcement cooperation; 
and the rights of migrants, asylum seekers and trafficked persons.  Participants in all Workshops were from 
outside of the government, and included community advocates, NGOs, academics, and U.N. officials. 
Participants in the overseas workshops were selected based on their expertise in countries where the USG 
is particularly active in its counter-terrorism efforts through either direct operations or assistance, including: 
Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda); Asia (Australia, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand); and the Middle East 
and North Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, the occupied Palestinian territory, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen).  The dates and locations of the Stakeholder Workshops were as follows:
 ▶ United States: New York, N.Y. (April 27, 2010).
 ▶ Africa: Nairobi, Kenya (August 26-27, 2010) in partnership with the Open Society Initiative for 
Eastern Africa.
 ▶ Asia: Bangkok, Thailand (September 13-14, 2010).
 ▶ MENA: Istanbul, Turkey (October 15-16, 2010) in partnership with the Bilgi University Human 
Rights Research Center.
Stakeholder Workshops were conducted under Chatham House rules.  As such, citations in the Report 
referencing statements from the Workshops are not attributed to individuals but rather to the regional 
Stakeholder Workshop during which the observations were made.    
G overnment Inter v iews
CHRGJ conducted extensive interviews with USG officials in Washington D.C. and in the field.  On the record 
interviews were conducted with various individuals in:
 ▶ Department of State: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
Communications; Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Office of the Special 
Representative to Muslim Communities; U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya; U.S. Embassy in 
Bangkok, Thailand; U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey.
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 ▶ Department of Defense: Office of the Special Coordinator for Rule of Law and International 
Humanitarian Policy; United States Pacific Command (PACOM). 
 ▶ U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID): Africa Bureau; Asia Bureau (various 
offices); Middle East Bureau; Office of Transition Initiatives; Office of Women in Development 
(now Office of Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment); USAID in Bangkok, Thailand and 
Nairobi, Kenya.
 ▶ Department of Homeland Security (DHS): Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division; 
International Law Enforcement Academies.
 ▶ Department of the Treasury: Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.
 ▶ Department of Justice: Federal Bureau of Investigation; Office of Overseas Prosecutorial 
Development, Assistance and Training.
Information from these interviews is attributed to the U.S. official’s division or agency affiliation and in some 
instances, where additional anonymity was requested, as from a “USG Official.”  Additional interviews were 
also conducted off the record.  
CHRGJ also undertook an investigation of the U.K. Government’s (HMG) counter-terrorism strategy 
(Prevent) through interviews from February 21-28, 2011 in the United Kingdom with HMG officials, national 
security experts, NGO representatives, and HMG implementing partners.  A Decade Lost draws upon this 
comparative research and analysis—which will be more fully documented in a forthcoming CHRGJ briefing 
paper—to further elucidate some of the findings in this Report.  In the United Kingdom, CHRGJ conducted 
on the record interviews with HMG officials in the Home Office, Department for International Development 
(DfID), Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Metropolitan Police, Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Birmingham City Council, and the U.K. House of Lords.  Information from 
these interviews as it appears in this Report is attributed to the HMG official’s departmental affiliation. 
Additional  E xp ert  Consultation and Inter v iews
In addition CHRGJ conducted in-person and telephone interviews with a number of the USG’s main 
implementing partners (particularly in the development field); inter-governmental institutions (including 
the U.N. World Food Programme, Somalia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Centre of 
Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT)); NGOs; and academics with subject-matter expertise of 
relevance to the Report.  The Report also benefitted from an expert consultation held at NYU School of 
Law on June 1, 2011.  Significant secondary research was also undertaken in 2009-2011 in English, Arabic, 
and French. 
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SECTiON i: ENGENDERiNG COUNTER-TERRORiSM: 
TOWARD A GENDER FRAMEWORK
Why Gender Matters 
The gender dimensions and impacts of the U.S. government’s (USG) counter-terrorism measures are largely 
undocumented and significantly under-theorized.  Major and extensive human rights reports detail the 
significant human rights abuses that have occurred in the context of countering terrorism without any reference 
to the gender of the victims, let alone any consideration of the differential impacts of counter-terrorism on 
women, men, and sexual minorities and the ways in which such measures use and affect gender stereotypes.7 
To the extent that there has been a gender analysis of USG counter-terrorism practices, it has been at a meta 
level (such as analyzing the ways in which the concept of a “War on Terror” is heavily gendered)8 or confined to 
specific incidents, most notably around the use of gendered interrogation techniques at U.S. detention facilities 
such as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay.9  This silence owes to many factors, which are explored below as 
a means to help the human rights community and governments avoid gender blind spots moving forward 
and to ensure that overall, counter-terrorism helps rather than hinders gender equality.  Employing a gender 
perspective in the counter-terrorism context is both timely and critical for a number of reasons.
First, the USG is at the helm of a worldwide trend toward a more holistic approach to counter-terrorism that 
increasingly relies on “soft” measures (such as development and diplomacy) alongside “hard” measures (like 
defense, law enforcement, and intelligence).  The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2002, 2006, and 2010 
each emphasize the importance of a “3D” approach to national security that features development, defense, and 
diplomacy.10  However, the Obama Administration’s NSS 2010 goes further than its predecessors to stress the 
strategic value of “prosperity,” “values,” and “international order,” alongside more traditional security interventions 
involving the use of force.11  The Obama Administration has also translated this focus into action and instituted 
significant processes, such as the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), to provide a 
blueprint for the Department of State’s (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) increased role in ensuring national security.12 Further, in June 2011, the Obama Administration released 
its first-ever National Strategy for Counterterrorism that embodies this holistic approach as follows: “We are 
engaged in a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that harnesses every tool of American power—military, 
civilian, and the power of our values—…complemented by broader capabilities, such as diplomacy, development, 
strategic communications, and the power of the private sector.”13  This holistic approach mirrors that being 
undertaken at the United Nations (U.N.).14  As part of this shift, the USG, U.N., and other countries also increasingly 
emphasize the role of terrorism victims and survivor networks in counter-terrorism strategies.15  In this way, this 
move toward a more holistic and “soft” approach to countering terrorism broadens the role and stake women 
and sexual minorities have in counter-terrorism efforts, because, for example, women and girls are the traditional 
beneficiaries of U.S. development assistance16 (such that securitization in this area will directly implicate their 
human rights) and terrorism in all its forms particularly impacts women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and 
intersex (LGBTI) individuals.17  The shift necessarily increases the breadth of activities that are now understood to 
constitute counter-terrorism, making it necessary to examine new activities of individual agencies, as well as the 
inter-agency processes that shape the development, implementation, and impact of counter-terrorism efforts.  
Second, the USG has recently placed increasing emphasis on the significance of gender to its national security 
and counter-terrorism measures.  Much of this emphasis can be traced to the NSS 2010, which notes, “countries 
are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity.  When those 
rights and opportunities are denied, countries often lag behind.”18  The QDDR puts it more starkly: “The status of 
the world’s women is not simply an issue of morality—it is a matter of national security.”19  The USG’s focus on the 
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link between gender equality and counter-terrorism is an unprecedented window of opportunity to ensure that 
USG counter-terrorism measures integrate and impact women and sexual minorities in ways that protect, rather 
than undermine, human rights for all.  In this respect, the USG has expressed concern that counter-terrorism 
measures adversely impact women and LGBTI individuals, and has asked: “How should Governments go about 
creating legitimate counter-terrorism polices, while avoiding actions that reinforced gender stereotypes?”20
Third, current USG counter-terrorism measures do not occur in a vacuum.  The Bush Administration’s “War on 
Terror” has indelibly impacted how communities perceive the United States and their willingness to cooperate 
in the USG’s current “soft” counter-terrorism measures.  A number of the USG’s human rights abuses—from 
torture to rendition to disappearances—remain unacknowledged and unaddressed, and some continue under 
the Obama Administration.21  The impacts of “hard” USG counter-terrorism on women and sexual minorities 
are largely off policymakers’ radar, but are lived daily the world-over by women and sexual minorities as family 
members, human rights activists, detainees, terrorism victims, and displaced populations.  In some cases this is 
because the counter-terrorism measure itself was gender specific, such as interrogating female family members 
in lieu of terrorism suspects or using gendered interrogation techniques on male detainees.22  In others, the 
counter-terrorism activity is notionally gender neutral (like border security) but has gender-based impacts 
because the USG fails to assess the underlying context, including differing background conditions for men, 
women, and LGBTI persons, in which it occurs.  This Report outlines these and other gender impacts with a view 
toward ensuring they are redressed and not repeated as the USG moves forward with a strategy that seeks to 
ensure that women and sexual minorities are beneficiaries rather than casualties of its counter-terrorism policy.  
Fourth, a gender approach to counter-terrorism is necessary to ensure that governments and the human 
rights community fully address the rights of victims of terrorism.  Some have argued that the human 
rights community’s response to the “War on Terror” undermines women’s rights by prioritizing responses 
to governments’ counter-terrorism measures over women’s experience of terrorism.23  This argument has 
manifested most publicly in the debate over Amnesty International’s advocacy relationship with former 
Guantánamo detainee and detainees’ rights advocate Moazzam Begg, arising out of the heatedly contested 
claims that he is “Britain’s most famous supporter of the Taliban” and that this fact makes Amnesty’s 
relationship with him ill-advised.24  It also re-surfaced following the American Civil Liberties Union/Center for 
Constitutional Rights’ representation of the family of suspected terrorist and target of the U.S. drone program 
Anwar Al-Awlaki, on the basis that Al-Awlaki has called for “large-scale murder of non-fundamentalist 
Muslims and other civilians” including women and “is still free to incite violence.”25  
At its core, this argument is that such relationships provide a platform for these individuals that either legitimizes 
or ignores the impact of terrorism on women and sexual minorities.26  The broader concern is that by focusing on 
male victims of States’ counter-terrorism measures, female victims of non-State (and particularly fundamentalist) 
violence get lost “in a world polarized between torture and terror.”27  At this point, it is indisputable that the 
human rights community and governments need to pay more attention to how terrorism undermines human 
rights, particularly for women and sexual minorities.28  The thornier issue is how this relates to the work that 
human rights organizations may simultaneously undertake on addressing violations that occur in countering 
terrorism.  A gender approach to counter-terrorism suggests that it is not only unnecessary, but also untenable, 
to choose between advocacy concerning the human rights impact of terrorism and counter-terrorism.  With that 
recognition at is core, this Report examines both the gender features and impacts of the USG’s counter-terrorism 
efforts and considers how these relate to gendered patterns in failures to protect women and LGBTI communities 
against terrorist violence.  In this way, the Report insists on a framework that examines State responsibility with 
respect to counter-terrorism while not freeing terrorists from accountability for violence.  Such a framework 
responds to the conditions in which women experience and combat terrorism in their communities.  Adopting 
such an approach makes clear, for example, that USG counter-terrorism measures cannot sideline women and 
sexual minorities by prioritizing partnerships that may be good for counter-terrorism but bad for human rights; 
nor can they barter rights to appease terrorist groups.29  
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Fifth, the failure to apply a gender lens to counter-terrorism symbolizes and provides insight into broader 
challenges concerning international law’s bias toward male victims of State civil and political rights violations.30 
In the United States and abroad, a focus on male victims of government policies of detention, rendition, 
and torture has displaced a focus on women and sexual minorities31 and marked a return to formalistic 
approaches to international law (e.g., with respect to the definition of torture) in ways that exclude the 
progressive application of the law to encompass gender-based violations.32  This idea that men suffer more 
than women—both numerically and in terms of the nature of rights violations—still persists in some circles 
of government and the human rights community.  This lopsided view is not new; it is one of the reasons 
why the international community historically failed to address women, peace, and security issues until the 
landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) in 2000.33  The processes of UNSCR 1325 and 
subsequent resolutions34 have exposed the multiple roles of women in conflict (as victims, human rights 
defenders, and combatants or fighters); relied on a definition of gender that takes into account biological 
differences and social constructs of masculinity and femininity; and shown how women and girls can benefit 
from the changed gender relations that conflict and post-conflict processes bring about.35  
All these observations are equally pertinent to the counter-terrorism context, yet governments and some parts 
of the human rights community have yet to carry over these hard-won lessons to the national security arena. 
This resistance was paramount in 2009, when the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism presented his groundbreaking report 
on gender and counter-terrorism to the U.N. General Assembly.36  Many Member States criticized the report 
for its use of a social, rather than biological, definition of gender and its documentation of the ways in which 
counter-terrorism undermined the rights of LGBTI individuals as well as those of women.37  However, as the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur noted: 
Understanding gender as a social and shifting construct rather than as a biological and fixed 
category is important because it helps to identify the complex and inter-related gender-based 
human rights violations caused by counterterrorism measures; to understand the underlying 
causes of these violations; and to design strategies for countering terrorism that are truly non-
discriminatory and inclusive of all actors.38  
At a time when the USG seeks to improve the rights of women and girls worldwide, it is critical to take this 
social, rather than biological definition of gender, which is used in much of international law and practice,39 
mandated by USAID,40 and adopted by institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),41 
and extend it to the realm of counter-terrorism to understand the gender stereotypes, norms, and dynamics 
that determine the effect of USG counter-terrorism at home and abroad.  
 
What Gender Means 
O ver view of  USG Counter-Terror ism
This Report analyzes USG counter-terrorism measures that the USG identifies as such.  This analysis does not 
assess whether measures are properly classified as being for the purposes of countering terrorism or scrutinize 
the often-problematic and broad definitions of terrorism that underlie such measures.42  However, the Report 
does assess the implications of the shift toward viewing certain activities (such as development) through a 
national security lens and the consequences of the USG’s holistic strategy where it is difficult to ascertain 
what, if any, government activities are not considered to be aiding counter-terrorism.  Indeed, the NSS 2010 
makes clear that the USG’s approach to countering terrorism is extremely multifaceted, encompassing 
defense, diplomacy, economic interests and institutions, development, homeland security, intelligence, 
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strategic communications, and the “American People and the Private Sector.”43  The breadth of these 
measures reflects a combination of what has been described as “tactical counterterrorism—taking individual 
terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, and thwarting conspiracies” and “strategic” counter-terrorism that 
seeks to counter violent extremism (CVE) and reduce terrorist recruitment.44  Through the latter, the USG 
seeks to enhance national security by “delegitimizing the violent extremist narrative in order to diminish its 
‘pull’; developing positive alternatives for youth vulnerable to radicalization to diminish the ‘push’ effect of 
grievances and unmet expectations; and building partner capacity to carry out these activities.”45  
Taken as a whole, the core elements of the USG’s counter-terrorism strategy include six areas that this Report 
examines: (1) development activities to counter the conditions that lead to violent extremism; (2) militarized 
counter-terrorism efforts; (3) anti-terrorism financing measures; (4) tactical counter-terrorism in terms of 
intelligence and law enforcement measures and cooperation; (5) border securitization and immigration 
enforcement; and (6) diplomacy and strategic communications.  Each section begins with a brief description 
of the contours of the USG’s efforts in the area concerned, then identifies and analyzes if the design of the 
counter-terrorism activity has gender features (such as through a particular focus on men or women) and 
the gender impacts that flow from such efforts.  The Report focuses on the United States, Middle East and 
North Africa, Africa, and Asia, and draws on comparisons with foreign governments’ (including the United 
Kingdom’s) counter-terrorism policies where appropriate.  
G ender :  Key  E lement s  and Terms 
There are a number of key concepts and obligations from international law that guide gender analysis of the 
USG’s counter-terrorism and national security measures.  International law requires governments to:
 ▶ Avoid adverse human rights impacts through the obligation to prohibit discrimination (both direct 
and indirect) on the proscribed grounds of sex, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity.46
 ▶ Ensure equality, both de jure (formal) and de facto (substantive) between men and women in 
the enjoyment of all civil and political rights.47
 ▶ Recognize that traditional stereotypes and attitudes (e.g., cultural attitudes) undermine the 
enjoyment of rights of women and ensure that such stereotypes are not used to justify violations 
of equality.48
 ▶ Assess how discrimination on the basis of sex, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity 
intersects with other grounds of discrimination, such as race, religion, and class, particularly in terms 
of impacts on Muslim, Arab, and South Asian (MASA) communities, and counter these effects.49
 ▶ Ensure participation of affected communities and that the rationale for inclusion is on the basis 
of equality and is rights protective.50
 ▶ Ensure the above obligations are exercised in all branches and levels of government, including in 
national security programs and national security institutions at the federal, state, and local levels.51
 ▶ Exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish gender-based violence by non-State 
actors, such as terrorists.52
These human rights obligations exist alongside a series of other guarantees relevant to the counter-terrorism 
context, including the right to life; the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment; non-refoulement and the transfers of terrorism suspects; liberty and security of the 
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person; due process and the right to a fair trial, freedom of expression and association; the right to privacy; 
and non-discrimination as it concerns profiling.53 
While there have recently been divisive debates at the U.N. over the meaning of the terms “gender” and 
“gender perspective,”54 such debates are out of step with the markedly consistent practice of government 
and inter-governmental entities that are directly tasked with gender and security issues.   In line with those 
agencies’ terms, drawing on USAID, U.N. Women, and NATO approaches, this Report uses the following 
definitions of key gender terms: 
 ▶ Gender: “Gender is a social construct that refers to relations between and among the sexes, 
based on their relative roles.  It encompasses the economic, political, and socio-cultural attributes, 
constraints, and opportunities associated with being male or female.  As a social construct, gender 
varies across cultures, is dynamic and open to change over time.  Because of the variation in gender 
across cultures and over time, gender roles should not be assumed but investigated.  Note that 
‘gender’ is not interchangeable with ‘women’ or ‘sex.’”55  In addition, gender relates to other ways of 
defining identity because: “Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context. Other important 
criteria for socio-cultural analysis include class, race, poverty level, ethnic group and age.”56
 ▶ Sex: “A biological construct that defines males and females according to physical characteristics 
and reproductive capabilities.”57
 ▶ Gender analysis: refers to the use of a range of methodologies for the “systematic gathering 
and analysis of information on gender differences and social relations to identify and understand 
the different roles, divisions of labor, resources, constraints, needs, opportunities/capacities, 
and interests of men and women (and girls and boys) in a given context.”58  For USAID, this 
involves asking two questions: “How will the different roles and status of women and men 
within the community, political sphere, workplace, and household (for example, roles in 
decision-making and different access to and control over resources and services) affect the work 
to be undertaken?” and “How will the anticipated results of the work affect women and men 
differently?”59  In this Report, gender blindness is used to refer to the absence of gender analysis, 
gender integration (see below), or a gender perspective (see below).
 ▶ Gender equality: “refers to the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women 
and men and girls and boys.  Equality does not mean that women and men will become the 
same but that women’s and men’s rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on 
whether they are born male or female.  Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and 
priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration, recognizing the diversity of 
different groups of women and men.”60
 ▶ Gender perspective: involves applying gender analysis to develop, implement, and assess 
activities, such as: “Examining each issue from the point of view of men and women to identify 
any differences in their needs and priorities, as well as in their abilities or potential to promote 
peace and reconstruction.”61
 ▶ Gender integration: “involves identifying and then addressing gender differences and inequalities 
during program and project planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.”62
 
In addition, in circumstances where USG counter-terrorism measures implicate women’s peace and security 
concerns, the landmark UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions provide key guidance on how to ensure a 
gender perspective is incorporated into conflict prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery 
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efforts.63  One such clear area is where USG counter-terrorism is militarized, ranging from the Department 
of Defense’s (DoD) operations and engagements with counter-terrorism objectives (such as those in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq) to military-to-military assistance and civilian-military cooperation in non-kinetic 
(or non-combat) environments such as Kenya and the Philippines.  Other areas where UNSCR 1325 will 
be relevant include where the USG provides support (for example, as part of peacekeeping missions) for 
security-sector reform, where there are significant challenges in ensuring gender-sensitive reform of national 
security institutions.64  The USG has recently explicitly linked UNSCR 1325 to its NSS 2010 on the basis of the 
latter’s recognition (mentioned above) that “countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are 
accorded full and equal rights and opportunity.  When those rights and opportunities are denied, countries 
lag behind.”65  Further to this observation, the USG is in the process of developing its National Action Plan 
to implement UNSCR 1325,66 which provides a key opportunity to ensure that counter-terrorism activities 
within its scope incorporate a gender perspective (see further Section III).  
 
Strategic Gendering: the USG on Women and National Security
 
“Pres ident  Obama and I  bel ieve  that  the  subjug ation o f  women is  a  threat  to  the  national 
secur ity  o f  the  United States .”  
S ecretar y  o f  State  Hi l lar y  Cl inton,  March 2010 67 
 
Tracing the Nexus 
In President Obama’s May 2011 speech on “a new approach to promoting democratic reform, economic 
development, and peace and security” in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), he emphasized that 
the United States would seek to “empower women as drivers of peace and prosperity, supporting their right 
to run for office and meaningfully participate in decision-making because, around the world, history shows 
that countries are more prosperous and peaceful when women are more empowered.”68  As mentioned 
above, this concept is embodied in the NSS 2010 and this reference in NSS 2010 is the explicit basis of many 
USG policy statements on the link between women, girls, and national security, including from Secretary 
Clinton and Melanne Verveer, Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women’s Issues.69  However, both prior to 
and after the NSS 2010, Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Verveer have more extensively articulated the 
USG’s perspective on how the treatment of women and girls relates to U.S. national security interest in two 
key ways.
First, these statements have emphasized a concern that gender inequality leads to or is symptomatic of 
instability, lack of democracy, and poor governance, where extremism can more readily take hold.  For 
example, in 2009, Secretary Clinton noted: “A society that denies and demeans women’s rights and roles is a 
society that is more likely to engage in behavior that is negative, anti-democratic and leads to violence and 
extremism,”70 and more recently that, “I am often asked why on earth do I believe that women and girls are 
a national security issue.  Well, I believe it because I know that where girls and women are oppressed, where 
their rights are ignored or violated, we are likely to see societies that are not only unstable, but hostile to our 
own interests.”71  In March 2011, Ambassador Verveer further noted:
We know that the most dangerous places in the world are more often than not the most 
dangerous places for women, where women are denied their rights and oppressed.  These 
are the places that are unstable, and where extremism often takes hold.  It is no surprise that 
President Obama’s National Security Strategy notes that in our experience, “countries are more 
peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full and equal rights and opportunity.”  
Countries that nurture terrorists are disproportionately those places where women have been 
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most marginalized, where women don’t have a place in the economy or political life of the 
country, or in their society more generally.  These are issues that impact on our own national 
security.  This link to national security is an important one, and it’s one of the reasons that we 
are also focused on the role that women play in ending conflict.  Women are essential in efforts 
to reconstruct and rebuild societies.72 
Second, in other statements, Secretary Clinton goes further and explicitly identifies gender inequality as an 
inherent marker of terrorism, noting in 2009:
Part of the reason I have pursued it [the link between national security and women’s issues] as 
secretary of state is because I see it in our national security interest.  If you look at where we are 
fighting terrorism, there is a connection to groups that are making a stand against modernity, 
and that is most evident in their treatment of women.  What does preventing little girls from 
going to school in Afghanistan by throwing acid on them have to do with waging a struggle 
against oppression externally?  It’s a projection of the insecurity and the disorientation that a 
lot of these terrorists and their sympathizers feel about a fast-changing world, where they turn 
on television sets and see programs with women behaving in ways they can’t even imagine.  The 
idea that young women in their own societies would pursue an independent future is deeply 
threatening to their cultural values.73  
The Nexus  in  Practice :  Women’s  Inclus ion and R ight s  as  Counter-Terror ism 
The corollary of the USG’s emphasis on how gender inequality contributes to insecurity is to call for greater 
promotion of women’s rights as part of the USG’s national security strategy.  This call is encapsulated in 
Ambassador Verveer’s statement that, “[r]aising the status of women would go a long way toward keeping 
states from failing and terrorists from winning.”74  
One of the main ways this manifests in USG policy is through a commitment to strengthen women’s 
participation at all levels of government.75  This includes identifying female partners around the world and 
supporting their activities.76  This emphasis on enhancing women’s participation most explicitly appears in 
USG policy in Afghanistan,77 but more recently the USG has also emphasized the need to integrate women 
in the current transitions in MENA.78  In general terms, according to Secretary Clinton, participation is a 
“necessary global security imperative.  Including women in the work of peace advances our national security 
interests.”79  This emphasis on participation reflects the USG’s broader policy position that women should 
not be seen merely as passive recipients of its programs.  Instead, the QDDR particularly emphasizes that 
in integrating gender into development and diplomacy activities, “women are at the center…not simply as 
beneficiaries, but also as agents of peace, reconciliation, development, growth, and stability.”80  
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Unpacking the USG’s  L inkages 
It is important to unpack the basis on which the USG seeks to include women in national security measures 
to ensure it does not rely on or perpetuate stereotypes of women.92  While many USG statements (as above) 
recognize that women are agents and drivers of change in their communities, in other cases, the USG relies 
on the stereotype that women are inherently more peaceful and moderate influences in a community as 
the basis for seeking their inclusion in national security efforts.  For example, in a 2009 meeting, in response 
to a question about the strongest case that could be made that educating women will combat extremism, 
Ambassador Verveer noted that women are on the “front lines of moderation” and that “to the extent that 
Box 1.  Women, National Security institutions, and USG 
Security Assistance in Practice
In terms of how the above emphasis translates into practice, according to the DoS Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), there has been a comprehensive push to enhance 
participation of women in all aspects of the USG’s national security assistance.81  The S/CT 
explains that the presence of women in national security institutions (as opposed to more 
typical government portfolios occupied by women) enables them to be a stabilizing force for 
government and means they may be less willing to compromise on gender equality when it 
comes to dealing with terrorist organizations.82  According to the S/CT, this, alongside leadership 
training for women working in areas afflicted by terrorism, enables women in those communities, 
as opposed to the USG, to be the public voice against terrorism, which helps to chip away at the 
ideas that national security issues only affect men and that women are incapable of participating 
in decisions on national security.83  According to the S/CT, it is important that counter-terrorism 
training of women also engages men, including by working with male supervisors, to ensure that 
after receipt of USG training, women officials are productively used in the field.84  The S/CT states 
that in some cases, stressing the utility or benefit of including women as a means to counter 
terrorism can also serve to counter the notion that women’s participation is a Western import 
or notion.85  
While USG interviewees pointed to efforts to encourage women’s participation in security 
trainings86—including through engagement with partner militaries and, as a matter of the United 
States leading by example, ensuring that women’s participation in leadership and advisory positions 
is encouraged throughout the U.S. military87—it was felt that it was difficult to achieve gender 
balance given the male-dominated nature of many national security, law enforcement and military 
institutions.88  This challenge is compounded by the failure to either make gender a criterion in 
selecting participants for USG trainings89 or to have gender be a specific or separate focus in 
curriculum (e.g., USG officials indicated there are no trainings dedicated to gender through the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) or International Law Enforcement Academies 
(ILEA) and that if and when gender came up it would be through aspects of training that deal 
more generally with human rights or in terrorism case studies).90  In the work of other DoS offices, 
such as the Office of the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, there is a strong focus on 
promoting women’s inclusion in decision-making processes, although, according to the Office, this 
is seen as a separate agenda from promoting women’s rights per se, which is the mandate of the 
Ambassador at Large for Global Women’s Issues.91
21A  D e c A D e  L o s t
women are invested in and educated it makes a great deal of difference in terms of the futures of those 
countries and the forces that succeed and don’t succeed.”93  In other interviews CHRGJ conducted, most 
notably with DoS officials and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USG officials reflected the 
need for complexity on this point, noting, for example, that mothers could be either a positive or negative 
influence on their male family members in terms of extremism.94
This role of mothers in preventing terrorism is a recurring aspect of the USG’s linking of women and national 
security.  For example, the U.S. Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security and Multilateral Affairs has 
noted that: “Due to their positions in their families, women can exert a stabilizing influence and empower 
individuals to be able to resist violent extremist propaganda and radicalization that can lead to terrorism.”95 
Other USG statements reflected on the need to include women on a number of different bases.  For 
example, according to the Office of the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, women have a 
critical role to play in countering violent extremism and in developing the counter-narrative to extremism, 
because of their influence in the community and their importance in the home as mothers.96  According 
to the S/CT, while it is important to recognize the role of mothers, it is also important to make it clear that 
women have a role beyond this, that fathers also have a role, and that women’s inclusion benefits everyone 
and not just women and children.97  
Other USG statements have linked women’s increased empowerment and economic prosperity to national 
security.  For example, according to the U.S. Deputy Coordinator for Homeland Security and Multilateral 
Affairs: “Providing opportunities for women to apply their skills and share their knowledge can drive social 
and economic progress that not only brings material benefits to their families and societies, but has a 
derivative effect that increases ideological moderation.”98  In interviews with CHRGJ, USG officials with 
Pakistan expertise similarly noted that over the long term, increasing women’s economic status (such as 
through better access to finance) helps increase women’s clout in their community and their families and 
ensures that their children do better in school and therefore are less vulnerable to extremism.99  Other USG 
officials have stressed this link between women’s economic prosperity and national security in more broad 
terms.  For example, in relation to Afghanistan specifically, the USG identifies “women’s empowerment as 
critical to unleashing the full economic potential of the Afghan people.”100  In addition, the Secretary of 
State’s International Fund for Women and Girls is premised on the idea that investing in women and girls is 
an “investment in peace, security, democracy, and prosperity.”101
Taking Stock: the USG’s Record on Gender and Counter-Terrorism
 
Parameters  for  Engender ing Counter-Terror ism
While this Report analyzes the gender dimensions and impacts of the USG’s counter-terrorism efforts, it 
does not directly comprehensively address the different and difficult question of whether evidence supports 
the USG’s claim that promoting the norm of gender equality counters terrorism.  The inability to fully 
answer that question at this stage owes to many factors.  First, assessing causal claims is very difficult when 
empirical evidence, as in this area, is scarce.  Second, such claims seek to situate gender equality in a security 
frame and thus risk redefining the gender equality agenda in light of national security objectives, making the 
assessment of the claim even more complicated.  Third, there is a lack of clarity around contested meanings 
of key terminology (such as gender, terrorism, and counter-terrorism); clarity about such terms is needed 
to address this question empirically.  Finally, research in this field is nascent at best, making it necessary to 
establish some foundational points for such an analysis, should it be undertaken.  
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Accordingly, this Report instead provides these foundational points by identifying and analyzing the ways 
in which the USG is thinking about gender in its counter-terrorism efforts, and identifying and assessing 
the gender-based human rights impacts of these measures.  Following this approach, our research leads to 
the following essential observations to frame a nuanced understanding of the relationship between gender, 
terrorism, and counter-terrorism:
 ▶ First, counter-terrorism measures will inadvertently punish, rather than protect, women 
and sexual minorities unless careful attention is paid to the underlying gender dynamics 
in which counter-terrorism measures are developed, implemented, and assessed.  From 
CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops and broader research, these dynamics relate to: (1) the negative 
impacts, both globally and locally, of USG counter-terrorism activities, including those that 
occur through actual or perceived cooperation with domestic governments; (2) women and 
sexual minorities’ experience with terrorism in their communities, both as victims of terrorism 
and as leaders in the effort to shield their communities from terrorist violence; and (3) specific 
gendered relations, division of labor, roles and responsibilities, and access to resources within 
the community, including in light of the impacts of both counter-terrorism and terrorism.  
These gendered dynamics—squeezing and polarization, bartering, skepticism, instrumentaliza-
tion, backlash, and stereotypes—are explored further below.  
 ▶ Second, while the Report does not make the claim that promoting gender equality 
will counter terrorism, it does establish that the failure to take account of gender in 
the design, implementation, and assessment of measures to combat terrorism will 
undermine the extent to which such measures can achieve their stated goals.  In many 
of the case studies and examples cited in this Report, the USG counter-terrorism measures that 
were gender-blind or discriminatory were not only bad for the human rights of men, women and 
sexual minorities, but also comprised the efficacy of these efforts and therefore the USG’s broader 
imperative to protect the human rights of whole populations from the threat of terrorism.
 ▶ Third, gender equality and non-discrimination are integral to a number of tools 
regarded as essential to countering terrorism.  Gender equality and non-discrimination 
are part of the corpus of human rights, fundamental freedoms, and rule of law, the general 
respect for which the U.N. has repeatedly emphasized as being “the fundamental basis of the 
fight against terrorism”102 and “an essential part of a successful counter-terrorism effort.”103  The 
increasing emphasis on the role of terrorism victims and survivor networks to combat terrorism 
also involves a corollary increase in the involvement of women and LGBTI individuals.104  
Finally, as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism notes, a “gender perspective is also integral 
to combating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,” including the “dehumanization 
of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations…discrimination, political exclusion, 
socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance.”105
The G endered E xp er ience of  USG Counter-Terror ism:  Patterns  to  Date 
CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops and broader research identify the following key trends as critical to 
understanding the underlying gender dynamics in which current USG counter-terrorism efforts occur and 
which shape the impacts of these efforts.  These gendered dynamics are complex, reflecting and enabling 
insight into both the actual impacts of prior and current USG actions and the USG’s failure to protect women 
and sexual minorities from terrorism, alongside core perceptions of advocates and communities about both. 
In light of these dynamics, participants in the Stakeholder Workshops also shared their perspectives on 
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the potential gendered impacts of the USG’s 
present emphasis on women and national 
security.  
S queez ing  and Polar ization
USG counter-terror ism post-9/11 has 
been characterized by a discourse of 
exceptionalism, militarization, and significant 
rights abuse.106  Many of the participants in 
CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops expressed 
their concern about the over-reach of the 
USG’s “War on Terror,” the USG’s failure to 
provide a clear definition of what constitutes 
terrorism, and the related tendency to 
categorize a wide range of legitimate activities 
as terrorism.107  The USG’s “War on Terror” 
and counter-terrorism measures more broadly 
have had direct impacts on women and sexual 
minorities that this Report explores.  However, 
in addition to such direct impacts, these 
measures have also fostered an environment 
marked by increased Islamophobia and vilification of Muslim communities that also affects the rights of 
women and sexual minorities.  
First, participants in all of the Stakeholder Workshops, and in some USG and foreign government interviews, noted 
that the “selectiveness” and “arbitrariness” of USG counter-terrorism, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, had 
“promoted identity-based politics,” “empowered extremist groups,” “created more terrorism,” and emboldened 
extremist narratives in their communities.108  Indeed, from Somalia to Pakistan to Afghanistan to Iraq, there are 
countless examples of how terrorists undermine the rights of women and sexual minorities and how the USG’s 
counter-terrorism response fails to protect and can make things worse.109  For example, in Somalia, Al-Shabaab—
an entity the USG designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 2008110—recently increased its violations 
of women’s rights by imposing dress restrictions,111 instructing that women “cannot shake any male’s hands in 
public, travel on their own, sell anything or work in an office,”112 closing women’s organizations,113 and subjecting 
women to rape, forced marriage, and beheading.114  However, USG counter-terrorism actions have exacerbated 
rather than helped this situation.  For example, Somali women report that the U.S.-supported invasion of Somalia 
in late 2006 squeezed women leaders between Al-Shabaab and the Transitional Federal Government, such that 
“it seems the United States, in its pursuit of the war on terror, unwittingly played a role in sending Mogadishu’s 
women back to an era they thought they had left behind forever.”115  Most recently, the USG’s significant 
cuts to humanitarian aid to Somalia (for fear it would be diverted to Al-Shabaab), has wreaked havoc on the 
humanitarian crisis there, with disproportionate impact on women and girls.116  Our Stakeholder Workshops also 
provided numerous examples of where terrorists may use the impacts of USG counter-terrorism to limit the rights 
of women in their communities.  For example, according to a national security expert at our MENA Stakeholder 
Workshop, Al-Qaeda propaganda has stated that the USG’s drones in Yemen are taking photos of women, which 
could be used as an excuse to limit women’s movement outside the home.117
Second, the overall marginalization of Muslim communities puts increased pressure on women within those 
communities to keep silent about their rights.  This is particularly true where the USG (and in some cases, 
terrorists) paints gender equality as the very marker of difference between the “West” and terrorists.118  For 
Muslim protesters gather at a large anti-war rally in Union Square on 
April 9, 2011 in New York City. Thousands of protesters called for the U.S. 
to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a large Muslim contingent 













24 A  D e c A D e  L o s t
example, one participant at our Asia Stakeholder Workshop noted that in India:
Muslim women’s groups are constantly in limbo as we are always told this is not the right time…
when the entire Muslim community is under threat there is very little space to articulate rights 
because there is a feeling that you can’t make complaints to the police.  As a result Muslim 
women’s rights groups are very frustrated.119 
Another participant in the Asia Stakeholder Workshop noted that in Malaysia:
NGOs questioning Muslim laws and women are seen as being Western funded and there is also 
a perception that if something explodes into a big issue then what is essentially a race, religion, 
or community issue will be seen as a security one.  Therefore, the women’s organizations can’t 
take many things to that new level.120  
Further, according to a Palestinian LGBTI activist at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop, “the Palestinian 
struggle says to focus on the national struggle first, and the time for the LGBT struggle will come later.”121 
USG counter-terrorism actions that create or reinforce an “us-versus-them” narrative with gender equality at 
its fulcrum hinder women’s and sexual minorities’ advocacy, including advocacy against terrorism.  
Third, the Report records a number of examples of where the USG or USG-assisted countries lack gender-sensitive 
mechanisms to properly distinguish between terrorists and their victims and thereby re-victimize those who 
suffer at the hands of terrorist violence.122  This is the case, for example, with USG policies that bar asylum 
to females forced to provide domestic service to terrorism or treat trafficked persons as potential national 
security threats rather than human rights victims.123  It is also incumbent on the human rights community to 
properly understand and address the rights of victims of terrorism in these ways.124
B arter ing
This concern emerges on two levels: governments bartering the rights of women and sexual minorities with 
terrorists and governments privileging counter-terrorism relationships with coercive governments over their poor 
human rights record.  First, as noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, “some Governments have used gender inequality to 
counter terrorism, employing the rights of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals 
as a bartering tool to appease terrorist or extremist groups in ways that have furthered unequal gender relations 
and subjected such persons to increased violence.”125  For example, in February 2009, following the Pakistani army’s 
failure to defeat an eighteen-month Taliban insurgency in the Swat Valley, Pakistan signed a peace accord with 
the militants agreeing to implement the Taliban’s version of Islamic law, which would curtail women’s rights, in 
exchange for peace.126  While the official USG stance was to publicly denounce the deal,127 reports indicate the 
USG privately supported its formation.128  In June 2010, Amnesty International reported that the deal resulted in 
severely curtailed women’s rights.129  In Iraq, the USG has similarly inadequately pressed the Iraqi government to 
address the targeting of LGBTI individuals by militias and State actors.130  
Second, to advance its counter-terrorism interests, the USG has invested significantly in authoritarian 
regimes,131 favoring security interests over democracy, human rights, and the development of civil society, 
including women’s groups.132  These impacts continue to reverberate with the uncertainty over whether 
the kinds of transitions seen in the Arab Spring will usher in a new era of rights protections for women and 
LGBTI individuals133 and how the USG will approach women’s and LGBTI issues in its engagement with new 
power brokers in countries where they may not have the upper hand and where equality agendas may not be 
popular.134  Most recently the USG has itself, somewhat nebulously, acknowledged that its counter-terrorism 
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strategy relies on “Accepting Varying Degrees of Partnership,” such that: 
In some cases partnerships are in place with countries with whom the United States has very 
little in common except for the desire to defeat al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates and adherents.  These 
partners may not share U.S. values or even our broader vision of regional and global security.  Yet 
it is in our interest to build habits and patterns of CT cooperation with such partners, work ing 
to push them in a direction that advances CT objectives while demonstrating through our 
example the value of upholding human rights and responsible governance.135
As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, these forms of bartering are deeply antithetical to human rights: “The 
bartering of human rights in the name of countering terrorism erroneously suggests that human rights are 
optional and is fundamentally inconsistent with the State’s obligation to ensure human rights protections to 
all persons within its jurisdiction.”136
Skepticism
Among some women and LGBTI groups (particularly in the Middle East, but also in Africa and Asia) there is some 
caution and skepticism regarding the USG’s recent linking of gender equality and counter-terrorism objectives. 
For some of the Stakeholder Workshop participants, this concern was not so much about the idea that women’s 
empowerment is necessary to achieve security objectives, but more about how the Obama Administration’s 
focus on promoting gender equality relates to the Bush Administration’s invocation of women’s rights as a 
justification for invading Afghanistan, which compromised women’s rights there.137  To put it more starkly, 
there was concern about whether the USG’s current link between women and national security was genuine, 
followed by immediate questions about the extent to which the link was based on harmful stereotypes, such 
as gender inequality in Muslim communities.  One Iraqi women’s rights advocate at our MENA Stakeholder 
Workshop reflects her frustration with the USG’s hollow emphasis on women’s rights as follows: “The United 
States’ propaganda of ‘saving nations from themselves’ is full of big titles but empty content like ‘women’s rights.’ 
The Bush Administration said they would free Iraqi women from the torture chambers and then they used the 
same torture chambers.”138  Participants at CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops also identified other examples of how 
focusing on equality in the context of countering terrorism (either by the USG or its counter-terrorism partners) 
is not always benign and may distract from wholesale rights abuses.  For example, several LGBTI groups argue that 
the portrayal of Israel as a gay-friendly nation diverts attention from its human rights abuses.139
Instrumental ization
Closely linked to the above concern was an apprehension that under the USG’s new emphasis on women and 
national security, women’s empowerment and women’s movements would be valued only to the extent that they 
could help achieve national security objectives.  Participants in all of the Stakeholder Workshops stressed that equality 
for women and sexual minorities should be a goal in and of itself, regardless of whether it contributes to broader 
national security objectives, which it well may.140  Participants also called on the USG to realize its commitment to 
women in practice.  For example, it was often stressed that participation is an important starting point for achieving 
gender equality, but that it is not enough, particularly where that participation may constitute token representation. 
There are concerns, such as in Afghanistan, that female representatives are proxies for conservative voices and are 
not representing women’s issues, and that in Iraq the USG is accessing only a small segment of the women’s rights 
community.141  In 2007, an International Women Leaders Global Security Summit similarly emphasized this need 
for genuine and transformative participation of women, noting: “Women’s expertise and leadership from across the 
world should be mobilized to help ensure a more holistic and inclusive approach to address the threats of terrorism. 
‘The key recommendation for women leaders is the transformation of perceptions, priorities and alliances.’”142
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B acklash
In addition, CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops raised questions about how the USG’s identifying of the link 
between gender and counter-terrorism affects women’s and sexual minority rights programming on the 
ground.  Participants in the Stakeholder Workshops were at pains to stress that the dangers that exist when 
women’s and LGBTI rights programming is seen as a Western agenda would be amplified if it also had (or 
was perceived to have) a counter-terrorism nexus.  For example in Afghanistan, Taliban leader Mullah Omar 
issued orders in July 2010 calling on Taliban fighters to “capture and kill any Afghan women who are helping 
or providing information to coalition forces.”143  The Stakeholder Workshops indicated that the danger of 
backlash is enduring, such that the risk is present where it known or perceived—either at the time of the 
inception of activities or later—that organizations are receiving USG money or training for particular activities. 
Stereotyping
Terrorism and counter-terrorism narratives have both mobilized and reinforced stereotypes around men, 
women, and sexual minorities.144  These stereotypes are also heavily racialized and include, for example, ideas 
about Muslim women as passive, subordinate, moderate, and maternal.145  Such stereotypes can either sideline 
Muslim women in efforts to combat violent extremism146 or lead to their inclusion in ways that may perpetuate 
these stereotypes, such as focusing on the role of women as mothers to combat terrorism or portraying 
women as inherently peaceful.147  The use of these stereotypes can be extremely harmful.  As one participant 
in the Africa Stakeholder Workshop noted, the idea that Muslim mothers are responsible for turning their sons 
away from terrorists inherently implies that Muslim mothers “breed terrorists.”148  In all regional Stakeholder 
Workshops there was also a concern that this focus on supporting mothers to combat violent extremism could 
cause backlash if their sons or male family members nonetheless went on to commit terrorist acts.  Further, 
the idea that women’s and LGBTI rights are Western or foreign—a notion that informs both terrorism and 
counter-terrorism narratives—serves to undermine the efforts of local activists who argue that gender equality 
and rights protection is not imported but rather indigenous to local communities.149  Finally, stereotypes 
about Muslim men (e.g., as misogynist, and particularly homophobic) are rife and have informed the USG’s 
development of interrogation techniques in Guantánamo Bay and beyond to the detriment of human rights.150
Moving Forward: Ten Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
In addition to the specific recommendations identified in this Report’s six areas of focus, the following general 
themes should guide all USG programming on counter-terrorism generally and on gender and counter-terrorism 
specifically.  These themes primarily build on recommendations made in the Stakeholder Workshops and are 
identified with a view to ensuring that the USG takes account of the different ways in which its counter-terrorism 
efforts impact men, women, and sexual minorities in order to: recognize and redress gender-based human 
rights impacts from prior actions; ensure positive human rights impacts moving forward; and to guarantee that 
the rights of everyone—particularly women and sexual minorities—are safeguarded from terrorism and that 
USG counter-terrorism responses do not compound its pernicious effects.  The Report recommends:  
1. Gender is not synonymous with “sex” or women.  Within the USG, this has been most explicitly 
recognized in USAID policy151 and should be incorporated into all other USG counter-terrorism 
institutions, policies and activities to ensure the USG is able to fully comprehend the ways in which 
its counter-terrorism measures have differentially impacted men, women, and sexual minorities; to 
tailor the appropriate redress to fully address these impacts; and to ensure that moving forward its 
counter-terrorism policy does not undermine rights and reinforce identities built around harmful 
stereotypes about masculine and feminine behavior, including in certain religions or cultures.  
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2. Gender really counts.  To realize the full human rights and potential of women and girls 
and mobilize the genuine support of grassroots organizations, the USG needs to more closely 
articulate the basis on which it is linking women’s status and rights to counter-terrorism; remove 
any actual or perceived reliance on harmful stereotypes (such as women as victims, Islam as 
oppressive to women, and women’s utility only as mothers); and demonstrate that its link can 
help rather than hinder the enjoyment of gender equality.  In addition, to demonstrate the 
genuine nature of this commitment to gender equality, it is extremely important to ensure that 
other parts of the USG’s counter-terrorism strategies do not inadvertently penalize activities in 
ways that make the USG’s stated commitment to gender equality seem hollow.  One key way in 
which this can be done is to reconcile the USG’s focus on a holistic strategy to combat terrorism 
with anti-terrorism financing rules that in practice circumscribe the range of actors and activities 
that can be mobilized to combat terrorism and undermine the rights of women and sexual 
minorities.152  It also entails the USG rejecting all practices of bartering—from bartering to appease 
terrorist groups to intelligence partnerships with nations that do not respect human rights, to 
even more subtle forms of bartering in which the USG promotes “moderate” or “credible voices” 
in a community that may be persuasive to those susceptible to radicalization but inimical to the 
rights of women and girls.153  Instead, the USG should seek to create open spaces for dialogue and 
promote a narrative based on human rights, rule of law, and equality for all.154 
3. Enhance gender equality because it is the right thing to do.  It is also incumbent on the USG 
to make it clear that supporting gender analysis and gender equality is not just the smart thing to do, 
but the right thing to do, regardless of whether it achieves counter-terrorism objectives (which it well 
may).  In other words, the USG should emphasize that gender equality is an end in and of itself that 
may lead to achieving concrete counter-terrorism objectives, but will not under any circumstances be 
sacrificed to achieve them.  In many of our interviews with USG (and some foreign) officials, there was 
a preoccupation with discussing the evidentiary basis for incorporating gender considerations into 
counter-terrorism and with the need to identify examples of whether, and how, incorporating gender 
into national security actually works in terms of enhancing security.  There is a perception that this 
evidence base is needed, particularly in agencies like the DoD, to ensure that gender analysis and gender 
equality goals are part and parcel of counter-terrorism activities.  While appreciating that emphasizing 
gender analysis and equality in this way has strategic value, the underlying equality rationale for including 
women and sexual minorities also needs to be stressed, not only because it will affect the shape of 
programs adopted, but also because without it, it will not be possible to mobilize the broad-based 
participation of women and LGBTI groups that USG national security policies contemplate.
4. Gender matters outside DoS and USAID—no gender siloing.  In contrast to the high-level 
policy emphasis—including in NSS 2010—on integrating women and girls in national security, by far the 
majority of USG counter-terrorism officials (with some notable exceptions identified below) surveyed 
for this Report did not think that gender considerations were relevant to their mandates and, when 
they did, it was only to the extent that it could be shown that integrating a gender perspective could 
enhance national security (see above).  In addition, for some agencies, such as the DoD, it was thought 
that to the extent that gender was relevant, this should be identified primarily through consultation 
with the DoS or USAID in the inter-agency processes that inform counter-terrorism efforts.  However, 
CHRGJ’s research demonstrates that the inter-agency process is an insufficient safeguard for ensuring 
that gender is on the radar of USG decision-makers when agencies such as USAID, with clearly articulated 
gender mandates, in practice rarely integrate a coherent gender perspective into their development 
activities designed to counter violent extremism.155  Moving forward, the USG cannot silo its gender 
and national security objectives and instead must work toward integrating a gender perspective in both 
intra- and inter-agency activities designed to counter terrorism domestically and abroad.  
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5. Broaden focus beyond women and girls to include LGBTI rights.  While many USG 
counter-terrorism institutions and implementing partners interviewed for this Report were 
at least open to discussing the gender dimensions and impacts of USG counter-terrorism on 
women, very few could envision how the rights of sexual minorities were at all relevant to USG 
counter-terrorism measures.  There is a huge information gap in governments and the broader 
human rights community as to how counter-terrorism measures implicate and affect LGBTI 
individuals and organizations.  This Report surfaces some of these dimensions, but much remains 
to be done in consultation with the local LGBTI rights movements that are best positioned to 
assess the impacts of any USG action in their communities.
6. Integrate gender into counter-terrorism and countering-violent extremism 
measurement and evaluative tools.  USG officials interviewed for this Report almost 
universally articulated the immense challenge in measuring the effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
measures, particularly where the measures are preventive, such as through development work 
to counter the conditions that lead to extremism or strategic communications to diminish 
the pull of extremist ideology.156  For example, in the context of measuring the impact of 
strategic communications, according to CHRGJ’s interview with the USG’s Center for Strategic 
Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC), the question of whether a particular exchange makes 
a difference is difficult to answer, and devices such as polling cannot accurately measure it.157  
This challenge is not unique to the United States.  The recent review and reissuance of the U.K.’s 
Prevent strategy, which seeks to “stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism,”158 
noted: “Evaluating preventative programmes is inherently challenging.  Success is often reflected 
in changing attitudes as much as behaviours, attitudes which are complex to measure and assess” 
and concluded that there had been “limited quality control” of Prevent activity.159  
From a gender and human rights perspective, compounding this general challenge of “quality 
control,” is the USG’s failure to integrate gender into those counter-terrorism and CVE measurement 
and evaluative tools that do exist.  It is striking, for example, that in no counter-terrorism program 
surveyed for this Report had the USG mandated collection and reporting on sex-disaggregated 
indicators in its outputs and outcomes.  This was the case despite the fact that some agencies—
most notably USAID—are mandated to undertake gender analysis that would include this and 
other elements.160  In addition, S/CT, the one counter-terrorism office where some personnel do 
have an explicit and strong gender focus, does not yet use a gender marker to evaluate the gender 
dimensions and impacts of its counter-terrorism measures, although it plans to develop one in 
the future.161  Both measurement efforts are essential and go hand-in-hand because effective 
counter-terrorism measures should protect the whole population from terrorism, including 
particularly women and LGBTI individuals who are regularly its victims.  There is a clear need to 
move toward both counter-terrorism indicators and evaluations and their explicit gendering in 
ways that are identified further and road-mapped in Sections II and VIII.   
7. Do no harm.  By and large, where gender is taken into account in USG programming, there 
is commendable and acute sensitivity to the risks that can attach to programs in this area, for 
example, of backlash to women’s groups working with the USG on countering terrorism.  For 
many USG officials across agencies, this risk is best mitigated by ensuring the USG footprint 
for an activity or program is light, and, for agencies such as the DoS, explicitly not engaging in 
a program that will put women at risk.162  The understanding across a number of agencies and 
USG implementing partners is that the lightness of the U.S. footprint is key both to ensuring 
the program is effective (and efficient) from a counter-terrorism perspective and the safety of 
women’s groups involved.163  This, and other examples discussed in the Report, demonstrates 
that gender and national security imperatives often point in the same direction. 
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8. Increase transparency and expand consultation on programs.  All USG programs to combat 
terrorism should be premised on consultation with women and sexual minorities, even when the 
program is not gender specific but instead directed at the community as a whole, such as “hearts and 
minds” activities that involve the building of schools and wells in at-risk communities.   Failing to do so, 
and instead, as the USG has done, consulting with existing decision-making structures, such as village 
elders or councils, may inadvertently serve to reinforce local gender hierarchies and could jeopardize 
the program’s effectiveness.164  Instead, modes of consultation in the design, implementation, and 
assessment phases for counter-terrorism actions should be gender sensitive and reflect local contexts, 
including through the potential use of third-party intermediaries like non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).165  The USG also needs to balance the risk of backlash with this need for broader transparency 
about USG programming.  In the words of one participant in CHRGJ’s Africa Stakeholder Workshop: 
“Communities are not stupid; they know that when the U.S. military turns up to build a well in a Somali 
community in Kenya that something else is going on.”166  Secrecy in these and other circumstances 
implies suspicious intent and generates ill-will that in the short term deters communities from 
participating in USG activities, and in the long term, further fortifies distrust of the United States.  
Further, participants in all of CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops stressed that USG programming should 
be responsive to the actual needs and preferences of women and sexual minorities as expressed in 
these consultative processes identified above.  For example, for women affected by the loss of male 
family members to terrorism or counter-terrorism, it may be more appropriate to provide services such 
as educational development and scholarships for children, medical services, trauma counseling, and 
life-skills training, or even resettlement to another town or a different country, rather than programs 
on conflict resolution, which are often the stock response of the USG and other governments.167  
9. De-securitize engagement with Muslim communities and turn the gaze inward.  Across 
all Stakeholder Workshops there was a concern that USG counter-terrorism policies consistently 
locate the problem of terrorism in Muslim communities worldwide, with severe implications for 
human rights.  While the USG is increasingly stating that it does not wish to securitize its relationship 
with Muslim communities in the United States and abroad,168 there is a resounding perception that 
action does not match this rhetoric, and that an enormous effort is required to undo the damage 
of the past ten years of USG counter-terrorism actions.  For example, participants from every 
region stressed local communities’ belief that the USG’s failure to strongly condemn Islamophobia 
or punish acts of violence against Muslims within the United States (such as the “Ground Zero 
Mosque” protests) or to take a strong stance against unlawful Israeli practices directly feeds into 
extremist messaging and undermines the work of gender activists in their communities.  It is unclear 
that the USG’s current emphasis on women and national security will help on this front—a number 
of participants in our Stakeholder Workshops stressed that this emphasis continues to approach 
women through the lens that their entire (Muslim) community is suspect.  Instead, participants in 
the Africa Stakeholder Workshop suggested that USG programming should be inward looking, and 
that the USG should take steps that show that it is seeking to educate its public about other parts 
of the world, rather than only working to change how the rest of the world sees the United States.  
10. “One size does not fit all” is not an excuse for gender blindness.  In a number of CHRGJ 
interviews for this Report, we were left with the impression that the difficulties or complexities of local 
contexts were often used as a reason to sideline a broader agency or inter-agency discussion about 
gender, terrorism and counter-terrorism.  Indeed,  while many of the recommendations in this Report 
stress the need to consider context and develop situation-specific programs, the Report nonetheless 
also points to a number of starkly similar gender patterns that emerge across both countries and 
regions, from the USG’s failure to adequately consult women and sexual minorities in counter-terrorism 
measures to the concerns about bartering of rights of women and sexual minorities to appease 
terrorists to the negative impact on female family members of post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures.  
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SECTiON ii: GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT ACTiViTiES TO 
COUNTER ViOLENT EXTREMiSM
Development as a Pillar of USG National Security Strategy
Under the Obama Administration, there has been an unparalleled and accelerated effort to emphasize the 
significance of development in U.S. counter-terrorism objectives and to expand activities that link the two 
objectives.  The NSS 2010 emphasizes the key role of development cooperation as a strategic investment 
in national security.169  On September 22, 2010, President Obama signed an unprecedented Presidential 
Policy Directive on Global Development to elaborate on this enhanced role of development.170  This 
Directive confirms that “development is vital to U.S. national security and is a strategic, economic, and 
moral imperative” and calls for “the elevation of development as a core pillar of American power” alongside 
diplomacy and defense efforts.171  On December 15, 2010, Secretary Clinton presented the first QDDR, 
which similarly reiterates the central importance of development (and diplomacy) in U.S. national security 
efforts and provides a blueprint for how the DoS and USAID can effectively advance these interests.172  The 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism further emphasizes the role of the USG in providing “focused foreign 
and development assistance abroad,” including in Pakistan and Yemen.173  Alongside USAID’s increased role 
in securing U.S. national security, the DoD has also extended its reach into the development realm in the 
name of countering violent extremism and terrorism,174 for example, to win the “hearts and minds” of at-risk 
populations, gain tactical access to communities, and mitigate underlying social, economic, and cultural 
factors thought to constitute a breeding ground for terrorism.175  The gendered dimensions and impacts of 
these shifts are explored further below.  
As a preliminary observation, it is important to note that this shift toward the use of development in service 
of national security is not unique to the USG.  As a result, many of the observations and lessons articulated 
in this section will be relevant to assess similar development activities of other governments, particularly 
those of Western countries.  However, some country-to-country variations do exist and should be taken 
into account when extrapolating lessons learned.  For example, the U.K. Department for International 
Development (DfID) has an important role in counter-terrorism (Prevent) strategy (i.e., its poverty-reduction 
work is seen to build resilience176 and contributes “upstream” to prevent violent extremism177); however, in 
contrast to USAID, DfID “does not fund Prevent activities directly”178 and does not report on CVE indicators 
because by statutory requirement all of its programs must have the overarching goal of poverty reduction.179 
Evolution of USAiD: Toward Gender, Toward National Security
 
In the past few years, USAID has undergone two significant and largely unrelated shifts: first, it has significantly 
strengthened gender analysis and integration in development programming, and second, as foreshadowed 
above, USAID’s importance to achieving U.S. national security has been elevated to unprecedented levels. 
These shifts are outlined separately in more detail below, followed by an analysis of the ways in which there 
has been little to no crossover between the two in practice, as well as inadequate attention as to how they 
should intersect at the analytical or policy level.  The result of these simultaneous but separate shifts is 
that there is markedly less gender analysis underpinning CVE programs than in traditional USAID programs, 
despite the clear gender dimensions and impacts of the shift toward USAID (and the DoD) undertaking 
development in aid of national security efforts.  
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USAID and G ender 
USAID recently reviewed and amended the Automated Directives System (ADS) to strengthen its gender 
integration in development programming.180  Gender analysis is now mandatory in the development of 
strategic plans, assistance objectives, and project-level analyses, and where it is determined “gender is not 
an issue,” this must be documented and explained.181  When gender is identified as an issue, this must be 
reflected in performance indicators, procurement requests, and the evaluation criteria to be used when 
determining grants and cooperative agreements to NGOs.182  USAID’s Evaluation Policy, released January 19, 
2011, also makes clear that “evaluation methods should use sex-disaggregated data and incorporate attention 
to gender relations in all relevant areas” and that evaluation procedures will incorporate “gender-sensitive 
indicators and sex-disaggregated data.”183  According to USAID’s Office of Gender Equality & Women’s 
Empowerment (formerly Office of Women in Development), gender is not just a “check the box”; it has to be 
integrated in programming from the start, and how it features depends on local context, including through 
avoiding the potential for backlash.184  USAID also appointed a new Senior Coordinator for Gender Equality 
and Women’s Empowerment in April 2011 as part of its institutional commitment to enhancing attention to 
gender.185  The ADS does not include guidance on when and how to integrate LGBTI issues into development 
programming, although some USAID activities do include LGBTI rights.186  Accordingly, although this Report 
is concerned with the differential gender dimensions and impacts of USG counter-terrorism on men, 
women, and sexual minorities, the remainder of this section applies gender analysis to focus primarily on 
how both USAID and DoD development programs differentially integrate and impact women and men and 
gender stereotypes more broadly.  
USAID and National  S ecur it y
USAID has taken a number of steps to realize its new and enhanced national security role as set out in 
the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development and the QDDR.187  USAID recently launched the 
reform effort USAID FORWARD “to transform its agency and unleash its full potential to achieve high-impact 
development,”188 and has also recently developed its “first-ever policy on the role of development assistance in 
countering violent extremism and counterinsurgency.”189  This policy was initially slated for release in February 
2011,190 but as of the time of publication is not publicly available.  There is an urgent need for such a policy 
within USAID.  CHRGJ’s interviews with USAID and implementing partners in Washington, D.C. and in the 
field reveal markedly different approaches to, and understanding of, the relationship between development 
assistance and combating violent extremism.  This manifests at the broad policy level, but also trickles down 
to the design and implementation of individual projects, where interviewees often expressed that it can be 
difficult to identify a sharp line between traditional development activities and those that seek to counter 
violent extremism.  In the words of one USAID official, when constructing a road in Iraq, the question is “is it a 
counter-terrorism road, economic growth road, conflict mitigation road, or community development road?”191
Development-National Security Nexus in Practice
USAID Pro grams to Counter  Vio lent  E xtremism 
Based on our interviews with USAID officials and implementing partners, there appear to be four ways in 
practice in which USAID activities relate to countering violent extremism.  
 ▶ First, USAID activities explicitly developed for the purpose of countering violent 
extremism and/or where countering violent extremism is the stated overarching 
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or driving frame for the project.  According to one USAID official, the number of these 
explicit CVE projects (as opposed to general projects that address broader factors that lead 
to recruitment) is so minimal “you could count them on one hand.”192  Based on interviews 
and secondary research, CHRGJ understands that these include: USAID’s Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)193 activities, such as its Peace for Development (PDEV) 
program in Niger and Chad (and previously in Mauritania),194 and USAID’s East Africa Regional 
Strategic Initiative (EARSI)195 activities, such as G-Youth in Garissa, Kenya, and the Shaqodoon 
Somalia: Somalia Youth Livelihood Program.196  Based on USG public statements, a number of 
USAID activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and in Yemen also 
have countering violent extremism as a dominant frame.  See Box 2 (USAID Activities with Strong 
Nexus to Countering Violent Extremism).
 ▶ Second, USAID activities in cooperation with the DoD in kinetic or active combat (e.g., 
with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan)197 and non-kinetic 
environments (e.g., Yemen198 and Philippines199) where the USG has a counter-terrorism 
or counter-insurgency objective.  The nature and extent of this cooperation varies depending 
on the context.  For example, in Kenya, USAID and the DoD each pursue development actions 
to combat violent extremism, but “USAID takes pains to distinguish their work to counter 
violent extremism from the counterterrorism actions of the military.”200  In other cases, the 
interaction between USAID and the DoD is both closer and institutionalized, such as in PRTs.  
 ▶ Third, USAID activities that contribute to mitigating the enabling environment for 
terrorism.    According to one USAID official, there are projects that are “specific” or “instrumental” 
CVE programs and others that are broader and more “developmental” and seek to address the 
broad drivers of violent extremism.201  The latter is part of the stated rationale for USAID activities, 
for example, in Bangladesh where USAID activities occur in the context of the U.S. Embassy’s overall 
strategy,202 and the USG’s “three critical priorities” are “democratization, development, and denial 
of space to terrorism.”203  In Bangladesh, USAID has addressed “the underlying social, demographic, 
and economic factors that threaten democratic governance and economic growth, and increase 
vulnerability to extremism” and notes the ways in which “extreme poverty and the frequency of 
natural disasters can destabilize the population and create favorable conditions for extremism to 
thrive.”204  In Sri Lanka, USAID stresses how projects, such as a 2008-2009 USAID-United States 
Pacific Command (PACOM) $2.4 million partnership to rehabilitate infrastructure in areas for 
returnees from conflict, “support the U.S. Government’s wider goal of helping to stabilize and 
develop eastern Sri Lanka so terrorism can never take root in the region again.”205  In Iraq, USAID 
has a program that works with civilian victims of Coalition military operations, including through 
work with widows on ensuring income substitutions for families that have lost their breadwinner.206  
According to USAID, while this program is not explicitly designed to reduce widows’ vulnerability 
to terrorist recruitment, it may have this secondary effect.207
 ▶ Fourth, USAID activities that are explicitly not directed toward countering violent 
extremism or terrorism.  One of the starkest examples of this is USAID’s new $30 million 
program in South Thailand to promote civil-society engagement and reconciliation.208  In 
interviews with CHRGJ, both USAID and its implementing partner Development Alternatives, 
Inc.  (DAI) clearly stressed that this is a conflict mitigation program and not a counter-terrorism or 
CVE project.209  It is understood that if the program was perceived to be a USG counter-terrorism 
initiative, this could undermine the project’s efficacy and potentially internationalize the current 
insurgency in South Thailand.210
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Box 2. USAiD Activities with Strong Nexus to Countering 
Violent Extremism 
USAID TSCTP Activ it ies  in  Chad ,  Niger,  and Mal i 
PDEV  
As part of the TSCTP, USAID West Africa manages PDEV in Chad and Niger.211  As of September 
2009, $27.267 million was scheduled for allocation to Chad, Niger, and Mauritania through 
PDEV.212  In FY 2010, USAID sought $32 million to support the expansion of PDEV, particularly to 
youth, and to potentially extend the program to Burkina Faso.213  The program is implemented 
by the Academy for Education Development (AED) and aims to mitigate the potential for 
terrorism and extremism in the Sahel region by “deter[ring] marginalized populations from 
contemplating destructive and hostile ideologies that advocate conflict resolution by violent 
means.”214  PDEV works in three key areas: improving local governance, empowering at-risk 
youth, and rendering violent ideologies redundant (including through radio programs),215 
with the latter seeking to create dialogue around, and to address, drivers of conflict and 
intolerance.216  Other activities include partnering with a local imam, which reportedly led to 
more than a dozen madrassas adopting a course focusing on peace and tolerance.217
Mali 
According to USAID, Mali is one of the three TSCTP countries “with the most robust 
counter-extremism programming.”218  Examples of these activities include: Shared Governance 
through Decentralization (Programme de Gouvernance Partagée 2 or PGP2), which supports 
decentralization in 152 target communities and is implemented by Management Systems 
International (MSI); the now-ended Radio for Peace Building in Northern Mali (RPNP, which 
supported TSCTP objectives by “promoting media freedom and de-legitimizing terrorist 
ideology in conflict-prone Northern areas”); and Trickle Up, which provides economic 
opportunities through microenterprise.219
USAID EARSI Activities: G-Youth, Kenya220 and Shaqodoon, Somalia 
Shaqodoon Somalia: Somalia Youth Livelihood Program is a USAID program implemented 
by the Education Development Center (EDC)221 that targets fourteen to twenty-four year-old 
“at-risk youth” for livelihood development in Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, and South 
Central.222  The program runs from September 2008 (it was officially launched in March 2009 
in Hargeisa)223 to September 2011, and has a grant of $9.3 million to reach 8,000 youth “to 
reduce insecurity by providing skills training and employment opportunities to high-risk youth 
through local community-based partners.”224
Pakistan Civilian Assistance Program
The USG has increasingly stated the need to invest in civilian infrastructure in Pakistan as a 
means to counter violent extremism.225  The USG pledged $750 million between 2007 and 
2011 toward development in the FATA, and on October 15, 2009, President Obama expanded 
this commitment when he signed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (also 
referred to as “Kerry-Lugar-Berman”), allocating $7.5 billion over five years (2010 to 2014) for 
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Mil itar y  D evelopment Activ it ies 
Alongside the increase in USAID activities to counter violent extremism, the U.S. military has also increasingly 
provided development assistance as a means to counter violent extremism and terrorism.  Some key 
examples of this engagement include:
 ▶ Asia: In the Philippines, PACOM’s239 U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSTOF-P) 
is a non-combat force whose mission since 2002 has been to “support the comprehensive 
approach of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their fight against terrorism in 
the southern Philippines.”240  The work of JSTOF-P focuses on humanitarian development 
in Mindanao province in Southern Philippines, with eighty percent of its effort constituting 
civil-military operations, such as repairing or building roads and airstrips, building schools, and 
providing medical clinics to change the conditions that foster extremism and provide safe havens 
for terrorists.241  Accordingly, “JSOTF-P reportedly has implemented over 150 construction 
projects worth $20 million, created livelihoods for former militants, and directly supported 
related USAID efforts.”242  USAID also has a large number of activities in Mindanao,243 working 
in close collaboration with other agencies such as the DoD,244 to focus on economic growth, 
conflict mitigation, and the promotion of peace and security, including through work with 
former combatants, building of infrastructure, and “strengthen[ing] community-based conflict 
management processes.”245  Notably, PACOM has characterized its Overseas Humanitarian, 
Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) as “a critical element in PACOM’s comprehensive approach 
non-military aid to Pakistan.226  The rationale for the Act is that a “campaign against extremism 
will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone,” and that it is critical that development of key 
infrastructure and services be seen as coming from the government and not from terrorist 
organizations.227  As of April 2010, USAID’s largest activities in the FATA concerned livelihood 
development programs.228  USAID/Pakistan established these program in 2008, with a main goal 
of “provid[ing] social and economic stabilization in FATA to counter the growing influence 
of extremist and terrorist groups.”229  The programs run for five years and with a budget of 
approximately $300 million230 that was originally split between the upper (the FATA Livelihood 
Development Program) and lower (the FATA Development Program-Livelihood Development 
(FDP-LD)) regions under the direction of two separate implementing partners,231 but is now 
under the direction of one organization.232
Yemen
The U.S./Yemen Strategy focuses on development assistance to “mitigate Yemen’s economic crisis 
and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, transparency, and adherence to 
the rule of law,” including through “empowering youth, women and other marginalized groups.”233 
This assistance includes two new USAID programs: the Community Livelihoods Project to 
“mitigate the drivers of instability,”234 and its complement, the Responsive Governance Program to 
strengthen government institutions and services and civil society organizations.235  There is also a 
broad range of other programs designed to counter violent extremism, including USAID’s Youth 
Stabilization Initiative (YSI);236 a DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor program “to 
increase public awareness and understanding of religious freedom and tolerance with a particular 
focus on youth”;237 and various Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) programs.238
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to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka,” including through 
natural-disaster response that seeks to “decreas[e] the operating space of terrorists and violent 
extremists.”246 
 ▶ Africa: The United States African Command (AFRICOM)247 Combined Joint Task Force–Horn 
of Africa (CJTF-HOA)248 was originally established in 2002 to deal with the threat of the Afghan 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda moving into the region after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan,249 but now 
adopts an “indirect approach to counter violent extremism.”250  Accordingly, approximately 
sixty percent of its activities constitute civil-affairs projects (often referred to as “hearts and 
minds” activities),251 such as those undertaken with communities in the northeast and coastal 
areas of Kenya.252  There is a stated gender component to these activities.  For example, it has 
been noted that the “US Army Civil Affairs Team working in Garissa, Kenya has a mandate to 
counterattack the influence of violent extremist organizations and the team sees supporting 
education, women’s education in particular, a key way to fight extremist ideology.”253  Another 
(controversial) method was to provide sewing machines to local women, in collaboration with 
Womankind Kenya, to enhance women’s vocational opportunities and enable them to further 
provide for their families and communities.254
 ▶ Yemen: The U.S. military, including through CJTF-HOA, has been involved in development 
assistance such as health and education projects to have “not only a physical impact in terms 
of the actual school or clinic that’s being built, but an impact on what people think of when 
they think of the American military or the American people as a whole.”255  The military’s 
involvement in economic-development activity creates a pool of additional resources and 
enables access to areas to which USAID is not permitted to travel, but has caused a number of 
problems that arise from local populations distrusting USG intentions and the limited expertise 
of military personnel who are deployed for short periods. 256 
 ▶ Iraq and Afghanistan: PRTs, joint civil-military cooperation units, were created in late 2002 in 
Afghanistan with a threefold mandate: engage in reconstruction, increase security, and promote 
the influence of the Afghan central government.257  Such efforts were also undertaken to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the Afghan people.258  In the U.S.-led PRTs in Afghanistan, the DoD provides 
logistical support and force protection for the team, USAID leads reconstruction projects, and 
the DoS is in charge of oversight and reporting, but all members of the PRT leadership approve 
reconstruction activities.259  In 2005, the “long-term objective” was to transition control over PRTs 
to NATO-ISAF forces,260 and as of November 2010, ISAF reported twenty-seven PRTs operating 
throughout the country.261  The PRT model was also extrapolated to Iraq, where the USG currently 
has PRTs in fifteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces and a Regional Reconstruction Team in Erbil.262  
Gender and Analytic Frameworks for Counter-Violent Extremism 
Activities
USAID’s activities on countering violent extremism are underpinned by two guides: Guide to the Drivers 
of Violent Extremism263 (“Drivers Guide”) and Development Assistance and Counter-Extremism: A Guide to 
Programming264  (“Programming Guide”) (collectively the Guides).  Taken as a whole, the Guides offer little 
analytical insight into how to concretely and comprehensively approach gender analysis and programming 
in the context of countering violent extremism; indeed, USAID officials understand that the discussion 
of gender in the Guides is confined to young men.265  The Drivers Guide and Programming Guide briefly 
integrate gender analysis as it relates to three areas: (1) understanding the drivers of violent extremism; (2) 
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the challenges of gender programming to avoid extremist backlash; and (3) the formation of partnerships 
for combating terrorism.
 ▶ Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Drivers Guide’s sole reference to “gender” is as a characteristic 
for developing a profile of populations that are at risk of violent extremism.266  However, it does 
not further elaborate on the relationship between gender and extremism and proceeds on the 
assumption that the majority of those at risk are males.267  The Programming Guide identifies the 
role of gender as a cultural driver of violent extremism, noting: 
While the belief that Islam is under attack represents the most significant cultural driver 
of VE [Violent Extremism] in countries with predominantly Muslim populations, broader 
perceptions of grave threats to customs and values…can play a decisive role as well.  The 
belief that one’s “home,” “space” or “turf ” is being subjected to a cultural invasion—
especially in sensitive areas such as gender roles and education—can be a powerful 
motivation for engaging in violent behavior.268  
While some USG statements tend to equate terrorism with gender inequality or support for 
gender inequality,269 this is not uniformly accepted in the development field.  For example, 
according to MSI, the author of the Guides, the presence of gender discrimination in a 
community does not indicate that it is susceptible to violent extremism, although it may be a 
“convenient coincidence.”270  In addition, while this is not extensively discussed in the Guides, 
MSI also notes that it is important to recognize the role of women in organizing, supporting, 
inspiring, or carrying out acts of terrorism.271 
 ▶ Gender programming and CVE: The Programming Guide notes the need to adjust standard or 
traditional development activities to enhance their effectiveness to counter violent extremism 
and minimize terrorist backlash.272  With respect to gender programming in particular, the 
Programming Guide recommends both adjusting gender programs to generate less hostility 
(such as framing gender equality rights as coming from within Islam rather than a human 
rights or Western perspective)273 and in some cases to “avoid interventions—especially in such 
sensitive, ‘loaded’ areas as gender roles or the content of education—which local populations 
easily may perceive as efforts to impose certain values on them.”274  The Programming Guide 
cites the “creation of new opportunities for women in the public sphere” as an example of 
well-intentioned “interference” that might provoke a violent backlash in communities, such 
as in tribal communities in Pakistan, Yemen, and Afghanistan, that have been able to preserve 
a “high degree of autonomy and self-regulation.”275  According to MSI, in communities that 
feel under threat, programming that uses social and cultural norms will create backlash unless 
gender is addressed in a non-secular or religious way.276  However, notably, from all CHRGJ 
Stakeholder Workshops (except the United States, where it was not explicitly considered), there 
was resounding concern that overt USG support for religion-based trainings on women’s rights 
that were in any way linked to countering violent extremism (e.g., holding trainings on women’s 
rights under Shari’a as a means to minimize communities’ feelings of being under threat) 
would create huge backlash; be dismissed as undue Western interference; and undermine local 
gender-equality movements that use a religious-based framework to advocate for rights.277
 ▶ Partnerships: The Programming Guide also mentions women in the context of warning 
practitioners against moving too quickly to work with “extremists” who, while they “may want 
to impose the Shari’a, veil on women, and deny girls the right to an education” might also 
“be persuaded to behave in ways that advance specific CE objectives.”278  The Programming 
Guide explains that “morality, here, may turn out to overlap with self-interest and program 
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effectiveness” and “[e]ven limited, ad hoc arrangements with a few extremist actors may 
undermine the credibility of the entire CE [counter extremism] program.”279  However, the 
Programming Guide does not, for example, delve extensively into the specifics about how 
practitioners should think about situations where morality does not overlap with program 
effectiveness or, in other words, where partnerships with actors ranging from “tribal leaders” 
to “extremists” to “militants”280 would be good for advancing counter-terrorism objectives but 
disastrous for the rights of women and sexual minorities.  This is the key issue, particularly 
in contexts such as Afghanistan,281 which is vexing for USAID and other government officials 
seeking to reconcile development and CVE objectives.  According to USAID, it would not 
partner with extremist militants under any circumstances.282
Gender and the Development-National Security Nexus: Shifting 
Landscapes 
O ver view
Development activities that seek to counter violent extremism differ from traditional development activities 
in four key areas: (1) the source of funds for the development activity; (2) the basis on which project 
beneficiaries are identified; (3) modalities for the design and implementation of programs; and (4) the 
monitoring and evaluation tools used.  Each of these areas has significant gendered components and 
impacts; however, when asked about the general role of gender in both the DoD and USAID development 
programs to counter violent extremism, USG officials provided a wide range of responses, all of which 
pointed to the lack of full and consistent gender analysis in this area.  These challenges echo the experience 
of USAID/OTI283 in Afghanistan, where a 2005 evaluation of its programming related to women found that 
“in spite of significant support for Afghan women at the highest levels of the US administration, no coherent 
strategy to support Afghan females was developed by OTI.  OTI programming related to women consisted of 
mostly small, seemingly haphazard projects.”284  Further, regarding gender initiatives that OTI did undertake, 
OTI has admitted that “it did not have, nor did it plan to have, a strategy in place to account for the often 
separate approach required to ensure women participated in and benefited from project programming and 
the political transition process OTI endeavored to support.”285
According to USAID’s Office of Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment, USAID is “empowering women 
on a spectrum of issues to combat violent extremism,” and in the context of civil-military cooperation, 
USAID always raised gender concerns, although the extent to which they were taken up depended on the 
individual decision-maker in the field.286  Other USAID officials working on programs to counter extremism 
were explicit that, among other things, the way gender features is “very fluid” such that there is no gender 
analysis of the drivers of violent extremism, but rather you might “find things that are gender-related” when 
looking at the drivers;287 “from a gender perspective, programs are all about empowering male youth”;288 
and CVE programs could “generously” be described as “gender-neutral” but in reality are focused on young, 
at-risk male youth as a vulnerable population that has not previously received USAID attention.289  
G ender  and CVE Pro ject  Funding
Many of the development activities surveyed for this Report (such as TSCTP activities290 and the Shaqodoon 
and G-Youth projects291) have been supported to some degree by what is commonly referred to as “section 
1207 funding.”  Pursuant to section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
the Secretary of Defense “may provide services to, and transfer defense articles and funds to, the Secretary 
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of State for the purposes of facilitating the provision by the Secretary of State of reconstruction, security, 
or stabilization assistance to a foreign country,” the aggregate value of which must not exceed $100 million 
annually.292  This authority, the monitoring of which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
criticized as “weak,” expired at the end of FY 2010293 and has now been replaced by the Complex Crises 
Fund that functions as an appropriation to the DoS, rather than being diverted from the DoD, to support 
USAID and DoS programming.294  The receipt of 1207 funding renders a traditional development project 
into one that is undertaken for the primary purpose of countering violent extremism.  While the full effects 
of the 1207 mandate are explored below, the first initial impact is to define the project beneficiaries and 
parameters of activities based on calculations of risk and not need.  On the latter, for example, EDC, the 
implementing partner of G-Youth, notes in its assessment and project-design document, that “when an 
extremism component is a key part of the assessment, other technical sectors are bound to receive less 
coverage.  Accordingly, the assessment prioritized the 1207 directive and took into account some of the 
more pressing sectoral trends,”295 which were unemployment, tertiary education, and civic participation.296 
Further, according to EDC, while one of its recommended activities, the G-Youth Career Resource Center, 
“will be open to both male and female youth…a special effort will be made to engage male youth in Center 
activities given the 1207 funding criteria for this project.”297  
G ender  and CVE Pro ject  B enef ic iar ies 
The clearest gender feature of USAID programs to directly counter violent extremism is that they mainly 
target at-risk male youth.  This is the case even where the programs seek to address underlying development 
needs, such as livelihood restraints, that are more acute for women and girls in the particular community 
than for young men.  CHRGJ’s research reveals that the extent that women do become beneficiaries of such 
programs depends on other factors, including particularly the approach taken by implementing partners.  
First, regarding the focus on male youth, it is this targeting based on risk, rather than need, that differentiates 
aid for the purposes of countering violent extremism from more traditional development programs.298 
According to one USAID official, the message from Washington is we “don’t need to worry about gender” 
(as it concerns women) because the focus should be on the terrorism threat that young men pose.299  This 
focus is clear in USAID TSCTP activities to date,300 and according to AED, the implementing partner of PDEV, 
activities in Chad and Niger, will likely continue in the follow-up project to PDEV.301  Relatedly, in USAID’s 
G-Youth program, the implementing partner EDC specifically recommended that G-Youth beneficiaries be 
sixty-five percent urban male youths and thirty-five percent female, on the basis that “ males are understood 
to be at higher risk of being pushed or pulled into extremist activities.”302  Notably, G-Youth’s overall focus 
on male youth did not match the general development needs of the community, in which female illiteracy, 
unemployment, and school dropout rates are higher than for males, and more generally “[t]he gender parity 
index in North East Province is the worst in the country.”303 Similarly, livelihood activities in Iraq and Yemen 
focus on young males.304  
Second, in the majority of CVE activities surveyed for this Report, USAID neither strongly emphasized the 
need for gender analysis nor mandated sex-disaggregated data, and in many cases activities that sought to 
include women were instead largely at the initiative of USAID’s implementing partners.  This is the case with 
G-Youth (see Case Study below), Shaqodoon, and PDEV activities in Niger and Chad:  
 ▶ Shaqodoon, Somalia: EDC notes that for Shaqodoon, gender analysis and collection of or 
reporting on sex-disaggregated data is not mandated by funding streams or project-design 
documents and therefore is “not strictly measured.”305  However, according to EDC, it nonetheless 
believes that Shaqodoon’s “location and context” make it important to consider women as 
at-risk youth and EDC therefore seeks to incorporate gender concerns into its activities.306  
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According to EDC, one way it does this is through Shaqodoon’s sub-grant approval process—
EDC does not give grants to organizations with a male-only hiring policy and also encourages 
applicants to take gender into account in their proposals (such as through identifying programs 
that recognize women as a target at-risk group and set gender-specific intake targets).307  
However, EDC notes that despite these and other efforts, from July 1 to September 30, 2009, 
“most partners face[d] challenges in recruiting the target number of girls for the trainings” 
because of the trainings’ focus on male-dominated fields (such as construction) and “[c]ultural 
biases.”308  The latter includes the fact that many women are not able to leave their homes 
unaccompanied and are thus unable to meet men outside their families.309  Some EDC initiatives 
try to mitigate these factors that inhibit women’s participation in Shaqodoon.  For example, 
EDC interns initiated a girls’ group at the Hargeisa Youth Livelihood Resource Center to enable 
young women to discuss issues.310  According to EDC, the anonymity of InfoMatch (a “system 
that uses web-based and cell phone technologies as a means of engaging youth, trainers and 
employers in an opportunity-matching system”)311 means that job matching is done without 
regard to sex or the need for face-to-face meetings and therefore allows women greater access 
to employment.312  This focus is not always carried through to other programs.  For example, 
while there were discussions in June 2010 around the establishment of “entrepreneurship 
training and support for disadvantaged groups, particularly young women”;313 such proposed 
programs do not in practice focus on women.314
 ▶ PDEV in Niger and Chad: According to AED, its approved Performance Management Plan (PMP) 
for PDEV did not require gender disaggregation of indicator data, and the original USAID solicitation 
for PDEV referenced but did not emphasize gender as a cross-cutting theme, calling for offerors to pay 
attention to under-participation of either gender and to ensure that activities did not serve to further 
disadvantage women, but ultimately emphasizing the need to focus on issues facing unemployed 
male youth.315  Despite this, AED made substantial effort to ensure that women were beneficiaries 
or specific targets of its activities.316  This gender inclusion mainly occurred in PDEV’s activities that 
focused on youth, where AED took specific steps to ensure that girls were able to participate.317  For 
example, in Chad, AED held sex-segregated activities, whereas in Niger women’s participation was 
somewhat less difficult to achieve.318  PDEV radio programming also benefited women; in Niger, 
women’s radio-listening groups took action in their communities.319  Such programming in Niger and 
Chad also had a gender component, including a chat show in Chad (Chabab Al Haye (Youth Alive)) 
that touches on girls’ education and early or forced marriage,320 and a soap opera in Niger (Hantsi 
Leka Gidan Kowa) that addresses issues such as education of women and forced or early marriage.321  
According to AED, substantial effort was put into achieving women’s participation, but to achieve 
even greater participation of women and girls (say, forty to fifty percent) would require that USAID 
design the program to emphasize women’s participation and set explicit gender-disaggregated 
targets for the implementer to meet.322
While the majority of development-CVE programs target male youth, the USG does have some development 
programs with a nexus to CVE where the gender component involves focusing on women.  However, as 
the examples below demonstrate, by and large such programming is not part of an overall coherent and 
coordinated strategy to integrate women and gender into programs to combat violent extremism.  Instead, the 
rationale for these programs varies from promoting women’s and girls’ rights to counter the conditions that 
lead to violent extremism (investments in women in Pakistan), to promoting women in their role as mothers 
who can turn their sons away from violent extremism (Eastleigh, Kenya), to showcasing USG support for 
populations targeted by extremists (Mali).  Some examples that exemplify these patterns are below.
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 ▶ War Widows in Iraq: In Iraq, the economic strain felt by widows has been cited as a reason 
widows are joining the insurgency and in some instances becoming suicide bombers.323  The 
USG has several programs in Iraq that seek to address the needs of vulnerable women, including 
widows.  However, the evident or stated nexus of these programs to CVE objectives varies and the 
exact nature of the activities—including which USG agency is responsible for each program—
is sometimes unclear.  For example, in 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense and 
Director of the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations stressed the need for economic 
programs to counter insurgency in Iraq and referenced activities that employed “vulnerable” 
persons (particularly widows and divorcees) in this regard.324  In 2010, the DoS Office of Global 
Women’s Issues and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor also announced a $5 
million DoS program to support “Iraqi widows, female heads of household and other vulnerable 
women.”325  This program, which does not have a stated CVE goal, provides grants to NGOs to 
conduct projects on “literacy, entrepreneurship, and vocational skills”326 to “achieve economic 
empowerment and sustainable livelihoods for the women and their families.”327  USAID has also 
instituted a variety of programs that assist Iraqi women, including female heads of household 
and widows.328  According to USAID, one outcome of programming for war widows in Iraq might 
be reducing their vulnerability to radicalization.329  Further, according to USAID, this is one of 
the few areas where there is an explicit gender element in USAID programs that contribute to 
CVE.330  For example, in 2003 USAID instituted the Community Action Program, which includes 
the Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund, to:
[A]ssist[s] Iraqi civilians, families, communities and organizations that have been directly 
affected by coalition military operations.  The Marla Ruzicka fund supports victims of 
war, widows and families of war victims, either with direct medical aid, replacing damaged 
property or helping them establish businesses such as grocery stores, bakeries, electronics 
shops or farms.331 
Additionally, USAID’s Office of U.S. 
Foreign Disaster Assistance “continues 
to provide humanitarian assistance 
that benefits widows and female-led 
households throughout Iraq through 
the provision of emergency assistance 
such as relief supplies, food, shelter and 
livelihood opportunities.”332 
 ▶ Investments in Women in Pakistan: 
The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan 
Act  o f  2009 author izes  act iv it ies 
to “support investments in people , 
particularly women and children,” and 
encourages the use of local Pakistani 
organizations where appropriate.333  In 
the USG’s civilian assistance program to 
Pakistan, a number of activities focus 
primarily on women,334 although the 
number of activities and amount of funds 
are not significant in light of the total 
civilian assistance package.  In Pakistan, 
one of the largest women-specif ic 
In this photo taken June 13, 2010, an Iraqi widow waits to receive money 
from a government office in Baghdad, Iraq. Three decades of wars, massacres 
and sectarian killing have left Iraq with as many as a million widows, by Iraqi 
government count. It estimates some 100,000 have lost husbands since the 
U.S .-led invasion, and the postwar government is struggling to meet their 
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programs is the Aurat Foundation’s Gender Equity Program (GEP).335  The GEP is a five-year 
program that was launched in December 2010 in Karachi, Pakistan,336 with an award of $40 
million337 to promote women’s human rights and empowerment, including through ending 
gender-based violence and providing political and economic opportunities for women in 
Pakistan.338 
 ▶ TSCTP in Mali: The risk assessment (i.e., the initiative to measure the risk of violent extremism 
in the community) that underpins USAID TSCTP activities in Mali refers to supporting girls’ 
education through scholarships as a measure to counter violent extremism.339  In addition, there 
is an explicit focus on women (along with youth and people with disabilities) in “Trickle Up,” 
which seeks to use microenterprise development to reduce poverty.340  
 ▶ Kenya: As of Fall 2010, USAID/OTI Kenya is seeking to establish a program in Eastleigh, a 
suburb of Nairobi, that would focus on the role of mothers in influencing their children to 
turn away from extremism.341  The USG’s counter-violent extremism programming in Kenya 
(particularly through the DoD) has also involved building schools for girls, which can be seen 
as a positive step provided it also translates into gender-equality outcomes, such as increased 
school attendance.342  
 ▶ Yemen: According to the USG, the Responsive Governance Program will be implemented with 
“gender sensitivity,”343 which includes holding general public dialogue forums (PDFs) where 
“[w]omen are also included in the PDFs, but will be separate.”344  The Responsive Governance 
Program also funds training courses for local radio services that feature the Yemeni Women’s 
Media Forum (WMF).345  USAID has also generally engaged with local religious leaders to further 
its “commitment to gender equity and strengthening the community’s knowledge of women’s 
rights vis-à-vis Islamic rules.”346  These programs are coordinated with MEPI’s 26 active programs 
in Yemen, which also, according to the USG, prioritize women’s empowerment.347
G ender,  CVE Pro ject  D es ign ,  Stakeholders ,  and Implementation
Gender  Analys is  and D esign o f  Programs
The use of gender analysis in the design of development programs with a CVE nexus changes the nature of 
programming required to ensure their effectiveness from both a CVE and gender perspective.  For example, 
USAID/East Africa and DfID support a program, “Trading for Peace,” designed to foster stability in the Great 
Lakes region by “reducing cross-border barriers to trade and improving trade practices.”348  Trading for Peace 
is also premised on the recognition that trade has an impact on security at the border.349  In the Eastern 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Trading for Peace works with small-scale traders, most of whom are 
women.  According to CHRGJ’s interview with USAID, this fact impacted project design, as women in these 
circumstances face different issues than men.350  According to USAID, to enable this specific understanding 
of gender and women’s issues, resources need to be earmarked so that the gender focus is neither secondary 
nor accidental.351  These issues are further explored below in Box 3. 
Partic ipation o f  Women in  D esign and Implementation o f  Programs
In programs earmarked to counter violent extremism, there is some limited scope to conduct outreach to 
women and women’s groups, but in practice such outreach is often minimal.  In terms of the opportunity 
for outreach, according to the USAID Bureau for Africa, women’s associations provide input into the risk 
assessments that inform CVE program design and implementation.352  In addition, where USAID uses an 
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analytical framework for problem analysis that focuses on building the resilience of the community rather 
than seeking to mitigate risk (because the particular risk of extremism is minimal to negligible such as in 
places like Sub-Saharan Africa), this can provide an opportunity for greater focus on women in development 
programming.353  Despite these important opportunities, in practice there are significant barriers to women’s 
participation in the design and implementation of programs that seek to counter violent extremism.  These 
factors are explored below in respect to USAID’s civilian assistance program in Pakistan.  While some of these 
factors are inherent to traditional development programs that seek to include women (such as cultural 
barriers to participation), others are very much derived from, or linked to, the program’s CVE character. 
For example, development programs with this nexus raise particular challenges under USG anti-terrorism 
financing laws and regulations which require certain certifications of implementing partners before USG 
funding can be provided (discussed below).354  According to USAID and its implementing partners, challenges 
in securing women’s participation in USAID’s civilian assistance program in Pakistan include the following: 
 ▶ The CVE-nexus of activities limits the extent of implementing partners’ outreach to communities, 
meaning that implementing partners cannot conduct their usual expansive outreach, including 
to women, and programs cannot be sufficiently driven by community demand.355 
 ▶ USAID’s outcome indicators for measuring its FATA livelihood development programs’ impact on 
countering violent extremism are gender neutral in that they do not require a consideration of 
gender.356  In the current revision of indicators, the implementing partner has encouraged gender 
to be included on a more comprehensive, activity-by-activity (as opposed to just sector) basis.357 
 ▶ USAID has identif ied sensitivities around programming on women’s rights in Muslim 
communities both generally358 and in the context of their membership in communities that feel 
under external threat.359  Indeed, USAID experiences significant challenges in accessing women 
in Pakistan because of local contexts and suspicion that they are importing Western feminism 
in their outreach to women.360  USAID seeks to overcome this by relying on local Pakistani 
partners,361 talking about how moderate interpretations of Islam support participation,362 and 
emphasizing that women’s participation helps the family more broadly.363 
 ▶ Shifts in USG strategy, such as the September 2009 move toward greater involvement of local 
Pakistani organizations, may fail to consider negative impacts on women that result from 
implementation without proper gendered safeguards.364  According to CHRGJ’s interviews, while 
local organizations must be involved in any project implemented by an international organization 
as they can assist in gaining access to women in these communities and have greater trust in the 
communities,365 challenges in ensuring the participation of women and women’s groups derive 
from: the fact that women’s organizations are often smaller and lack the capacity to comply with 
extensive reporting requirements that accompany USAID grants;366 the fact that leadership of 
non-women’s groups is not gender-sensitive; and the risk of retaliation against women’s groups if 
it was felt that they were receiving too many resources.367  More generally, according to USAID, 
the fact that there are not many women-owned construction groups means that they may not be 
chosen for the large scale infrastructure projects that the USG’s program in Pakistan emphasizes.368 
 ▶ Violent extremists target female aid workers in Pakistan369 and Afghanistan370 because of their 
participation in USG programs.  According to Amnesty International, “the Taleban also targeted 
NGOs and warned against any action that could be construed as ‘cooperating with the United 
States of America’—understood by aid workers to refer to programs on literacy, health care for 
women, and work training (such as technological or computer training).”371 
These risks of exclusion of women and sexual minorities may increase when the DoD is the primary provider of 
humanitarian assistance.  See Box 3 (Gender in Military Development Activities: Approaches of AFRICOM and PACOM).
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Box 3. Gender in Military Development Activities: 
Approaches of AFRiCOM and PACOM 
AFRICOM
In 2006–2008, AFRICOM built approximately ten to fifteen wells in ten villages in Garissa, Kenya 
as part of its effort to change the “hearts and minds” of local communities.372  According to a USG 
official, the process of consultation involved the AFRICOM Civil Affairs team meeting “with the 
district village elders and chiefs and they tell us what they want and that is what is done.”373  The 
village elders and chiefs did not include women, and there was no separate effort to reach out to 
women, despite the well-recognized fact that around the world women are particularly affected 
by development activities that relate to water.374  Not only did this failure to consult women 
inadvertently reinforce existing gender hierarchies in the community, but the Civil Affairs team’s 
construction was faulty in many respects (including problems with boreholes, broken pipes, 
and lack of water),375 which inherently compromises women’s access to water, and also adversely 
affects the community’s perception of the United States.376  AFRICOM apparently learned of 
these problems when a Socio-Cultural Research and Advisory Team (SCRAT), which included 
two women, assessed the impacts of AFRICOM’s activities in the community.377  According to a 
USG official, the SCRAT found it “beneficial” to speak with local women in this process.378  Indeed, 
more generally within the USG,379 there is an expectation that SCRATs may help to bring a gender 
perspective to AFRICOM’s work; however, CHRGJ was unable to verify this as requests to interview 
AFRICOM’s Social Science Research Center, the SCRAT parent organization, were unanswered.  
PACOM
In contrast to the above, according to JSOTF-P’s communication with CHRGJ, “as part of a 
comprehensive USG approach, DoD’s advice and assistance to Philippine Security Force civil-military 
operations includes gender considerations.”380  According to JSTOF-P, “the gender neutrality and 
gender specific aspects of our MEDCAPs [medical-dental civil-action projects] have made our 
engagement with Philippine Security Forces more conducive to their development of positive 
relations with their indigenous peoples.  These efforts result in building security and prosperity for 
all regardless of gender.”381  This attention to gender considerations apparently includes:
 ▶ Engagement and assistance that: “targets populations from a gender neutral 
position” and encourages local security forces to be “balanced in their engagement 
with local populations,” but also provides “gender specific medical support” in 
MEDCAPS (e.g., in gender-related medical care such as circumcisions, medical 
advice for mothers, and sanitation training); 382
 ▶ Tracking gender participation in activities : “we take notice when males or 
females attend our sessions out of proportion of normal population densities.  
Misrepresentation of normal population densities indicates that there is a level of 
mistrust with US or GPH [Government of the Philippines] forces”;383 and
 ▶ Acknowledging women’s leadership: “[s]ince females carry a significant leadership 
role in government, teaching responsibilities, and communities, DoD’s engagement 
takes this into consideration.”384
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Where USAID programming is couched primarily in terms of conflict mitigation—but is nonetheless understood 
to have some nexus to combating violent extremism—there is potential for increased attention to ensuring 
women’s participation and incorporating gender dynamics in program planning.  For example, PEACE II is part of 
USAID’s Conflict Management and Governance Program390 that focuses on promoting peace in the Horn of Africa 
and the Great Lakes region, an area USAID considers “vulnerable to emerging violent ideologies.”391  PEACE II is 
implemented by Pact in partnership with Pact Kenya and operates in the border areas of Kenya, Uganda, Somalia, 
Sudan, and Ethiopia, with a focus on the “different nomadic and pastoralist populations that move across porous 
national borders.”392  According to CHRGJ’s interview with Pact, there is no involvement of the DoD in PEACE II’s 
activities, and such involvement would likely create issues of trust with local communities.393  According to Pact, 
PEACE II has the strongest CVE nexus in the Somali East Corridor, where the CVE aspects of the program focus 
on resisting the influence of extremism and terrorism in the area through sector-specific responses to conflict.394 
According to Pact, there is strong gender integration in PEACE II’s activities,395 reflecting USAID’s recognition 
that there is a tendency to exclude women from the decision-making processes vis-à-vis peace efforts in the 
region, despite the impact of conflict on women and children.396  Unlike some of the explicit countering violent 
extremism programs discussed above and further below, Pact’s monitoring and evaluation of PEACE II focuses on 
achieving development goals, not on CVE outcomes.397  USAID also explicitly mandates consideration of gender 
in all of Pact’s monitoring and evaluation of PEACE II.398  
Gender  Impacts  o f  CVE Programs
In addition to the gender impacts identified above, USG development-assistance programs to counter violent 
extremism that are notionally gender neutral (i.e., not directed toward either male youth or women as widows, 
etc.) nonetheless may have negative gendered impacts because of the failure to take into account local 
gender dynamics when planning and implementing development programming.  While this risk attaches to 
USAID programs with a CVE nexus, it is particularly acute when the DoD is carrying out the development 
project, as the above case study on AFRICOM activities in Kenya clearly demonstrates.399  In general terms, this 
militarization or securitization of aid has been critiqued as ineffective in terms of both development400 and 
counter-terrorism.401  A gender and human rights perspective offers additional insights into the extent and 
consequences of these problems that arise.   
More generally, in correspondence with CHRGJ, PACOM noted that “[h]uman rights 
considerations are included in the advice and assistance DoD provides to Philippine Security 
Forces.  In our Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, human rights is an important area that is 
covered when our program includes the use of force.”385  In light of the significant gender-based 
violations arising from the Philippines Security Forces’ counter-terrorism operations, it is 
clear that such an approach is warranted and that even more effective integration of gender 
concerns is necessary.  For example, the U.N. and human rights advocates have documented 
the following relevant human rights abuses by local security forces in the name of countering 
terrorism: targeting of men, which in turn means that women are tasked with documentation 
of human rights abuse and its attendant risks;386 use of counter-terrorism measures to 
intimidate and chill the activities of women human rights defenders;387 and rape of indigenous 
women in Mindanao.388  Local human rights advocates perceive that U.S. military support 
in the Southern Philippines gives local security forces the means (such as arms, resources, 
international legitimacy) to commit these abuses.389 
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In particular, CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops 
(especially in the United States, Africa, and 
MENA) and interviews with USAID officials in 
Asia, Africa, and Washington, D.C., emphasized 
that the U.S. military: fails to consult with 
stakeholders (including, in some cases, USAID); 
prioritizes projects with quick impact over 
long-term gains; is not familiar with gender 
concerns; lacks transparency and accountability 
in its disbursement of development funds; fails 
to ensure the longevity in its staff that is essential 
for understanding local gender dynamics and 
gaining trust of women; undermines the good 
work and reputation of other USG agencies 
in the field; and is inherently more concerned 
with security than humanitarian objectives.402 
In the words of one USAID off icial :  “ In 
Afghanistan, in their [the military’s] eagerness 
to do something, they are not looking at power 
structures.  They are empowering the wrong 
people.  They are doing development but they 
don’t know how.”403 
These concerns may be present even where the development activity is done through civil-military 
co-operative arrangements, such as PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq.404  In both countries, there have been some 
U.S.-led PRT activities that have explicitly engaged women.  For example, in Afghanistan such projects include 
teaching women how to weave gabion baskets to facilitate their employment,405 constructing a women’s 
shelter,406 and establishing female-literacy programs.407  In Iraq, U.S.-led PRTs have also engaged with women, 
including through local governance programs, working with civil society to empower women, and assisting 
with a conference on “The Roles and Rights of Women in the New Constitution.”408  However, alongside 
these efforts there have been concerns about whether PRTs have sufficiently engaged women and women’s 
organizations.409  These concerns have been addressed through some measures: for example, from 2007 
onward, NATO increased the integration of a gender perspective in all of its operations, including by initiating 
a process to implement UNSCR 1325,410 and some USG military officials have also encouraged prioritizing 
engagement with women, including through “incorporating FETs (Female Engagement Teams) with the 
PRTs.”411  However, more remains to be done: according to a women’s rights advocate from Afghanistan in our 
MENA Stakeholder Workshop: “Provincial Reconstruction Teams are doing something good.  But the policy 
is not well coordinated, and there needs to be an assessment of the reactions by people on the ground.  Also, 
the United States and the United Kingdom don’t go into areas where security is most needed.”412
G ender  in  the Monitor ing and Evaluation of  CVE Pro grams
The full gender impacts of the USG’s development activities to counter violent extremism are simply not 
known because of the lack of effective evaluative tools to measure program impact on either counter-terrorism 
objectives or gender equality and relations.  In almost all of CHRGJ’s interviews on development and CVE 
and in secondary research, USAID officials and implementing partners strongly emphasized the difficulties 
in measuring whether development activities actually worked to counter extremism.413  The impediments 
identified include: the absence of clear goals of particular projects (such as whether this is to reduce the 
general enabling environment for terrorism or tackle recruitment more directly);414 the disproportionate 
reliance on output rather than outcome indicators;415 the inherent difficulties in measuring a negative (i.e., 
U.S. civil affairs soldiers based with a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) hand out humanitarian relief to local Afghans in Bamiyan province 
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that something did not occur); and the need to collect “perception” data or qualitative data to measure 
attitudinal changes and the difficulty in so doing.416  
These observations are borne out in relation to both TSCTP activities417 and FATA livelihood development 
programs in Pakistan.418  In relation to TSCTP, a mid-term evaluation of activities found that TSCTP 
implementing partners regularly measured program inputs and outputs, however impact or outcome 
indicators that would enable measurement of the overall effectiveness of their programs from a CVE 
perspective, were absent from most PMPs.419  The indicators that are used include, for example, the aggregate 
number of individuals who participated in TSCTP activities and the number of community-development 
projects undertaken.420  As with its implementing partners, USAID itself reports on the aggregate “number of 
individuals from at-risk groups that have been reached though a wide variety of activities”421 and also reports 
using program-dependent422 or custom indicators (e.g., “[t]he number of intra-faith dialogues facilitated”) 
that reflect TSCTP’s “unique nature.”423  However, the absence of output indicators is striking, as performance 
indicators are intended to measure the impact of a program on its main goal (the program’s Assistance 
Objective)424 such that without these indicators, it is impossible to determine whether a project has met its 
goals, and thus whether the program has been effective.  The mid-term evaluation of TSCTP partly attributes 
the failure to use performance indicators to the fact that some of the most useful data for such purposes is 
expensive and often unavailable.425  The mid-term evaluation specifically identifies data captured via surveys 
measuring attitudes as especially suitable to measuring counter-terrorism impacts such as diminished public 
support for extremism426 and recommends the use of some third-party indicators to track country progress 
in counter-terrorism.427  Without this type of data, evaluations of programs are reduced to conjecture about 
how traditionally measurable results, such as digging a well or opening a school, may reduce extremism.
Similarly, in relation to the FATA livelihood development programs in Pakistan, a December 10, 2010, USAID 
Inspector General’s audit for the lower FATA region determined that “little progress was made in reaching 
the program’s outcome and goals,”428 primarily because of FATA’s security situation, but also because of 
inadequate monitoring and oversight and other issues.429  Accordingly, the Inspector General recommended 
“revisit[ing]” of the “Program’s Indicators, Targets and Goals,”430 which USAID is presently undertaking.431  A 
December 10, 2010, audit of the program for the upper FATA region similarly concluded that “the program 
has not achieved its main goal of social and economic stabilization to counter the growing influence of 
extremist and terrorist groups in upper FATA,” particularly noting the absence of baseline data for measuring 
progress.432  Indeed, according to Christine Fair: “There is inadequate evidence that instrumentalized and 
securitized aid programming effectively advances the various U.S. goals that are repeatedly expressed in 
successive budget justifications, such as persuading Pakistanis to embrace moderation and abjure violent 
extremism.”433  Fair attributes this partly to the fact that matrices have focused on outputs, not outcomes, 
and that the monitoring and evaluation is self-administered.434
It is striking that when approaching CVE measurement and its challenges, gender analysis is either simply 
not on USAID’s or the DoD’s radar as something to be incorporated, or to the limited extent that it is 
contemplated, there is little to no guidance or sense of what this would look like in practice.  In the words 
of one USAID official, “it’s difficult to measure CVE, let alone CVE and gender.”435  USAID’s Office of Gender 
Equality & Women’s Empowerment is not aware of any indicators specific to gender and CVE, although it 
notes that “this doesn’t mean that gender can’t be weighed in that way.”436  There are many reasons for the 
failure to measure the gender impacts of CVE programs, including particularly that USAID has not required 
sex-disaggregated data in CVE project reporting.  For example, figures from TSCTP implementers are not 
disaggregated by sex437 because USAID does not require this in the approved PMP on which partners 
subsequently report.438  However, some implementing partners, such as AED, keep data on participants’ 
gender and record gender in the baseline survey data that informs project design, without undertaking data 
analysis according to gender.439  In relation to the FATA livelihood development programs in Pakistan, target 
outcomes are also gender neutral,440 and implementing partners have not been required to disaggregate data 
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on the basis of sex.441  Further, in April 2010, the GAO found that that USAID Pakistan FATA programming 
“could not be determined” to be in compliance with the general USAID requirement to disaggregate 
performance indicators by gender wherever possible.442  In USAID, there is a perception that the extent 
to which gender is incorporated in FATA programming more generally depends on the mission director’s 
prerogative, and that some do require its inclusion in activities.443  This failure to require sex-disaggregated 
data in CVE programs—despite the broader USAID imperative to do so—appears to derive from the 
underlying assumption that CVE programming is largely about targeting young men for the purposes of 
violent extremism and that gender analysis (including with respect to women’s inclusion and impacts 
on gender relations) is essentially irrelevant.  For example, while the TSCTP mid-term evaluation did 
disaggregate some data by gender and age, its proposed Results Framework to Better Monitor and Measure 
the Impact of TSCTP Programs is conspicuously silent on gender.444  
Box 4. Measuring Counter-Terrorism Development 
Programming: The Gendered Challenge
At present, the USG insufficiently evaluates its development activities to counter violent 
extremism from both a counter-terrorism and gender perspective.  However, both efforts are 
essential and complementary because effective counter-terrorism measures should protect 
the whole population from terrorism, including particularly women and LGBTI individuals 
who are often its victims.  This brief section seeks to provide a summary of the key challenges 
of measuring both CVE and gender equality outcomes and offers some ways in which these 
challenges can be overcome.
Measuring Counter-Terrorism Impact
USG programs aimed at countering terrorism present enormous challenges to those designing 
the programs, monitoring their implementation, and assessing their impact.  Social scientists 
do not fully understand the causes—or “drivers”—of terrorism or violent extremism leading 
to terrorism.445  At the same time, USG policies emphasize the importance of ensuring that 
programming is increasingly evidence-based.  USAID’s 2011 Evaluation Policy, for example, 
asserts that the agency “bases policy and investment decisions on the best available empirical 
evidence.”446  The Programming Guide identifies the measurement challenges inherent in this 
endeavor, explaining that “the benchmarks traditionally used to assess developmental and 
[democracy and governance] activities may not be adequate in isolation to evaluate such 
activities when they are part of a [counter-extremism] strategy.”447  Instead, indicators and 
benchmarks, the cornerstone of USAID’s Evaluation Policy and practice, should be specifically 
designed to ensure they can measure counter-terrorism or CVE impacts, not only development 
impacts.  Under USAID’s Evaluation and Planning Policies, this means the Assistance Objectives 
of a program—the “most ambitious result that a USAID Mission/Office, along with its partners, 
can materially affect, and for which it is willing to be held accountable”448—should be explicitly 
framed to capture counter-terrorism results.  A detailed Results Framework should then be 
designed to identify cause-and-effect relationships between program activities and resources, 
measurable achievements, and impacts on the Assistance Objective.449
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The failure to fully use USAID’s well-developed planning, monitoring, and evaluation frameworks 
and processes in counter-terrorism contexts translates into a dynamic in which the “biggest challenge 
has been demonstrating that the general development results of the [CT] activities are actually 
contributing to the higher counter-extremism goal.”450  The answer to these criticisms is found in 
USAID’s 2011 Evaluation Policy, which, as noted above, emphasizes that projects should be based on 
identified hypotheses, and that such hypotheses should be tested through evaluations that link cause 
(project activities and outputs) with effect (project results).  While the Policy stresses the importance 
of a knowledge base for planning interventions, it also recognizes that development programming 
can produce important new knowledge by operationalizing “untested hypotheses.”451  When 
evaluating innovative interventions based on such hypotheses, the Evaluation Policy recommends 
choosing impact evaluations that use experimental methods.452  In the counter-terrorism realm, 
using random assignment methods453 for impact evaluations will, where possible, ensure they yield 
badly needed new evidence concerning the drivers of extremism and the interventions best suited 
to reducing vulnerability to extremism or mitigating its impacts.  Such evidence can then be used 
to create new analytic resources for USG development programming to counter violent extremism.
Gender Data and Inputs
The focus of CVE interventions on young men as the population most at-risk for violent 
extremism does not obviate the need for gender analysis.  Instead, on its very terms, it requires 
it—the Drivers Guide’s reference to “gender” as a characteristic in the profile of at-risk populations 
extremism,454  indicates that decisions about targeting of beneficiaries should be based on sound 
data about how CVE programming can impact the “constraints and opportunities associated 
with being male or female.”455  This will allow the USG to better understand what methods of 
countering violent extremism programming are most effective for those most at-risk—including 
specific sets of young men—in given contexts.  
Gender Impacts
A thorough gender analysis will also reveal the impact on women of programming aimed at 
men in the relevant community, even when women are not the direct beneficiaries of a specific 
program.  Identifying those indirect impacts will help ensure that unintended effects, such 
as intensified discrimination against women or changes in patterns of gender-based violence, 
do not go unnoticed.  For example, CVE programming guidance stresses the importance 
of not provoking backlash through ill-designed gender-equality programming in contexts 
where perceptions of cultural threat are key drivers of violent extremism.456  This important 
warning should be tested in specific circumstances through gendered program evaluations 
and supplemented by a recognition that programming that is not focused on women can 
still have significant gendered impacts.  Where unintended gendered impacts are identified, 
programming aimed at ameliorating such effects may be needed.  
Gender Equality and Outcomes
In addition to identifying the different impacts of counter-terrorism programming on men and 
women, monitoring gender impacts throughout the life cycle of an intervention can help ensure 
that USG programming protects and enhances women’s equality.  Even in circumstances in 
which an intervention is targeted at male beneficiaries, using gender-sensitive indicators and 
sex-disaggregated data will allow program implementers and evaluators to identify trends and 
monitor unintended negative impacts.  For example, a program might be effective at creating 
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livelihood opportunities for idle young men in a community, but ineffective at responding to 
the community-related changes that come with increased income disparities between young 
men and women.  On the other hand, gender-sensitive indicators may also identify unintended 
positive impacts.  When idle young men find jobs, for example, domestic violence rates may 
drop appreciably.457  Such dynamics, if identified, will also help policymakers determine the best 
program design in a given circumstance, and will contribute to general knowledge benefiting 
all.  For example, new hypotheses about how gender equality improves communities’ resilience 
to violent extremism may be generated and tested through program evaluations using gender-
disaggregated data.  Most importantly, the consistent use of gendered indicators and other metrics 
will ensure that gender equality is not sacrificed for the purpose of advancing counter-terrorism 
efforts.  Finally, it is important to learn lessons from gender-rights advocates, who have analyzed the 
shortcomings of dominant monitoring and evaluation frameworks for understanding how change 
occurs in relation to gender.458  Those shortcomings—which include overly rigid or unidirectional 
models of social change and the ability to appreciate only what can be readily quantified—can be 
mitigated through the use of mixed methods in evaluation design, an attention to both positive 
and negative change, and an appreciation of the complexity of factors relevant to gendered change. 
Case Study: G-Youth, Kenya
G-Youth and 1207 Funding
In March 2008, USAID/Kenya sought to adopt a preventive approach to countering violent extremism that 
would bolster the inclusion of marginalized Muslim youth.459  To further that strategic framework, and with 
the support of 1207 funds from the DoD, USAID/Kenya commissioned EDC460 to undertake an assessment 
of youth development needs in Garissa, Kenya, and to design a program to address such challenges.461 
The resulting project is the Garissa Youth Project, known as G-Youth, which operates in Garissa Town, the 
provincial headquarters of the North Eastern Province in Kenya.462  USAID/Kenya also explicitly characterizes 
G-Youth as a “response” to the fact that Garissa’s high youth-unemployment rate (approximately 90 percent) 
“provides fertile ground for recruitment of young people into extremist and anti-social activities.”463  Notably, 
Al-Shabaab is present in the area in which G-Youth operates.464  The project’s original lifespan was October 
2008 to October 2010 with a budget of $2 million.465  A further two-year extension was launched in October 
2010, supported by $4.9 million in funds, $3.4 million of which is for counter-terrorism activities. 466  The 
remaining $1.5 million is for civic education and comes from a variety of other sources within USAID, 
including the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade.467
The fact that G-Youth receives 1207 funding is seen as simultaneously restrictive and permissive of the kinds 
of activities that USAID/Kenya and EDC can undertake.  On the former, EDC’s assessment and project design 
explicitly prioritized its 1207 (counter-terrorism) mandate, requiring it to narrow its focus to specific areas 
and male youth.468  Conversely, USAID/Kenya identified 1207 funds as more flexible than USAID funding that 
enabled USAID/Kenya to address critical needs in Garissa, such as giving more youth access to schooling and 
employment, and providing civic education.469  According to USAID/Kenya, there are no adverse effects of 
G-Youth’s dual role of keeping youth from extremist behavior while also bettering their lives, although there 
could potentially be such effects in theory.470  Despite clear and publicly available information about G-Youth’s 
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purpose, funding , and USAID/Kenya’s 
characterization of the program, neither 
EDC nor USAID/Kenya acknowledges 
G-Youth’s counter-extremism objectives 
when interacting with local populations.471
G-Youth Target s
From the outset, EDC identified the key 
at-risk profile as “secondary school students 
in forms III and IV (11th and 12th grades), 
graduates and, to a lesser extent, those 
who dropped out of secondary school.”472 
There was a clear gender component to 
this assessment, with (as noted above) EDC 
recommending that G-Youth beneficiaries 
should be sixty-five percent urban male 
youths and thirty-five percent female.473 
According to EDC, while G-Youth was 
designed to “provide services to males 
and females alike, emphasis will be placed 
upon males, as they are understood to be 
at higher risk of being pushed or pulled 
into extremist activities.”474  It is clear that 
this focus on males was driven by the project’s counter-terrorism objectives and funding source (1207) and 
did not match the development needs of both males and females in the community.475 
G-Youth Comp onent s
As a result of this explicit focus on male youth, G-Youth’s operation from 2008 to 2010 did not have a sustained 
or systematic approach to addressing the particular issues facing young women and girls in Garissa.  However, 
according to USAID/Kenya and EDC, the program has nonetheless sought to be both gender-inclusive and 
gender-sensitive.  This includes having women in the community feed into program design, and in terms of project 
administration, having three to four women participate in the ten-member Public Advisory Committee.476  The 
reasons for this gender inclusiveness are community demand,477 gender-sensitive perspectives of key project 
staff (e.g., at EDC),478 and the perception that female inclusion in counter-terrorism activities is key because of 
the role of girls in influencing behavior479 and as future mothers.480 
From 2008 to 2010, the main components of the G-Youth Project included:481  
 ▶ G-Youth Career Resource Center (CRC): G-Youth established a CRC in 2010 to “provide 
local youth with structured career development information, skills and opportunities to pursue 
careers and transition into higher education.”482  At the CRC, separate career-counselling spaces 
and computer areas are provided for males and females.483  This approach is designed to respect 
religious norms;484 although there have been complaints about inappropriate mixing of the sexes 
in practice, particularly in Youth Action (discussed below).485  Additionally, an AFRICOM Civil 
Affairs team is also meant to build a basketball court at the CRC—this has not yet happened, 
but EDC is cognizant that working with this team will create a perception issue for G-Youth.486 
The USAID-funded Garissa Youth Project in Kenyva created a Career Resource 
Center at the local library in order to provide a safe space for youth where they can 
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 ▶ North East Province Technical Training Institute (NEPTTI): EDC “works to strengthen 
the capacity of NEPTTI to secure, educate and link employment opportunities to students in a 
manner that lives with market realities in Garissa and surrounding cities.”487  While EDC’s campaign 
to market NEPTTI did not deliberately target women, women expressed interest in attending, and 
according to EDC, the number of afternoon and evening classes increased as a result.488 
 ▶ Sub-grants to NGOs: G-Youth provides sub-grants to partner NGOs that work to “strengthen 
the livelihood and employment skills of Garissan youth.”489  Notably, local women’s groups 
constituted four of the six potential NGO partners the EDC assessment identified as having the 
capacity to work with urban youth and to manage grant funding.490  The extent to which these 
partnerships actualized and their influence on the role of gender in programming is unclear.
 ▶ The Work Readiness Program (WRP): G-Youth runs WRP as its “primary activity for 
out-of-school youth.”491  While the initial intake capped women at fifty out of 150 places because 
of G-Youth’s counter-terrorism focus, women also expressed interest in the workplace training, 
and the next two intakes were gender balanced.492  However, from the fourth intake onward, 
the proportion of female participants dropped noticeably.493  EDC attributes this to a shift in 
the course format from an eighteen-week part-time course to a three-week full-time format—a 
move that was originally designed to address the number of male and female dropouts from the 
eighteen-week course494 but was not sufficiently attentive to local gender dynamics, which make 
it difficult for girls to be away from their family full-time for the course length.495  According to 
USAID/Kenya, the training course itself now involves a component on civic education, which 
allows young women to do plays that address cultural issues.496 
 ▶ Youth Action: G-Youth launched Youth Action in January 2010 “to engage and enable the 
youth of Garissa to become active participants in the design and implementation of programs 
and services that impact their lives and futures.”497  G-Youth held a number of summits in 2010, 
where a male and a female youth representing each of the thirty-six Garissa villages (bullas) are 
developed as youth leaders.498  According to EDC, there was a special effort to attract strong 
female youth leaders to the Youth Action program, and at the conclusion of the program, two 
women successfully used USAID grants to start a beauty parlor employing other women and 
a youth-led environmental movement.499  G-Youth also ran a Youth Action Summit, which 
included a “Young Women’s Village” event to provide “training to young women on how to 
develop their ideas and how to speak with confidence.”500
G-Youth’s extension may offer some scope for improved gender inclusiveness.  The next phase of G-Youth will 
extend its existing activities to focus on youth workforce-readiness training, Youth Action, youth education, 
and youth civics.501  As part of the extension, workforce-readiness training will move to the villages, which 
USAID/Kenya expects will allow more women to have access to the program.502  According to USAID/Kenya, 
the youth-civics component will incorporate a civic-education radio program that is also gender-sensitive 
and encourages women to be empowered and participate in community life.503  Additionally, G-Youth will 
provide scholarships for 1,000 vulnerable youth to attend secondary school, which will be distributed to 
ensure gender and clan equity.504  Other features of G-Youth’s extension appear to be less gender-inclusive 
or at least gender-neutral.  This includes plans to work with religious leaders to promote moderate views 
to youth, and English-language tuition in madrassas, as well as an $80,000 “tactical conflict and prevention” 
project that involves youth conducting surveys to monitor extremism in their communities.505 
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Monitor ing and Evaluation
According to USAID/Kenya, G-Youth is assessed according to the same kinds of indicators used in other 
development activities in Kenya, such as youth-education access, workforce-readiness training, and new 
business development.506  Under the terms of its grant, EDC is not required to include a focus on gender 
in its project evaluation, but will probably do so because such indicators are useful in tracking progress.507 
However, G-Youth was not evaluated prior to its extension in 2010, and USAID is building on the original 
assessment, which is less than two years old.508  This is consistent with the GAO’s concerns that “[b]ecause 
of limited monitoring and evaluation, State and DoD have made decisions about sustaining Section 1207 
projects without documentation on project progress or effectiveness.”509 
RECOMMENDATiONS
 ▶ USAID should provide general policy and operational clarity and transparency around 
its role in countering violent extremism, including by elaborating on how CVE drivers 
and traditional development processes are interlinked and how CVE work affects its 
development mandate.  It should, as a matter of priority, release its “first-ever policy on the 
role of development assistance in countering violent extremism and counterinsurgency” that 
was originally scheduled for release in February 2011.  
 ▶ In particular, USAID should supplement the existing analytical frameworks for 
countering violent extremism (the Guides) with a comprehensive gender analysis that, 
among other things, affirms that CVE projects and partnerships that undermine gender 
equality cannot be pursued.  This supplement should emphasize that gender analysis is mandatory 
and should explain in concrete terms how a gender perspective enables USAID and partners to more 
fully understand the enabling environment in which terrorism occurs and the gendered tools that 
are available to build a community’s resilience to terrorism.  The analytical guide should also identify 
best practices from a gender and CVE perspective on how to foster women and sexual minorities’ 
participation in ways that avoid backlash and reinforcing of stereotypes.  Additionally, the analytical 
framework should reiterate that CVE programming—as with all other USAID programming—should 
not undermine gender equality or replace gender-equality programming in a particular community.  
Finally, it should specify that in USAID CVE programs in at-risk communities, activities to address risk 
should be reconciled with, rather than prioritized over, community needs.
 ▶ Regarding individual projects, USAID and the DoD should provide greater clarity on 
project goals and targets, including, for example, whether such activities are directed at 
combating conditions that lead to violent extremism, challenging violent ideologies, or seeking 
to reduce terrorist recruitment.510  This will not only enhance the design of the project from 
a CVE perspective, but it will also enable the kind of context-specific gender analysis needed 
to ensure that the program does not negatively impact on gender and that gender equality 
programming is still being adequately represented in USAID’s overall activities.  
 ▶ All USAID programs to counter violent extremism should be required to undertake 
the mandatory gender analysis as set out in the agency’s ADS.
 ▶ In the USAID design document for projects that have a nexus to countering 
violent extremism, gender should be strongly emphasized as a cross-cutting theme 
that implementing partners are required to incorporate into program design, 
implementation, and assessment proposals.  This would include, for example, requiring 
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proposals to reflect on the specific approaches that would be taken to ensure participation 
of men and women in the CVE program under consideration, the setting of sex-disaggregated 
targets (see below), as well as information on how the implementing partner will seek to ensure 
that USG development assistance helps rather than hinders gender equality.
 ▶ USAID should explicitly require that input, output, and outcome indicators in 
implementing partners’ PMPs and USAID’s own reporting take account of gender, 
including, at a minimum, requiring that data be disaggregated on the basis of sex for each 
program activity.  The fact that USAID projects are supported by Complex Crises funding 
(previously known as DoD 1207 funding) does not obviate the need to conduct gender analysis.  
This will likely require developing custom indicators that fully encompass the unique nature of 
CVE programming that selects beneficiaries based on risk, not need.  For example:
 · Gender-sensitive indicators should be designed for each programming stage, and 
data sets should be disaggregated by gender and examined for evidence of gendered 
impacts, even where men and boys are the target beneficiaries of programming.  When 
new CVE-oriented indicators are developed, gender disaggregation should be required 
wherever feasible.  
 · Development hypotheses, including those about the gendered impacts of CVE 
programming, should be clearly identified in CVE program planning, and impact 
evaluations should be designed to capture causal links between the intervention and 
its gendered impacts.  
 · Like other USAID impact evaluations, where feasible CVE evaluations should use 
experimental design aimed at comparing treatment and control groups, but they 
should also include the use of qualitative methods and data to ensure that relevant 
gender-related impacts and dynamics that are not easily quantifiable are thoroughly 
examined.  New evidence about gendered dynamics gleaned from such evaluations 
should be built back into analytical and programming guides.
 ▶ To the greatest extent possible, USAID should bear sole or prime responsibility for 
the design, implementation, and assessment of USG CVE development activities 
with a view to mitigating the heightened negative impacts (on both human rights 
and project efficacy) that occurs when the U.S. military leads aid securitization.  
 ▶ To the extent that the DoD does undertake development programming, it should 
mandate that development activities require gender analysis and sensitivity, 
including specific outreach to women and sexual minorities, in the project’s design, 
implementation, and assessment phase to ensure that ostensibly gender-neutral measures 
do not have unintended consequences for human rights and that quick gains are not prioritized 
over the long-term commitment needed to ensure gender equality.  
 ▶ The USG should encourage community-led development while also ensuring that 
strategic shifts toward the use of local partners in programs to counter extremism are 
first assessed in terms of the specific impact they will have on women’s and LGBTI organizations, 
including ensuring that such organizations are not inadvertently excluded from participation in 
USG assistance because of their limited capacity to comply with USG reporting requirements.511 
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SECTiON iii: GENDER AND MiLiTARizED 
COUNTER-TERRORiSM 
Overview
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the USG developed an enhanced counter-terrorism 
role for the U.S. military, characterized by an “increasing role for conventional forces,” alongside an “increased 
emphasis on an indirect approach.”512  The latter is designed to extend traditional military capabilities to 
the “operational environments within which CT campaigns/operations are conducted” in order to “shape 
and stabilize those environments…to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their 
ability to acquire support and sanctuary.”513  This shift has had many consequences, a largely ignored 
one of which is how this enhanced role extends the U.S. military’s reach to more directly impact civilian 
populations, particularly women and LGBTI individuals, in its operational environments.  While the U.S. 
military has recently paid more attention to integrating a gender approach in its counter-terrorism efforts, 
it has not yet elevated gender analysis to the level needed to appropriately integrate gender and mitigate 
deleterious gendered impacts on affected men, women and sexual minorities.  These three trends—
increased militarization of counter-terrorism; corresponding impacts on women and LGBTI individuals; and 
failure to enhance gender integration to the level needed to respond to these shifts—are outlined briefly 
below and then explored in respect of four key areas: (1) gender integration in domestic and foreign national 
security apparatus; (2) gender impacts of USG and USG-supported military operations; (3) gender impacts 
of USG security assistance; and (4) gender integration in post-conflict and conflict-resolution programs. 
These trends are in addition to those observed above on the military’s role in development, where case 
studies showed that the DoD’s failure to include women and understand local gender dynamics and needs 
compromised both the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures and human rights protection.514
 ▶ Expanded militarization of counter-terrorism efforts: Under the USG’s current approach, 
counter-terrorism is considered to be part of a broader “Irregular Warfare” strategy515 that “involves 
a variety of operations and activities that occur in isolation or combined with conventional force 
operations”516 and includes five principal activities: counter-terrorism, unconventional warfare, 
counter-insurgency (COIN), stability operations, and foreign internal defense.517  In practice, the 
USG has, for example, used unconventional warfare518 and COIN519 tactics against the Taliban 
in Afghanistan post 9/11, with the latter understood to encompass the “[c]omprehensive 
civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances”520 
and to consist of political, economic, security, information, and control activities.521  COIN 
operations are supported by Civil Military Operations (CMOs) through “decisive and timely 
employment of military capabilities to perform traditionally nonmilitary activities that assist…
in depriving insurgents of their greatest weapon—dissatisfaction of the populace.”522  Alongside 
the military’s extension into non-traditional areas, it increasingly cooperates with other USG 
agencies to pursue counter-terrorism or COIN objectives.  For example, the DoD coordinates 
stability operations, particularly those involving “large-scale projects,” with USAID and these 
operations also require civil-affairs personnel.523  As part of its irregular warfare approach, the 
U.S. military also plays a significant role in developing foreign internal defense through indirect 
support (such as security-assistance programs);524 “[d]irect support (not involving combat 
operations)” such as civil-military operations; and U.S. combat operations.525 
Each of the DoD regional commands in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (United States Central 
Command [USCENTCOM],526 AFRICOM,527 United States European Command [EUCOM],528 
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and PACOM)529 conduct a range of direct and indirect measures to achieve the USG’s 
counter-terrorism objectives, including military operations, building the capacity of partner 
nations, and CMOs.  These efforts are complemented by those of the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM).530  To give one example of how these functions combine, 
USCENTCOM,531 conducts combat operations; “develop[s] and implement[s] theater-wide 
responses in the cyber and physical domains to disrupt and degrade militant networks”;532 
cooperates with, equips, trains, and conducts joint exercises with militaries;533 responds to crises 
(e.g., by delivering humanitarian aid to Pakistan in September 2010 following heavy flooding);534 
supports development and reconstruction to “establish the conditions for regional security, 
stability and prosperity”;535 works “as a part of an integrated civil-military effort to prevent 
security vacuums that foment extremism and provide sanctuary to VEOs [violent extremist 
organizations]”;536 and counters VEO efforts to use the “information environment to promulgate 
and reinforce their ideology.”537  USCENTCOM’s development and reconstruction work has been 
particularly marked in the USG’s COIN strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq.538  One significant COIN 
tool is the use of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq that “bring together civilian and military personnel 
to undertake the insurgency-relevant developmental work.”539  A second is the deployment of 
Female Engagement Teams (FETs) in Afghanistan and Iraq.540  
 ▶ New and expanded gender impacts: In some ways, the expanded militarization of the USG’s 
counter-terrorism efforts causes gender-based impacts that are routinely associated with military 
interventions: for example, it “serves to stereotype, marginalize and profile those who challenge 
or fall outside the boundaries of predetermined gender roles”;541 results in civilian casualties; 
increases widowed populations; and causes mass displacement, refugee flows, and human trafficking 
with gendered effects (see below).  However, militarization in the counter-terrorism context is 
particularly concerning from a gender perspective by virtue of its sheer breadth: militarization of 
counter-terrorism means not only the 
use of traditional military interventions 
to achieve counter-terrorism objectives, 
but it is also characterized by an 
increase in the role of the military in 
non-traditional military activities such as 
development and civil affairs, which by 
definition brings the military into closer 
contact with civilian populations, where 
females are predominately civilians. 
Similarly, the gendered rhetoric that has 
accompanied USG counter-terrorism 
military interventions has served to 
increase female and LGBTI vulnerability 
to terrorists who identify women, sexual 
minorities and their advocates with 
foreign oppositional forces (see below).  
 ▶ Minimal gender integration and 
analysis: There have been a number 
of recent efforts to incorporate gender 
analysis into military engagements, 
security-assistance packages ,  and 
military-civil activities.542  However, 
overall, systematic and sound gender 
U.S. Army Sfc. Sawyer Alberi, the brigade medical operations noncommissioned 
officer in charge with the 86th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, Task Force Wolverine, 
and native of Eden, Vt., and U.S. Army Maj. Lora Bowens, a nurse practitioner with 
86th IBCT and a Saint Albans, W. Va., resident, listen to the Women’s District Center 
head contractor discuss some programs that she would like to be funded for the 
women of the villages surrounding Charikar here Sept. 16. Alberi and Bowens are 
both members of the female engagement team that visited the center to help 
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analysis remains largely absent from USG military efforts to combat terrorism despite the new 
and myriad ways in which these efforts impact on women and sexual minorities.  The reasons 
for this absence vary.  According to USG officials: in military-to-military cooperation, gender 
equality is a lower priority than other human rights problems;543 gender does not come up in 
discussions about military operations with counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency objectives, 
as the discussion is more in terms of not killing civilians;544 and in the context of inter-agency 
operations it is primarily the role and responsibility of other agencies (such as USAID) to raise 
gender concerns.545  Some USG military officials have explained that it is not that “no one cares” 
about gender, but rather that no one has raised the issue546 and officials have not received 
sufficient information on how to effectively integrate gender into military operations.547  
Gender in National Security Apparatus: Opportunities and 
Challenges
O ver view 
Many of the USG officials interviewed for this Report highlighted FETs in Iraq and Afghanistan as emblematic 
of the USG’s increased attention to gender dynamics in U.S. military operations to counter terrorism.  In 
addition, the USG has promoted or supported the development of female counter-terrorism officers and units 
in other countries, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, and Bangladesh.  A case study of FETs below is followed 
by a discussion of these USG efforts to promote female participation in national security operations in other 
contexts.  Both discussions highlight the complex issues that arise in integrating gender into a country’s national 
security apparatus (including the military) and identify areas where integration may promote women’s rights 
and areas where it may undermine them, by considering the effects of inclusion on the women participating 
in national security institutions and the women in the communities with which they seek to interact.  These 
key issues and areas include, but are not limited to: the viability of the underlying rationale for women’s 
inclusion (such as whether inclusion is premised on national security or broader equality goals); whether 
security concerns specific to women who may be targeted as a result of their participation are identified and 
ameliorating measures put into place; whether women are adequately compensated to reflect added burdens 
where they exist; the extent to which women are being integrated in security forces at various levels of power 
and not just in junior or entry-level positions; adequacy of steps taken to ensure that male counterparts 
are properly engaged in inclusion efforts so they appreciate not only the benefit of female inclusion but 
that women have the right to be included; and, finally, whether women’s involvement in national security 
programming that is premised on female-to-female engagement reflects and responds to the needs of women 
in the communities in which they operate or instead adversely impacts these women.  
Less ons  f rom Female  Engagement Teams (FE Ts)  in  Afghanistan and I raq
 ▶ Gender rationale and origin of FETs: As expressed by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, the 
participation of women in counter-terrorism efforts should “be grounded on principles of gender 
equality, recognizing the unique gendered impacts of both terrorism and counter-terrorism 
measures.”548  While there are a number of rationales that underpin FETs, gender equality does 
not appear to be prominent.  In Iraq, the first FET, a group of twenty female soldiers attached 
to male combat units, was instituted in 2003 to respond to the fact that women who refused 
to be searched by male U.S. officers were hiding weapons and other contraband.549  As the 
FET, referred to as “Team Lioness,” began accompanying male units, military commanders 
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observed that both Iraqi men and women found them more approachable than their male 
counterparts.550  It has also been reported that FETs were able to “collect intelligence from them 
that the men wouldn’t have been able to get.”551  While the original Lioness team focused on 
searches, FETs’ current objective is broader and involves support missions for Civil Affairs Units; 
collecting information about the local economy; building rapport; providing aid; and discussing 
reconstruction efforts.552  In February 2009, the Marines adopted a similar “Lioness” approach in 
Afghanistan to facilitate interaction with the Afghan female population553 in light of the failure 
to previously consult women on quick impact and infrastructure projects.554  In addition, the 
use of FETs in Afghanistan was based on notions of the role and influence of Afghan women 
in their families to combat terrorism.  According to one USG military official, “If the women 
know we are here to help them, they will likely pass that on to their children…If the children 
have a positive perspective of alliance forces, they will be less likely to join insurgent groups or 
participate in insurgent activities.”555  One FET trainer also notes, “[t]he women are the biggest 
influence on the young children who might get swayed into the Taliban.  As males, we look 
up to our mothers as role models.”556  This approach has been criticized as premised on the 
“dubious assumption” that “Pashtun women not only wield great power at home but also know 
all that transpires for miles around.”557 
 ▶ Genesis of FETs: Following the initial FET, their development on a broader scale was “haphazard” 
or “ad hoc.”558  The military did not begin training FETs formally until March 2010, when it 
worked with 40 female Marines at Camp Pendleton in California.559  These teams are trained to 
make household visits in a structured way: after arriving in the village, the FETs “get permission 
from the male elder to speak with the women, settle into a compound, hand out school supplies 
and medicine, drink tea, make conversation and, ideally, get information about the village, local 
grievances and the Taliban.”560  More recently, FETs have been sent across sixteen locations in 
Helmand Province and to the more gender-segregated Pashtun areas in southern Afghanistan 
to assess the needs of Afghan women and “convey information, perform security searches, and 
whenever possible, win the support of Afghan mothers and daughters.”561  
 ▶ Gender and impacts on affected communities: From a gender and human rights perspective, 
the FETs’ impact has been mixed and has depended on a wide variety of factors.  Some factors 
are external to the FETs.  For example, in the southern Pashtun region in Afghanistan (which 
is, as noted above, an area of rigid gender segregation where local women are harder to access) 
Afghan men are more reluctant to allow the female Marines to speak to the Afghan women, 
female interpreters are a scarcity, and the teams have had their operations scaled back when 
their roles in combat have become politicized within the United States562 or when the Taliban 
has reportedly threatened clinics with bombs.563  In other cases, the community’s limited 
receptivity to FETs is tied to their status as U.S. soldiers.  For example, some female Marines have 
sympathized with the local women who are reluctant to engage with weapon-carrying Marines 
in their homes.564  Further, one women’s rights advocate at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop 
noted in respect of FETs in Iraq that, “female soldiers are associated with abuses such as Abu 
Ghraib and rude interactions.  I doubt that FETs change the acceptability of U.S. presence.”565  In 
addition to these factors, in some cases, well-intentioned FET projects simply misunderstand 
local women’s priorities.  For example, one FET “learned that village women walked more than 
an hour each day to get water, [and] had a well built in the village.  The village women had the 
well destroyed; that daily walk for water was their only chance to escape the house and be 
together.”566  In contrast, positive FET engagements reportedly occurred when FETs consulted 
with the community before developing projects and when program implementation reflected 
local norms.  For example, following consultation, a FET successfully organized a temporary 
medical clinic where women accompanied by male family members could receive medication 
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and examinations.567  However, a broader and more omnipotent concern is the extent to which 
the presence of FETs—and indeed of the U.S. military more broadly—endangers local women: 
for example, in one case, elders in a village implored troops (including a FET) not to spend 
the night there because it would invite insurgent attacks.568  While the FETs are cognizant of 
security concerns,569 these concerns are not always reflected in other parts of the U.S. military.  
For example, in one particularly egregious case, an abused woman reportedly accepted a FET’s 
repeated offer to help women by walking to a U.S. Army base with her children to provide 
intelligence about the Taliban.570  She was refused assistance, reportedly sent to a women’s 
shelter that didn’t actually exist, and subsequently imprisoned for several months before an 
international organization came to her aid.571  
 ▶ FETs and impacts on women in the U.S. military: The use of FETs occurs against a larger 
backdrop in which women in the U.S. military are formally denied combat roles, but in practice, 
through their attachment (versus assignment) to combat units are exposed to, or facilitate, 
combat operations.572  In March 2011, the Military Leadership Diversity Commission573 presented 
a report to Congress and the White House recommending that this ban on female assignment 
to combat operations be revoked.574  The U.S. Army is also currently reviewing this policy and is 
expected to release its determination in October 2011 on whether the ban should be revoked.575  
In relation to FETs specifically, it has been argued that this prohibition on women in combat 
has led to “one of the ironies of FETs that women soldiers, insufficiently trained to defend 
themselves, must still be escorted by men, just like Afghan women.”576  This increase of women 
on the battlefield, of which the FETs are a key example, has more generally afforded women the 
opportunity to have combat experience without the “disruption of discipline and unit cohesion 
that some feared”577 (which is particularly relevant given “promotion to many senior positions in 
the military is dependent on” combat experience 578), but it has simultaneously exposed female 
soldiers to sexual violence, the extent of which is such that Representative Jane Harman has 
stated, “[w]omen serving in the U.S. military are more likely to be raped by a fellow soldier than 
killed by enemy fire in Iraq.”579  Underreporting has compounded this issue—the DoD’s own 
estimates indicate that eighty to ninety percent of sexual assaults are unreported—as has the 
military’s notable unwillingness to prosecute perpetrators.580  
 ▶ Gender and FETs, moving forward: Hurdles to successful FET engagement include internal 
resistance to supporting FETs such as a lack of willingness “to establish full-time FETs” that 
are given the “resources and time to train as professionals should”; not involving FETs in the 
planning of operations; USG commanders’ assumption that talking to women “will pay no 
dividends”; and the assumption, as in Afghanistan, that Pashtun men will be offended by the 
engagement.581  The efficacy of FETs is also circumscribed by the military deployment structure 
(in the words of one advocate at CHRGJ’s MENA Workshop, “they come and go” in short 
deployments)582 and the fact that FETs make repeat visits less than fifty percent of the time and 
sometimes fail to follow through on a prior group’s undertaking (for example, some Afghan 
women were angry when a FET returned without seeds promised during its last visit).583  In such 
cases, the potential for positive impacts that could result from multiple visits is diminished.  
While more research is needed to ascertain the impact of FETs on women in the U.S. military 
and the local women and communities with which they engage, it is possible to make some 
preliminary observations on gender and best practices in FET engagements.  First, it is important 
that FETs receive gender-sensitive guidance to avoid endangering women in the communities 
in which they are deployed.  However, to date, the training of FETs appears insufficient to 
enable them to understand the complex gender dynamics in these communities.  For example, 
it has been reported that in some FET training for Afghanistan, none of the recommended 
readings were about Afghan women, there were no lessons on Afghan manners, and the 
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prepared questions for Afghan women were based on lessons initially intended for male-to-male 
conversations that women would be unable to answer.584  This absence of core training in these 
areas is lamentable.  For example, in one case, Afghan doctors “begged” a FET who tried to 
teach pregnancy and child-care classes to leave because the soldiers were not expected and the 
community distrusted FETs after a previous visit, when they had searched female patients at the 
clinic gate in front of male Afghans and U.S. troops.585  The result of such insufficient sensitivities 
is not merely a missed engagement opportunity, but an adverse impact on local women’s access 
to health care.  In the example just referenced, female patients who had walked several miles 
to reach the clinic turned around when they saw the troops.586  Second, these examples reflect 
the need observed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism for local consultation on the basis 
that “marginalization of those voices who understand the realities of gender inequality on the 
ground...is a significant barrier to the full realization of human rights and should be reversed.”587
Promoting Women’s  Inclus ion in  Foreign Unit s  to  Counter  Terror
In addition to deploying FETs, the USG (including through the DoD) has supported or promoted the 
use of female counter-terrorism officers in other countries.  Some of these programs, such as in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, particularly exemplify the challenges of integrating women in national security apparatus.  For 
example, in October 2008, the USG established and funded the “Daughters of Iraq.”588  The objective of the 
unit is to work with Iraqi police to search women at checkpoints to reduce increased reliance on female 
suicide bombers and the threat of male bombers that dress like women.589  For many Iraqi women, joining 
the “Daughters of Iraq” was a means of survival, as one officer explains: “Joining the Banat al-Iraq was the 
only way to survive…Nobody sees how much we have sacrificed, how much trouble we have supporting 
our families.”590  However, membership in the “Daughters of Iraq” also involves considerable risk, with some 
officers enduring threatening phone calls for participating in the program.591  In addition, any initial positive 
opportunities this engagement may have offered have since diminished: the Iraqi government has taken 
over management of the program, with the result that many female officers have not been paid in nearly a 
year and Iraqi officials nonetheless pressure these women, many of whom are war widows or their family’s 
only breadwinners, to keep working “as a matter of duty to Iraq and their slain husbands, even as some 
sank into debt.”592  The USG also trains policewomen in Afghanistan on the basis that women can conduct 
certain counter-terrorism operations and “perform tasks men cannot do, including searching women and 
homes.”593  However, Afghan female police officers routinely face threats (including, in some cases, ambush 
and assassination); discrimination (including limits on promotion and lower salary than their male peers); and 
inadequate protective measures (they are not given “new armored cards [sic], body armor, or bodyguards, 
even though they are more vulnerable” than their male colleagues).594  Outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, the 
USG also trains and assists Yemen’s Counter-Terrorism Unit, which now includes women.595  These female 
units “conduct house, family and female body searches”596 and are designed to capture terrorists who seek to 
use women’s dress to evade capture.597  However, they also face endemic gendered challenges and according 
to one female member of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, “[f]or society it’s something strange, for me, that’s 
what I want to be doing.”598  
While the exact scope of the USG’s assistance to Bangladesh’s counter-terrorism force, the Rapid Action 
Battalion (RAB), is unclear,599  RAB activities also provide an insight into both the opportunities and limits 
of women’s participation in national security institutions.  The RAB includes women police officers to “deal 
with women arrestees during raids”600 and has apprehended a number of alleged female terrorists.601  This 
inclusion of women in the RAB and their relative effectiveness in investigating incidents of stalking and 
sexual harassment have also apparently made the force more approachable to some community members, 
including women.602  The RAB has nonetheless been implicated in severe human rights abuses that have 
drawn international condemnation (including from the United States)603 and that cast skepticism on claims 
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that the inclusion of women in national security institutions makes those forces inherently more peaceful 
and rights-protective.  More generally, human rights groups have also expressed concern that the USG 
has failed to push for RAB’s disbandment despite its human rights record because it sees it as a critical 
counter-terrorism ally, thereby prioritizing security cooperation over human rights.604  
Gender impacts of USG and USG-Supported Military Operations
As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism notes regarding “[g]endered targeting and militarization”: “Those 
subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between targeting by terrorist groups and the State’s 
counter-terrorism measures that may fail to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish these acts and may 
also perpetrate new human rights violations with impunity.”605  This “squeezing effect”606 is borne out in 
USG and USG-supported military engagements in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen, 
where both terrorists and governments focus on women and LGBTI individuals to advance their agendas 
and the governments’ failure to protect women and sexual minorities from non-State violence emboldens 
terrorist actors (see below). 
Pro l i feration of  Non-State  Vio lence and Fai lure  to  Protect
The DoD’s Office of the Special Coordinator for Rule of Law and 
International Humanitarian Policy608 notes that the challenge 
of civilian protection is one that the USG seeks to address 
in all military operations, including COIN strategy.609  These 
challenges of civilian protection can be uniquely gendered. 
For example, in Afghanistan, it has been widely observed that 
the USG’s rhetoric for going to war in 2001 to “save” Afghan 
women was heavily gendered.610  However, less frequently 
noted are the ways in which this rhetoric further sets women 
up to be subsequent targets of terrorist violence.  According to 
CHRGJ’s interview with an Amnesty International researcher, 
terrorists are targeting women in Afghanistan partly because 
of this emphasis on women’s rights: “There is 100% targeting 
of women’s groups—even very small ones.  There is in both Pakistan and Afghanistan a sense that because 
women’s and girl’s rights are championed in the West, they become part of the war.”611  Indeed, one of the 
complexities of the USG’s (and other governments’) promotion of Afghan women’s rights and participation 
in public life has been that as women increasingly exercise their rights, they also come under attack from 
violent extremists who explicitly target them for choosing to work (including for international or foreign 
organizations), go to school, or run for political office.612  The explanation for this inadvertent outcome lies 
in part in the observation of an Amnesty International researcher, that the USG and others “highlight gender 
issues just enough to make it worse, but not enough to get stuff done.”613  This conundrum is explored more 
fully below.
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq, there has been a surge in State and non-State gender-based violence 
against women and LGBTI individuals, with patently inadequate responses from both the Iraqi Government614 
and the USG (see below).  Women in Iraq currently experience gender-based abuse, including sexual 
violence, from a multitude of actors, including “members of Islamist armed groups, militias, Iraqi government 
forces, foreign soldiers within the US-led Multinational Force, and staff of foreign private military security 
contractors.”615  The DoS has recognized the impact of this pervasive violence, noting that “[t]he security 
“ W e  s u f f e r e d  u n d e r  t h e 
S addam Huss ein  regime;  we 
d o n’t  w a n t  to  s u f f e r  m o re 
under  the U.S .  and U.K .” 
I raqi  Women’s  R ight s 
Advo c ate ,  MENA Stakeholder 
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situation disproportionately affects women’s ability to work outside the home.”616  There are numerous 
examples of gender-based targeting by terrorists since the U.S. invasion.  For example, young boys are 
reportedly raped in order to shame them into becoming suicide bombers.617  In addition, there have been 
reports of terrorist groups beheading and raping women trying to be part of public life,618 and female 
politicians have been targeted, and in some cases killed, by non-State actors, including Al-Qaeda.619  Women 
have also been killed for not veiling and being “made up,”620 such that “Islamic extremists [have] targeted 
women for undertaking normal activities, such as driving a car and wearing trousers, in an effort to force 
them to remain at home, wear veils, and adhere to a conservative interpretation of Islam.”621  Various human 
rights groups have highlighted the nexus of these and other private acts of violence (such as trafficking [see 
below]) to the U.S. military presence.  For example, the Organization of Women’s Freedom in Iraq (OWFI) 
explains that “[o]usting the government and all systems of security left Iraqi cities vulnerable…to gangs of 
men who kidnapped women and girls and assaulted them sexually…Borders with other countries were in a 
state of chaos and made easy the trafficking of kidnapped or destitute females.”622  One Iraqi women’s rights 
advocate at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop attributes the surge in terrorist violence to the U.S. presence 
by explaining, “the more the U.S. is present in Iraq, the more radicalization takes place...terrorist recruits are 
among the poor, within a small and young age range from impoverished areas…They joined because they 
felt no other hope.  Before the invasion, Iraqis weren’t all Al-Qaeda’s army.”623  
Box 5. Targeting of LGBTi individuals in iraq: USG Role 
and Responsibility  
Terrorist and State Violence against LGBTI persons
In October 2009, New York Magazine exposed the brutal killing of gay men in Iraq as a means 
for militias to exploit anti-gay prejudice to shore up public support.624  There is complete 
impunity for these actions: in 2010 and 2011, the USG reported that Iraqi “[a]uthorities had 
not announced any arrests or prosecutions of any persons for killing, torturing, or detaining any 
LGBT individuals.”625  Moreover, there are numerous reports that Iraqi police and security forces 
are themselves targeting, apprehending, and torturing Iraqi men who are suspected of being 
gay,626 including through torturing and executing gay men in the Interior Ministry in Baghdad627 
and apprehending and handing over gay men to militias for further abuse.628  
USG Role and Responsibility
The USG’s role in, and responsibility for, these attacks falls into three main areas.  First, a number 
of reports trace the surge in discrimination and violence against Iraqi men to the U.S. invasion, 
such that “[a]fter the invasion…gays and lesbians were driven underground by sectarian violence 
and religious extremists.”629  In addition, one non-governmental actor claims he targets Iraqi gay 
men because “they work with the Zionists, with the Americans.”630  This nexus has also been 
described as follows: 
In the wake of the surge in American troops and the increase in strength of the Iraqi 
military and police forces, Iraq’s once-powerful Sunni and Shia militias have wound 
down their attacks against American forces and one another.  Now they appear to 
be repositioning themselves as agents of moral enforcement, exploiting anti-gay 
prejudice as a means of engendering public support.631  
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In addition, advocates from the region argue that the presence of the occupying forces led 
many LGBTI individuals to believe that society would be freer and encouraged them to be 
more public with their sexuality, only to be subsequently targeted by violent extremists for 
advocating for their rights and left unprotected.632  
Second, the USG trains Iraqi police633 who, as discussed above, are also implicated in their 
attacks.  The USG has also been criticized elsewhere for providing funding, training, and arms 
to Iraqi militias that perpetrate gender-based violations.634  Third, the USG’s immediate and 
long-term response to these allegations has been at best mixed, and at worst, inadequate.635 
While it was reported in 2009 that the DoS was looking into these allegations,636 in June 2010 the 
U.S. Embassy in Baghdad stated “[w]e have no evidence that GOI [Government of Iraq] security 
forces are in any way involved with these militias.”637  More broadly, there is a concern that the 
USG’s failure to take action on this front is attributable either to the sense that “there is only so 
far Americans can push the Iraqi government without inadvertently causing a backlash on gay 
Iraqis”638 or because of more overarching political concerns, including “not upset[ting] the Iraqi 
government.”639  In addition to failing to take concrete action in Iraq itself, the USG has been 
criticized for not prioritizing the resettlement of Iraqi LGBTI individuals to the United States,640 
despite the fact that “America has a singular responsibility to protect these men.  Although 
homosexuality was by no means permitted under Saddam Hussein’s regime, only after the U.S. 
















Homosexual Iraqi ‘Sami’ poses for portraits in the empty apartment where he is staying in an undisclosed location on Sept. 10, 
2009. After being tortured in Iraqi, many Iraqi homosexuals are seeking refuge.  Original Caption
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U.S. militarized counter-terrorism activities aiming to eradicate violent extremist forces outside of conflict 
zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq are also reportedly emboldening extremist forces with adverse gender 
impacts.  In general terms, it has been argued that Al-Qaeda uses increased USG (and U.K.) activity in Yemen 
as “propaganda to win over the support of locals and discredit the Yemeni government,”642 and that alongside 
the growth in the U.S. military presence, Yemen has “transformed from being a place for terrorists to hide out 
or train to a place where militants can participate in jihad.”643  This shift has implications for women’s rights. 
A national security expert at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop observed that recent Al-Qaeda propaganda 
claiming that drones were taking photos of Yemeni women may be having a detrimental impact on women 
who are then forced to stay at home.644  Relatedly, in late March 2011, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
declared the Abyan province in south Yemen an “Islamic Emirate,”645 and its first decree was to forbid women 
from leaving their homes except for under urgent circumstances, and even then only if accompanied by a 
male relative.646  A Palestinian LGBTI advocate at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop also argued that Israel’s 
occupation, as supported by the United States, increases radicalization and makes it more difficult to 
organize with Israeli LGBTI organizations, with detrimental impacts on LGBTI individuals.647  
Fai lure  to  Resp ect  Women’s  and LGBTI  R ight s
In addition to likely contributing to, and failing to protect, women and LGBTI individuals from terrorist 
violence, the U.S. military is implicated in a series of direct gender-based violations against men and women in 
its pursuit of counter-terrorism or COIN objectives.  While the most well-known examples of such violations 
include the use of rape, sexual assault, and other gendered interrogation techniques against both male and 
female detainees (such as in Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay),648 other core gendered impacts include:
 ▶ Civilian casualties: Women have reportedly borne the brunt of civilian casualties that result 
from USG-led air raids in Iraq.649  In addition, an Afghan women’s rights advocate in our MENA 
Stakeholder Workshop noted that in relation to Afghanistan: “Who is suffering the civilian 
casualties?  Women are the first victims and nobody is listening.  Talking about women’s rights 
is a joke to those in control.”650  Further, while estimates vary, reports indicate that the USG’s use 
of drone attacks in Pakistan have resulted in a significant number of civilian casualties,651 despite 
the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) purportedly takes “gender” into account 
when assessing whether an individual is a civilian and, “[a]s a general rule, a woman is counted 
as a non-combatant.”652  Family members of targeted individuals are particularly affected, either 
because they themselves are killed (family members reportedly made up the majority of civilians 
killed by CIA drone attacks between mid-2008 to mid-2010653) or because operations that kill 
male family members leave female family members particularly vulnerable to marginalization, 
rights’ deprivation, and abuse (see discussion regarding widows below).  These adverse impacts 
in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq, are exacerbated by inadequate civilian casualty compensation 
schemes.  For example, in Afghanistan and Iraq the USG has failed to adequately compensate 
family members of civilians killed or injured by Coalition Forces.654  In Pakistan, “[d]rone victims 
receive no assistance from the Pakistani or US governments, despite the existence of Pakistani 
compensation efforts for other conflict-victims and US compensation mechanisms currently 
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan.”655  In Pakistan, one women who lost her husband, son, and 
home as a result of a drone strike explains that her situation is “desperate” and argues that 
“definitely the government or military should provide compensation and it should be provided 
timely and without any further delay…in the short-term I need my house reconstructed and in 
the long-term I need compensation for my husband’s and son’s deaths.”656 
 ▶ Widows:  The war in Iraq has created a significant population of widowed women (an estimated 
one in eleven women aged fifteen to eighty is a widow)657 who, along with other women face 
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dire poverty; lack access to government services such as clean water, healthcare, sanitation, 
and electricity; and are unable to access financial assistance from the Iraqi Government.658  
While in theory the Iraqi Government does provide some assistance to widows, this is only 
approximately US$50 per month, with an additional US$12 per month for each child, and is 
difficult to obtain—only approximately 120,000 widows (about one-sixth of the widowed 
population) have received the government stipend.659  The USG takes a particular interest in 
this issue660 following Secretary of State Clinton’s visit to Iraq in 2009,661 during which she met 
with Iraqis “including women and war widows…[and] told them the Obama Administration 
will stand by them in their travails.”662  In Pakistan, women who have lost their spouses—be it 
from militant violence, the Pakistani government’s offensive against militants (supported by the 
USG663), or USG activities such as drone strikes664—experience “long-lasting instability” where 
“[s]trictly defined gender roles leave widows and their children marginalized, and vulnerable.”665  
Widowhood under these circumstances also has significant psychological impacts: “One man 
described the anguish of his sister-in-law, who lost her husband and two sons in a US drone 
strike: ‘After their death she is mentally upset…she is always screaming and shouting at night 
and demanding me to take her to their graves.’”666  In addition, gender-based vulnerabilities 
result from the fact that “[w]idows often must rely on other male relatives to do everything 
that is required to access assistance and entitlements, such as open bank accounts, cash checks, 
register with authorities, and physically go to aid distribution points.”667  Women are also 
susceptible to abuse by male relatives, such as male in-laws, who “may claim to be legal heir of 
the husband and receive compensation instead of the wife and children.”668  As discussed above, 
based on publicly available information, these victims receive no compensation from either the 
USG or the Pakistani government.669  
 ▶ Trafficked persons:  The situation in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates a mixture of both State 
and non-State involvement in trafficking in persons in the aftermath of the U.S. presence.670  For 
example, in Afghanistan it has been argued that the “climate of insecurity and impunity [after 
the invasion] has produced new forms of powerlessness for many Afghan women and girls, who 
have been widowed, displaced, trafficked, and forced into marriage as a direct or indirect result 
of the conflict.”671  Indeed, according to the USG, since the U.S. invasion in 2001, Afghanistan has 
become a destination country for trafficking.672  A range of private actors has perpetrated this human 
trafficking; for example, the USG has stated that international security contractors “may” be involved 
in trafficking of persons for sexual exploitation673 and that extremist groups traffic young boys to 
training camps.674  As the latter example demonstrates, men and boys have also been victims of 
human trafficking in the burgeoning security crisis in Afghanistan.  Further, according to the USG, 
“[a]t the end of 2009 and beginning of 2010, an increasing number of male migrants from Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, and India who migrated willingly to Afghanistan were then subjected to forced labor.”675  
Other reports indicate that foreign contractors in Afghanistan have hired Afghan “dancing boys,”676 a 
practice which, depending on the circumstances, may constitute trafficking.677  In addition to these 
patterns, according to an Afghan women’s rights advocate, Afghan women are trafficked by gangs 
who offer families a sizable bride price on the pretext of marriage and then exploit the women 
obtained.678  This advocate also notes that women are being trafficked to Afghanistan from Pakistan 
and Iran and that law enforcement agencies, for a variety of reasons, fail to act on these reports.679  
Similarly, in Iraq, the “US-led war and the chaos it has generated” is cited as one of the contributing 
factors to an increase in sex trafficking and prostitution.680  While it can be difficult to ascertain the 
exact scope of these impacts—including because some reports on the phenomenon conflate sex 
trafficking with prostitution—significant questions persist about the extent to which the USG’s 
presence and U.S. personnel in Iraq facilitate sex and labor exploitation.  For example, the OWFI has 
documented one case in which a woman was forced to marry a translator for a U.S. base in Tikrit 
after U.S. forces detained her brother.681  She was then coerced into helping her husband use their 
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apartment to “entertain” U.S. military officers, including through providing different girls.682  Private 
military contractors have also allegedly trafficked Nepali men to Iraq to work on U.S. bases.683  A 
multitude of human rights violations result from these instances of trafficking.  In Iraq, for example, 
women and girls who allege that they are victims of trafficking have been imprisoned “for unlawful 
acts committed as a result of being trafficked”684 and women forced into sex work have been 
subsequently killed because it shames their families.685  According to an Iraqi women’s rights advocate 
at our MENA Stakeholder Workshop, in one case a girl was trafficked to Dubai, deported back to Iraq 
and imprisoned, and then forced into becoming a suicide bomber because jihadis pay the families of 
female suicide bombers for their martyred female relatives.686
Further, in an interview with CHRGJ, an Afghan women’s rights advocate explained that through 
its implementing partner, the Colombo Plan, the DoS is supporting temporary transit shelters 
for female survivors of violence, including trafficked women.687  This effort is funded by the 
Bureau of International Narcotic and Law Enforcement Affairs and includes support to a local 
NGO to train police.688  These efforts are commendable, as there is a dire need for shelters 
to provide victim assistance,689 and shelters need security and long-term financial support to 
continue providing services and conducting trainings to sensitize the police and prosecutors 
to victims’ needs.690  However, women housed at these temporary shelters are asked to work 
with the police to prosecute traffickers and pimps, and it appears that staying at shelters may 
require such cooperation.691  While USG support to women’s shelters serves a critical need in 
Afghanistan, it should reject the practice of conditioning assistance on a victim’s willingness to 
cooperate with law enforcement as antithetical to the human rights of trafficked persons.692
 ▶ Internal displacement and refugee populations:  USG drone attacks693 and other 
USG-supported military activities in Pakistan;694 USG military operations in Afghanistan695 and Iraq;696 
and USG drone attacks697 and other USG-supported military activities in Yemen;698 have caused mass 
internal displacement with disproportionate impacts on women and girls.  The gender dimensions 
of the Iraqi refugee problem bear particular reflection here.  Among those who have had to leave 
Iraq since the beginning of the 2003 U.S. invasion, the majority have fled to countries in the region,699 
including Syria,700 Jordan,701 and Lebanon.702  In Syria, Iraqi refugees are unable to legally work, and 
in Jordan, the vast majority of Iraqi refugees is unable to obtain residency cards and therefore also 
cannot work.703  In Syria, acute stress for male refugees and their families results from working illegally, 
unemployment, and poor living conditions.704  One identified outcome of this stress has been an 
increase in domestic violence.705  In general terms, female refugee victims are reluctant to report any 
abuse to the police because of their “uncertain legal status and fears of deportation.”706  Similarly, 
in Jordan, “the stress of living in cramped quarters compounded by the loss of displacement” 
has reportedly contributed to an increase in domestic violence within the refugee population.707  
Because, as noted above, the vast majority of refugees are not permitted to hold jobs in Syria and 
Jordan, many women have turned to, or have been forced into, the sex trade to support themselves 
and their families.708 Despite this, in 2009, many Iraqi women refugees were still resisting returning 
to Iraq because of gender-specific concerns about their situation upon return, including the lack of 
economic support for widows, “rising conservatism,” and the potential for “honor killings.”709  Many 
gay Iraqis have also reportedly fled to Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan to escape the persecution described 
in detail above.710  These individuals’ needs are under-met because most assistance programs focus 
on families, women, and children, rather than single men.711  A LGBTI rights advocate at our MENA 
Stakeholder Workshop also explained that increased border security in Lebanon and Syria makes it 
more difficult for refugees fleeing violence in Iraq to get into those countries.712  The USG has been 
criticized for failing to adequately respond to this crisis (see Box 5. Targeting of LGBTI Individuals in 
Iraq: USG Role and Responsibility) and has been called upon to facilitate expedited processing for 
LGBTI refugees and trafficking victims to be resettled in the United States.713  
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Gender impacts of USG Security Assistance 
As noted above, the USG provides a wide range of security training and assistance to foreign militaries and 
security sectors, including through the DoS Foreign Military Finance (FMF) program,715 the IMET Program,716 
the Global Train & Equip Program Section 1206 Funding,717 the ILEA,718 the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) 
Program,719 and the Transnational Crime Affairs Section.720  In addition, through COIN, the USG seeks to 
develop the “affected nation’s military force” and the security sector more broadly.721  
From a gender and human rights perspective there are three main concerns about USG security assistance 
to achieve counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency objectives.  First, the USG’s uneven and, in some cases, 
inadequate vetting of forces it trains or funds can contribute to impunity for human rights violations, including 
gender-based violence.  U.S. law restricts the DoS from providing funds to a unit “of the security forces 
of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross 
human rights,” through legislation commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment.722  A version of the Leahy 
Amendment is also found in the DoD Appropriations Act of 2001.723  However, the GAO has repeatedly 
identified inadequacies and “lapses” in the USG’s vetting procedures, including in respect of assistance in 
key counter-terrorism partnerships.724  At CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshop in Asia, a women’s rights advocate 
raised similar concerns that in Nepal monitoring compliance with the Leahy Amendment is still an issue.725  In 
addition, there is an unevenness built into vetting processes, with the DoD having more leeway than the DoS 
in some circumstances.  For example, an official from the DoS Bureau of Political-Military Affairs explains that 
this discrepancy is why the DoS has cut off IMET funding to the Kopassus Unit in Indonesia, whereas in July 
2010,726 the DoD was able to resume Title X funding assistance to Kopassus727 in the face of much criticism.728  
Second, in certain instances, USG support and training of local 
militaries for counter-terrorism exercises increases militarization 
and military impunity in that country with detrimental 
gender impacts.  In general terms, U.S. partner governments’ 
militarizing to combat terrorism has acute and adverse gender 
impacts .729  However, according to CHRGJ’s Stakeholder 
Workshops (particularly in Asia), USG training and assistance 
does not mitigate such impacts and may instead exacerbate 
them.  For example, the USG supported the Ethiopian invasion 
of Somalia in late 2006, with the latter regressing women’s rights 
enjoyment and squeezing female leaders between Al-Shabaab 
and the Transitional Federal Government.730  In other cases, 
the concern is that USG training and funding muscularizes 
militaries which then go on to commit gender-based abuses, 
including in the name of countering terrorism (see the 
example from Lebanon below).  Rights advocates also argue 
that USG funding and training to local militaries can deter 
accountability discussions because the military contends 
that it is U.S.-trained and therefore has the USG’s stamp of 
approval.731  This imprimatur of USG support makes it more 
difficult to oppose local government action, because human rights advocates are by implication seen to 
be also challenging the United States.732  In addition, in Nepal, there have been trainings during which U.S. 
officials share their experiences in handling military cases through commissions, which directly undercuts 
the efforts of Nepali women’s human rights defenders who are resisting militarization and impunity for 
violations by the military.733  In a similar vein, it has been argued that AFRICOM’s training of local militaries 
for counter-terrorism exercises undermines gender activists’ efforts to promote demilitarization.734  
“ P o l i c e  g e t t i n g  m o r e 
re s o u rc e s  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y 
a  go o d  th i n g .   By  i n c rea s i n g 
t h e i r  p o w e r  y o u  i n c r e a s e 
e n tr a p m e n t … Yo u  a re  g i v i n g 
th em m o n e y  an d p ower  an d 
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minds  c ampaigns  on them?”
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Third, the USG fails to sufficiently track and condemn gendered human rights abuses that U.S.-supported 
forces perpetrate during counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations, thereby  appearing to enable 
and legitimize gender-based violence (such as widespread sexual violence by Ethiopian forces in the Ogaden 
region in eastern Ethiopia).735  The failure to condemn such abuses is closely linked to a broader failure 
to track how foreign partners use USG security assistance.  For example, in Lebanon, the DoS provides 
significant security assistance to the Lebanese Government and particularly Lebanon’s security services, 
the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF), to “address border security, counter 
negative extremist elements, and curb the influence of Syria and Iran.”736  However, LGBTI advocates argue 
that USG assistance to the ISF increases street surveillance by an intolerant force, which further marginalizes 
LGBTI individuals.737  One advocate notes that after receiving U.S. assistance, the police are now “catching 
people in cruising places because of the new Dodges provided by the USG.  It is like a vice squad or morality 
police.”738  He argues that in an oppressive regime, the more you train or assist police or military forces, the 
more resources they have to commit rights violations and oppress minorities.739  The failure of the USG to 
exercise adequate oversight of this type of assistance compounds these concerns.740 
Gender integration in Post-Conflict and Conflict-Resolution 
Programs 
The USG, particularly under the leadership of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Verveer, has strongly emphasized 
the need to address the concerns of women and girls in conflict-resolution and post-conflict measures and 
to include women as key stakeholders in the reconciliation and reintegration programs that impact their 
lives.742  In many ways, Afghanistan represents the starkest current example of the USG’s immense challenges in 
realizing these gender commitments in practice.743  Indeed, on February 18, 2011, Secretary Clinton announced 
a “new phase” in USG diplomatic efforts in Afghanistan, characterized by a shift toward communicating with 
the Taliban.744  While she specifically highlighted the continued importance of ensuring women’s participation 
and the rights of Afghan women and minorities,745 it is unclear how this can be guaranteed in negotiations 
with the Taliban.  In this regard, while some local women’s rights advocates view negotiations with the Taliban 
as necessary for peace,746 other advocates have repeatedly raised concerns about what negotiations with the 
Taliban, with a view toward including them in the Afghan government, may mean for women’s rights and the 
ability to maintain the minimal gains achieved since the Taliban’s ouster.747  
Accordingly, notwithstanding the support of Secretary 
Clinton,748 the concerns moving forward are threefold. 
The first concern is that Afghan women will not be 
adequately included in reconciliation processes.749  This 
fear is firmly based on women’s prior exclusion from 
peace-building efforts (such as when Afghan women 
were poorly represented in two key international 
consultations on Afghanistan, the London Conference750 
and the Kabul Conference)751 and the fact that while 
President Karzai has repeatedly stated that women’s 
rights in Afghanistan will not be compromised or 
sacrificed,752 his record to date contradicts this claim.753 
The second concern is that there has been a marked 
shift in rhetoric amongst Western governments, such 
that “today the treatment of women under the Taliban 
is increasingly being dismissed as part of local culture. 
“One Afghan woman s a id  to  me , 
‘What  would it  take  for  the  a l l ies 
to  kn ow that  by  ab an d o ni ng  u s , 
i t  w i l l  h i t  t h e m  l a t e r  o n ? ’  T h a t 
v i o l e n c e  t h a t  m a n i f e s t s  i t s e l f 
with  us  wi l l  spread .   The Tal ib an 
star ted with us ,  then Afghan men, 
then America ,  and the world .” 
Z a i n a b  S a l b i ,  F o u n d e r ,  Wo m e n  f o r 
Women International 741
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This apparent change in attitude in the west is seen as a consequence of the British and US governments’ desire 
to extricate themselves from a messy, expensive and time-consuming war.”754  Third, advocates worry that the 
USG and Afghan government will appease extremist forces at the price of gender equality, using women’s rights 
as “currency” in exchange for peace.755  According to both local and international women’s rights advocates, 
strong international pressure and commitment to supporting Afghan women in their role in reconciliation 
processes is required to avoid these outcomes.756  
RECOMMENDATiONS 
To ensure gender analysis and integration undergirds all USG military efforts to 
combat terrorism:
 ▶ Prioritize efforts to adopt the USG’s UNSCR 1325 National Action Plan and ensure that the 
National Action Plan specifically contemplates how UNSCR 1325 norms and guidance on 
women, peace, and security can be brought to bear in situations where military operations 
have a counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism objective.  In addition, the National Action 
Plan should address how women’s advocates and organizations can undertake the types of 
peace-building and other activities UNSCR 1325 contemplates, in areas where there is terrorist 
activity, without falling afoul of U.S. anti-terrorism financing law (see below Section IV).  
While promoting inclusion in national security measures to advance 
counter-terrorism objectives: 
 ▶ Recognize the role of women and LGBTI individuals as stakeholders in, and critical contributors 
to, the design and implementation of counter-terrorism measures and in combating terrorism.
 ▶ Ensure that such participation furthers, and does not undermine, the rights of participants, 
including by premising participation on principles of gender equality and non-discrimination 
rather than gender stereotypes; ensuring that inclusion is not tokenistic; and engaging male 
counterparts to appreciate the benefit and the right of inclusion of women and LGBTI individuals.  
 ▶ Recognize and respond to the fact that as a result of inclusion, women and LGBTI individuals 
may experience unique and gender-specific security concerns, including as a result of increased 
targeting from terrorist and insurgent groups.  
 ▶ Ensure that FETs receive gender-sensitive guidance to avoid endangering women in the 
communities in which they are deployed; base engagements and programs on adequate 
advance consultation with women and sexual minorities in the community about their needs; 
and conduct a gender analysis prior to engagement to assess whether outreach to women will 
create additional burdens or undermine local movements.  
To protect women and sexual minorities from terrorism: 
 ▶ Avoid gendered rhetoric to legitimize counter-terrorism military operations where this rhetoric 
is seen to have the effect of increasing the likelihood of women and LGBTI individuals becoming 
targets of terrorist violence and undermines local gender-equality movements.  
 ▶ Undertake and support efforts to prevent, investigate, and prosecute gender-based abuses 
perpetrated by terrorist groups, including by ensuring that USG partner nations adequately 
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prevent, investigate, and prosecute gender-based abuses perpetrated by terrorist groups and do 
not contribute to or further these abuses.  
 ▶ Recognize that USG military engagements to counter-terrorism can embolden terrorist activity 
and make women and LGBTI individuals more insecure and take responsibility for this impact, 
including by prioritizing arrangements for expedited resettlement of these individuals (including 
to the United States) if the circumstances require.  
To address unlawful impacts of USG direct military engagement to counter-terrorism 
or insurgency: 
 ▶ Prevent, investigate, and punish gender-based human rights violations committed by the U.S. 
military in the context of countering terrorism.
 ▶ Provide redress for victims through non-discriminatory and equality-enhancing reparations 
schemes and recognize all forms of gendered harms, including for victims targeted on the basis 
of sexual orientation and gender identity.
To ensure full partner vetting and rights-compliant training and assistance: 
 ▶ Design and implement robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure that security training, 
equipment and assistance is only provided to individuals properly vetted in compliance with 
the Leahy Amendment and is not utilized in furtherance of human rights abuse, including in the 
context of countering terrorism.
To effect gender-sensitive reconciliation and reintegration initiatives: 
 ▶ Reject the use of rights of women and LGBTI individuals as bartering tools in negotiations with 
extremist groups.
 ▶ Ensure that women and sexual minorities are represented in all discussions and decisions 
regarding reintegration, negotiation, and reconciliation involving extremist groups in compliance 
with UNSCR 1325.
 ▶ Vet individuals who seek reintegration assistance for gender-based abuse.
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SECTiON iV: GENDER AND USG ANTi-TERRORiSM 
FiNANCiNG REGiMES
Gender Features of Anti-Terrorism Financing
In the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the USG significantly expanded its capacity to 
combat transnational terrorist financing, implementing widespread institutional changes and adopting 
a comprehensive approach that relies on the designation of individuals and organizations as terrorists 
and terrorist supporters or facilitators; intelligence and law enforcement operations; development of 
international standards through the Financial Action Task Force; and provision of technical assistance to 
foreign governments to develop domestic anti-terrorism financing regimes.757  In addition, U.S. strategy 
has increasingly stressed the need to protect the charitable sector from terrorist abuse that may occur, for 
example, when terrorists use charities to channel funds (illicit and licit) or provide social services as a means 
to strengthen support for terrorist organizations and incentivize vulnerable communities to radicalize.758  
According to the U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury or Treasury Department), these anti-terrorism 
financing measures are designed and implemented without a specific gender lens; in part because 
anti-terrorism financing regimes are concerned with the overall protection and safety of whole communities, 
including women.759  Further, most of the questions Treasury receives about its impact on the charitable 
giving sector are with respect to Muslim or Arab charities, not women’s groups.760  According to Treasury, 
gender issues, to the extent that they do come up in anti-terrorism financing actions, would be expected 
to be brought up through the inter-agency.761  The one area where Treasury sees a gender dimension to its 
anti-terrorism financing work is in respect of financial inclusion policies that seek to enhance the security 
of the financial system.762  Such measures, including those done in conjunction with the World Bank, seek 
to reduce the world’s unbanked population (e.g., through mobile banks) which often includes women.763
Out of all of Treasury’s anti-terrorism financing efforts, our USG interviews, interviews with USG implementing 
partners, and Stakeholder Workshops identify three measures that, in practice, have particularly impacted 
women and sexual minorities: terrorist designations, regulation of charities, and assistance to foreign 
governments.  These measures are inter-related and can be explained in more detail as follows: 
 ▶ Designations and prohibited activities with designated individuals or organizations: 
Under U.S. law,764 the two common terrorist designations for organizations and individuals are 
FTO (designated by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act [INA], as amended under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
[AEDPA])765 and Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) (designated by the Treasury Office 
of Foreign Assets Control [OFAC] pursuant to the authority of the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act [IEEPA] and Executive Order 13224).766  Both designations block property 
of the FTO and SDGT, and for FTOs, designation criminalizes the provision of “material support 
or resources” pursuant to Section 2339B of the material support statute.767  On June 21, 2010, 
in Holder, Attorney General, et al.  v. Humanitarian Law Project et al., the U.S. Supreme Court 
interpreted this provision expansively to prohibit support regardless of whether its purpose is 
non-violent, which includes, among other things, training on “international and humanitarian 
law to peacefully resolve disputes.”768  Executive Order 13224 also prohibits all transactions with 
SDGTs, including “the making or receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or 
for the benefit of those persons.”769  According to Executive Order 13224, this includes donations 
of “food, clothing, and medicine, intended to be used to relieve human suffering.”770  There are 
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a number of concerns about USG terrorist designations and procedures, including lack of due 
process in listing and de-listing organizations;771 the large number, and growth in number, of 
designated individuals and organizations;772 the OFAC licensing scheme for transactions that are 
otherwise prohibited;773 and the breadth of prohibited transactions with designees (including 
the absence of adequate exemptions around humanitarian assistance).774  
 ▶ Regulation of charities: In terms of scope of impact on charities, as of May 2010, OFAC 
had designated 547 individuals and entities under Executive Order 13224, of which “there 
are approximately 60 designated charities, branches and associated individuals.”775  As part of 
its private-sector outreach, Treasury has issued a number of tools to guide charitable giving, 
including the Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities 
(“Guidelines”), the OFAC Risk Matrix for the Charitable Sector (“OFAC Risk Matrix”), and Typologies 
and Open Source Reporting on Terrorist Abuse of Charitable Operations in Post-Earthquake 
Pakistan and India.776  All of these documents are gender neutral in that there is no guidance on 
how to follow a risk-based approach that reflects the particular local conditions or organizational 
characteristics of women and LGBTI organizations.  Alongside these voluntary guidelines, there are 
various mandatory rules, including most relevantly for USAID grantees, a rule that requires USAID 
to obtain an Anti-Terrorism Certification (ATC) from NGO grantees stating that the grantee 
does not support terrorism.777  USAID also checks terrorist listings to ensure that grantees are 
not listed,778 and USAID contractors both verify sub-grantees against various terrorist lists779 and 
require sub-grantees to sign ATCs.780  Interviews for this Report indicate that the degree to which 
USAID and its implementing partners are transparent with grantees about these terrorism finance 
checks varies.  While not yet mandatory, USAID also has a proposed Partner Vetting System (PVS) 
according to which USAID employees would check potential partners’ information (including 
personal and professional data) against a database containing, among other things, intelligence 
and law enforcement records to “ensur[e] that neither USAID funds nor USAID-funded activities 
inadvertently or otherwise provide support to entities or individuals associated with terrorism.”781
 ▶ Assistance to foreign governments: This assumes many forms, from USG technical assistance 
and training in the adoption, amendment, and implementation of anti-terrorism financing 
laws (as in Ethiopia,782 Bahrain,783 Saudi Arabia,784 UAE,785 Indonesia786) to the USG’s pressure on 
countries to adopt anti-terrorism regimes or risk heavy sanctions.  For example, in 2010 the 
USG and international community pressured Nigeria to pass a comprehensive anti-terrorism 
law (including provisions on terrorism financing),787 regardless of human rights concerns about 
earlier versions of the bill.788  According to the Department of Justice (DoJ) Office of Overseas 
Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) Counterterrorism Unit, its 
technical support to anti-terrorism financing regimes is gender neutral and limited to providing 
expertise to ensure that such laws comply with international standards.789
The impacts of these anti-terrorist financing measures can be seen in three ways: on women and sexual 
minorities as victims of terrorism and other fundamental human rights violations; on women and sexual 
minorities as activists, human rights defenders, and agents combating terrorism; and women and sexual 
minorities as terrorists subject to designation procedures or bars on material support to terrorism.790  These 
three categories can be traced through the concerns explored below.
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Locating Anti-Terrorism Financing in Holistic Counter-Terrorism
CHRGJ’s research points to an inherent tension between anti-terrorism financing rules, which by definition 
view any activity in areas of terrorist threat as inherently suspect, and the USG’s broader focus on “soft 
measures” to combat terrorism, which explicitly relies on local partnerships in these at-risk communities. 
However, the exact nature and extent of this tension, and the efficacy of steps taken to mitigate it, are hotly 
contested both within the USG and as between the USG and the human rights community.  At its core, this 
debate addresses the key question: what is the role of anti-terrorism financing laws and policies in the USG’s 
broader counter-terrorism strategy? 
Treasury characterizes this debate as one between balancing the more immediate counter-terrorism threat 
of money going to support terrorist activity (with which Treasury is primarily concerned as part of the 
USG counter-terrorism community) and servicing long-term development and other needs (with which 
other agencies such as USAID are primarily concerned but in which Treasury plays a role in its outreach 
and issuance of guidance).791  According to CHRGJ’s interview with Treasury, while Treasury recognizes its 
enforcement actions may have repercussions in many cases, Treasury is working with the inter-agency process 
to try to mitigate any unintended consequences, particularly related to charitable assistance; yet solutions 
require a sustained inter-agency collaborative effort.792  According to a Treasury official, Treasury is part of this 
inter-agency process to combat terrorism and has the unique position of being both operational and having a 
big picture perspective based on a unique combination of policy expertise and targeted authorities.793  
However, outside of the Treasury Department, other USG officials, USG implementing partners, and human 
rights advocates stress the ways in which USG anti-terrorism financing measures have had significant chilling 
effects on counter-terrorism partnerships and on CVE and broader humanitarian activities.  This was clear in the 
Stakeholder Workshops, but what is marked is how much USG officials and implementing partners themselves 
are also apprehensive about unwarranted enforcement action and concerned that anti-terrorism financing rules 
do not correspond to operational reality.  For example, according to individuals working on Somalia at the U.S. 
Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya: the listing of Al-Shabaab as a terrorist entity has had a huge impact on humanitarian 
aid in Somalia; Treasury and other decision-makers “have no sense of the consequences” of anti-terrorism 
financing rules; and the OFAC exemption or licensing regime is insufficient to mitigate these consequences.794 
In addition, these USG officials note that there is a comprehensive failure to appreciate conditions on the 
ground in Somalia (“We don’t knowingly provide assistance, but if the FTO controls the seaport, what do you 
do?”) and that fear of prosecution from “gung-ho” attorneys in the United States is the “single biggest problem” 
that stymies all action in ways that are “ludicrous” because “people won’t take the risk that one bag of grain will 
get into the wrong hands.”795  These concerns are not new; in 2009 the State Department felt it was necessary 
to seek assurances from Treasury that U.S. officials in Somalia would not be prosecuted if humanitarian aid 
inadvertently reached the designated entity Al-Shabaab.796  OFAC accordingly granted a “good faith” exemption 
by which it assured the DoS that it “would not prosecute American Aid officials if they acted in ‘good faith.’”797 
Alongside concerns within the USG, the charitable sector in the United States and abroad has similarly 
rejected Treasury procedures (including specifically its Guidelines and OFAC Risk Matrix) for being unrealistic, 
unclear, impractical, stigmatizing, dangerous, inhibiting, and intractable.798  The gulf between the charitable 
sector and Treasury on this matter cannot be overstated, with discussions to issue revised Guidelines 
breaking down in November 2010 because of the charitable sector’s concerns that Treasury was unwilling 
to make any fundamental changes in its approach to charitable operations.799   In particular, the charitable 
sector has pointed to concerns that compliance with the Guidelines does not preclude enforcement action, 
such that “there is no reward for getting it right, but lots of problems if you get it wrong”;800 that Treasury’s 
overregulation of charities is disproportionate to the threat they allegedly pose to national security (for 
example, as of September 2009, only nine U.S.-based charities were on the OFAC list);801 and that reliance 
on inter-agency processes to mitigate the impact of anti-terrorism financing laws is an inadequate safeguard 
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because of Treasury’s dominance of such processes.802  Another concern is that the USG has not extended 
a “good faith” exemption to NGOs similar to that which has been issued to USG officials, despite the 
significant impact this would have in enabling legitimate global philanthropy.803 
Regarding the latter, the broader concern about incompatibility between anti-terrorism financing measures and 
“soft” counter-terrorism is that anti-terrorism financing rules hinder the role of civil society in combating the 
conditions that lead to violent extremism or terrorism.  The U.N. has repeatedly stressed the importance of civil 
society in a holistic and collective strategy to counter terrorism.804  The USG has also particularly highlighted the 
key role of women in working to ensure security for whole communities.805  CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops 
and interviews also provided numerous examples of women in countries such as Yemen at the forefront of 
the battle to end extremism in their communities at great personal risk.  Indeed, according to Urgent Action 
Fund for Women’s Human Rights (UAF), the women’s rights organizations that it funds have increased their 
requests for funding for security purposes because of the threats they face.806  However, rather than mitigating 
these challenges, it has been argued that USG laws, the Guidelines, and the OFAC Risk Matrix fail to recognize 
global philanthropy’s critical role in countering violent extremism and instead characterize charitable activity 
as inherently risky and suspect.807  For example, on the OFAC Risk Matrix, the risk of charitable giving increases 
according to the level to which charities engage in areas where there is conflict or terrorist activity,808 but there 
is no recognition that these are precisely the areas in which philanthropy is most needed.  
Indeed, in light of anti-terrorism financing rules, charities and donors have been changing their programs to 
avoid “the very global hotspots that would benefit the most from their work,”809 compounding difficulties 
that gender-equality organizations in these areas already face.  For example, a recent report on funding 
patterns for women’s movements noted that women’s organizations in MENA “operated under difficult 
limitations,” and that USG counter-terrorism activity has made “giving to this region much riskier.”810  As the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism notes, overly restrictive anti-terrorism financing provisions cause:
[I]nterference with efforts by women’s rights organizations to resolve conflicts, support victims 
of terrorism, advance the rule of law and human rights, and realize equality, political inclusion, 
and socio-economic empowerment [and] may curb efforts that would effectively counter 
conditions conducive to terrorism…organizations that further gender equality may be among 
the non-profit organizations that reduce the appeal of terrorism by engaging in development 
measures that can counteract conditions conducive to recruitment to terrorism.811 
Gendered impacts on USG Partners and Partnerships
Prof i le  o f  USG and Char itab le  S ector  Grantees
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism summarizes the impact of anti-terrorism financing rules on gender-equality 
organizations as follows: 
The Special Rapporteur is also concerned that terrorism financing laws that restrict donations 
to non-profit organizations have particularly impacted organizations that promote gender 
equality, including women’s rights organizations.  The small-scale and grassroots nature of such 
organizations means that they present a greater “risk” to foreign donors who are increasingly 
choosing to fund a limited number of centralized, large-scale organizations for fear of having 
their charitable donations stigmatized as financing of, or material support to, terrorism.  At the 
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same time, as divergent voices within their communities, it is precisely this foreign funding on 
which women’s rights organizations may be particularly dependent to achieve their objectives.812
CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops and interviews confirmed and elaborated upon these observations as follows:
 ▶ Anti-terrorism financing rules occur against a backdrop of funding cuts to women and 
LGBTI organizations because of a shift toward funding of national security activities 
and partners.813  According to the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), 
while the shift toward national security:
[S]hould in theory mean funds for women’s rights organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
especially given the doctrines of the US alongside several other western governments to 
fight against Islamic extremists for “democracy and women’s emancipation,” this has not 
been the case.  Women’s organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had to struggle for 
resources that most often get absorbed by INGOs or multilateral agencies.814 
The general reasons for this absorption are outlined below, but as a starting point it is important 
to recognize that the “war against terrorism is shrinking women’s movements because it has led 
to a revisiting and development of unfavourable funding policies for women’s organizations.”815  
 ▶ Local women’s and sexual minority NGOs are characteristically small and often lack 
the necessary capacity to comply with rigorous auditing and reporting procedures 
that USG and other anti-terrorism financing regimes require.  According to one USAID 
official, USAID’s push to increasingly use local NGOs faces two challenges: difficulties with ATCs 
(see below) and the amount of capacity building required to ensure that local NGOs properly 
receive funds and exercise sub-grant making capacity.816  These challenges can adversely impact 
the participation of local women and LGBTI groups in two ways.  First, this can create a shift 
away from local NGO and grassroots involvement in favor of international or northern NGOs 
that can better absorb the costs and other resources associated with reporting requirements.817  
Second, to the extent that some local NGOs are able to comply with onerous reporting 
requirements, in many countries this is not likely to include women and LGBTI groups.  This has 
been observed regarding women’s organizations in Pakistan,818 and is consistent with a recent 
finding that “organizations supporting LGBTI communities typically have small staff sizes and 
incomes, and tend to be relatively young.”819  The relative youth of LGBTI organizations in some 
countries presents additional challenges (see below).  
 ▶ Anti-terrorism financing regulations are geared toward recognizing established 
organizations with extensive and verifiable track records, which can exclude women 
and LGBTI groups.  For example, the OFAC Risk Matrix considers factors such as the extent to 
which a relationship exists between the charity and grantee and whether the grantee has trusted 
references.820  As USAID’s Office of Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment has noted about 
anti-terrorism financing rules, “sometimes it is hard to fund small organizations without a track 
record.”821  These challenges amplify in times when civil-society support is most needed.  According 
to the Office of Gender Equality & Women’s Empowerment, a core challenge is “findings ways to 
certify NGOs after conflict situations because more groups spring up.”822  This concern is particularly 
acute for women’s and LGBTI organizations which, because of unfavorable local conditions (including 
fear of being penalized by overly broad counter-terrorism laws), may be unregistered, have had their 
registration significantly delayed, or have a slim public profile compared to their actual advocacy 
history.  For example, in Uganda, some groups do not seek registration because of the fear that harsh 
anti-terrorism laws will be used to criminalize their activities.823  In addition, under the Taliban’s regime, 
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Afghan women had to “organise home study groups, sewing centres and community development 
councils underground” and could register only after the Taliban left power.824  
 ▶ Women’s and LGBTI organizations tend to decline USG funds because grant conditions 
endanger them and undermine their work.  This is a multifaceted issue.  First, certification and 
due-diligence requirements can suggest undue closeness to the United States.  Signing certification 
requirements “may be perceived as a statement of allegiance to the United States government,”825 and 
requiring non-profit organizations to conduct background checks on partners (this is anticipated by 
the Guidelines) risks them being labeled U.S. agents or spies.826  These challenges are particularly acute 
in contexts where the USG’s determination of which organizations are “terrorist” is heavily politicized 
or when that organization controls large swathes of territory, such as Al-Shabaab in Somalia, Hamas 
in Gaza, or Hezbollah in Lebanon.  These sensitivities can lead local NGOs to refuse to certify, 
including because the requirement is perceived as “humilat(ing).”827
Second, according to one USAID official interviewed for this report, a number of NGOs are unwilling 
to sign the ATC not only because of the risk of association with the United States, but also because 
of a principled position that all humanitarian work should be impartial, as well as a belief that it is 
virtually impossible to guarantee that funds will not inadvertently support terrorism.828  While these 
concerns apply to almost all USG-backed NGOs working on the counter-terrorism agenda and/or in 
areas considered to have high terrorist activity, women and LGBTI activists are doubly at risk because 
their work for gender equality is often already maligned by terrorists as “Western” and foreign.829  
In other areas, the USG recognizes this extraordinary risk and takes steps to protect local women, 
particularly when they are working on national security;830 however, anti-terrorism financing rules 
work against such efforts.  Indeed, the Stakeholder Workshops, particularly on MENA and Africa, 
revealed instances of women’s and LGBTI organizations refusing much-needed USG funding because 
of concerns about stigma, principled objections, or the inability to guarantee that money would not 
inadvertently go to terrorists given the areas in which they work (e.g., Lebanon).  
Partnerships  to  Combat  Terror ism
 ▶ Anti-terrorism financing rules can undermine trust and frustrate effective partnerships, 
“damaging the international goodwill and promise for stability that these relationships 
had helped to create.”831  While organizations such as Cordaid have explicitly declined USG grants 
because of this concern,832 even groups that sign certifications may do so reluctantly.833  According to the 
American Institutes for Research (AIR)—the implementer of a number of USAID projects in Pakistan, 
such as the Links to Learning Education Support to Pakistan (ED-LINKS)834—even if local organizations 
do sign ATCs, the “fact that you have to get local organizations to sign the paper does more harm than 
good.”835  Indeed, in the occupied Palestinian territory, USAID funding restrictions, including the ATCs, 
have undermined access to grassroots organizations and “further eroded USAID’s local reputation.”836  
There is “anger and mistrust” between U.S. and Southern NGOs that occurs when the latter “become 
aware of the compliance activities they [U.S. NGOs] are undertaking,” which can also lead to U.S. NGOs 
hiding their activities in ways that are also inimical to trust building.837  The President’s Advisory Council 
on Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partnerships has similarly critiqued USAID’s proposed PVS because 
“as currently designed [it] would significantly harm partnerships with local communities.”838
 ▶ Even in countries where the ATC requirement does not deter local organizations, 
the requirement to report back to the USG if support reaches terrorists undercuts 
goodwill.839  According to EDC, the ATC requirement has not been a deterrent in USAID’s 
Shaqodoon project in Somalia, but this report-back requirement has: “The whole NGO community 
is concerned about this as it can stigmatize you and can put your people and youth at risk.”840
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impact on Safety of Women’s and LGBTi Organizations
 ▶ Detailed background checks and storing of information on grantees risks unwanted 
and potentially dangerous attention to organizations, including women’s and LGBTI 
groups.  For example, the Guidelines call for “programmatic verification,”841 and the OFAC 
Risk Matrix emphasizes the need for “due diligence” by charities, including through on-site 
inspections.842 USAID’s ATCs and the proposed PVS have been similarly critiqued on the basis 
that they require invasive background checks and potentially violate privacy protections.843  
There is also a concern that USAID “has not established sufficient safeguards for information 
collected under the PVS.”844  More broadly, there is a fear that when the USG collects data 
about NGO grantees or participants in its activities, it could inadvertently be transmitted to key 
counter-terrorism partners that criminalize human rights defenders (such as the Philippines).845  
This unearthing and spotlighting of women’s and LGBTI communities is insufficiently attentive 
to the ways in which such actors may need to operate below the radar in their communities 
and may unjustifiably increase the operational risks these groups face.  
 ▶ Anti-terrorism financing laws may inadvertently embolden terrorist organizations 
in ways that are inimical to the rights of women and sexual minorities.  A terrorist 
designation does not always protect local communities; rather, it isolates the community from 
the kinds of external support necessary to mitigate the impact of terrorism.  Where U.S. law 
prohibits charities from working in areas of high terrorist activity, suspends or removes funding 
for local groups in territories controlled by terrorists, and bans assistance explicitly designed to 
make terrorist organizations more peaceful, the pernicious effects of terrorism are strengthened, 
not undermined.  For example, when Hamas (an organization the U.S. considers to be terrorist) 
won the Palestinian Authority’s general legislative elections in January 2006,846 the USG cut 
off or put on hold funding to a number of local organizations, including the Association of 
Women’s Committees for Social Work (AWCSW), which had outstanding project proposals 
“ranging from domestic violence prevention to voter education.”847  As a consequence, AWCSW’s 
founder articulated her “frustration about international isolations that she says will only serve 
to strengthen Hamas.”848  In a different but related vein, it has also been argued that certification 
procedures fail to prevent money going to terrorists because terrorist organizations can and will 
lie when signing requisite documents, such as the ATCs.849 
 ▶ USG anti-terrorism financing laws may 
inadvertently compound domestic 
gover nment s ’  cr iminal iz ation of 
women and LGBTI human rights 
defenders .   A number of countries 
have used vague and broad definitions of 
terrorism and material support of terrorism 
to target women’s rights defenders and 
LGBTI advocates.850  By labeling such groups 
“terrorist,” there is a risk that these human 
rights defenders will then be subject to 
USG or another entity’s terrorism-financing 
restrictions, rendering them unable to obtain 
needed funding for their activities.  USG 
anti-terrorism financing laws, regulations, and 
policy guidance do not contemplate how to 
avoid these consequences.  
“D isp lace d wo m en are  o ften  re fu s e d 
a c c e s s  t o  h u m a n i t a r i a n  a s s i s t a n c e 
b e c a u s e  t h e i r  m e n  a re  c o n s i d e r e d 
terrorists who are hiding in the mountains.  
Even in distress the terrorism argument 
is used against them.  Nevertheless it is 
mainly  women who s o cia l ly  wage the 
f ight against injustice.” 
R ais s a  Ja jur ie ,  Mindanao,  Phi l ipp ines ,  L aw yer 
and legal  a id  worker,  law yer  for  the  Alternative 
Legal  A ss istance Centre/S al igan 851
77A  D e c A D e  L o s t
Gender, Humanitarian Relief and Peace-Building Activities
Anti-terrorism financing rules intersect with humanitarian assistance and peace-building efforts in a number 
of ways,852 including by seeking to prevent terrorist organizations from benefiting from natural disasters, such 
as in the aftermath of Pakistan’s extensive flooding in 2010.853  CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops and interviews 
emphasized two aspects of this intersection as having particular significance for the rights of women and 
girls.  First, the USG’s concern about preventing its humanitarian aid from being diverted to terrorist groups 
has adversely impacted the delivery of aid to women and girls.  This can be seen most clearly, for example, 
in Somalia (See Box 6. Impacts of Aid Restrictions by the USG and Al-Shabaab on Women in Somalia), where 
there is a potent mix of USG aid, acute humanitarian crisis from drought and conflict, and strong presence 
of designated groups (most notably Al-Shabaab) in control of large areas of territory and resources.  Second, 
in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Holder, Attorney General, et al.  v.  Humanitarian Law 
Project et al., U.S. law circumscribes the ability of NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance and undertake 
the very conflict resolution, mediation, and peace-building activities necessary to engage proscribed groups, 
access areas under control of banned groups, and change “hearts and minds” of affected communities.854 
These effects extend to activities with governments as well, for example, according to one participant in 
CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshop in Asia, the USG’s designation of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist in 
2003 puts donors and activists in a “difficult position” in terms of the levels of engagement possible with the 
now-government of Nepal.855  Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Holder, Attorney General, et 
al.  v.  Humanitarian Law Project et al., also likely compromises the USG’s ability to respect the full edicts of 
UNSCR 1325, such that the USG’s forthcoming National Action Plan will need to specifically guide women’s 
organizations on how to undertake peace-building work in areas where there is terrorist activity without 
running afoul of U.S. law.  This guidance will need to be sufficiently robust to overcome the chilling effect 
that decisions such as Holder, Attorney General, et al.  v.  Humanitarian Law Project et al., have: the resounding 
message from our interviews, Stakeholder Workshops, and research is there even where the chances of 
enforcement action are slim, wide-ranging decisions like Holder, Attorney General, et al.  v.  Humanitarian 
Law Project et al. stop the humanitarian world, including women and LGBTI activists, in its tracks.  This 
situation is untenable: restrictions on humanitarian relief and peace-building efforts impact women both as 
victims of humanitarian crisis and activists seeking to mitigate its impacts.  As the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism 
stresses: “The need to ensure accessible, safe and effective channels for donation to such [gender-equality] 
organizations is particularly acute in situations of humanitarian crisis, which, as noted earlier, often have 
disproportionate impacts on women and girls.”856 
Box 6. impacts of Aid Restr ict ions by the USG and 
Al-Shabaab on Women in Somalia
The U.N. World Food Programme (WFP)857 describes Somalia as “perhaps the most challenging 
environment in the world for humanitarian operations.”858  The challenge owes to the magnitude 
of the crisis859 and the WFP’s operating conditions.860  While the humanitarian crisis in Somalia 
is worsening,861  the capacity to address it is diminishing.  As of 2009, the USG was the largest 
financial contributor to Somalia, “providing about 40 percent of the $850 million annual aid 
budget, intended to feed more than three million people.”862  In 2009, the USG suspended aid to 
Somalia because of concerns that the U.N. was diverting aid to Al-Shabaab.863  According to the 
78 A  D e c A D e  L o s t
Somali women and their children queue to receive relief food from the hardline al Shabaab Islamist rebel group outside the 












WFP, as of September 2009, half the population of southern and central Somalia was in need of 
food aid and “getting help to them inevitably involves dealing with al-Shabab and other hardline 
groups now in control of the towns and villages across the region.”864  In January 2010, the WFP 
temporarily suspended its food aid distribution program in the southern parts of Somalia 
because of “growing insecurity and threats and unacceptable demands from Al-Shabaab.”865  As 
of May 2011, the WFP has not resumed operations in Al-Shabaab–controlled areas and will not 
do so until Al-Shabaab revokes its ban on the WFP, retracts its conditions, and enables the WFP 
to verify this and provide unimpeded access.866
The gender dimensions and impacts of aid restrictions by both the USG and Al-Shabaab are 
acute.  In  September 2009, the WFP announced that it would “clos[e] 12 feeding centres for 
mothers and children in Somalia” because of aid cuts that meant the WFP had “only received 40 
percent of the funding needed for the year ahead.”867  In November 2009, Al-Shabaab provided 
the WFP with a list of conditions for continued WFP presence, including that WFP food be 
handed over to Al-Shabaab for distribution,868 and that WFP have no female aid workers and no 
programs for women.869  As noted above, the WFP rejected the conditions as “totally contrary 
to the WFP basic principles of transparency and accountability” and has not been operating 
in Al-Shabaab–controlled areas since then.870  However, in practice this means the WFP is no 
longer able to provide assistance to a huge part of the Somali population.  The WFP’s lack 
of access to the region makes it impossible to know the exact number of people in need in 
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RECOMMENDATiONS
 ▶ Review, assess and report on how anti-terrorism financing measures and their 
implementation interact with, assist, and impede the USG’s broader development, 
diplomacy, and defense efforts to counter-terrorism, potentially through an Interagency 
Policy Committee (IPC).
 ▶ Adopt fair procedures of listing and delisting that afford due process and adequate 
checks and balances on executive discretion, including adequacy of notice, meaningful 
opportunity to respond to allegations (including through legal representation), and 
confidentiality (unless waived by the non-profit).
 ▶ Require explicit consideration of the conditions under which women’s and LGBTI 
organizations operate, particularly in listing and de-listing processes and in Treasury’s 
tools to guide the charitable sector, to ensure that funds go to the right people and do 
not fund terrorists and terrorist organizations.  This will likely require withdrawal of the 
Treasury Department’s current Guidelines and replacing it with guidelines that provide sufficient 
information to assist charities, including those that work on gender equality, to carry out 
needed and legitimate philanthropic activities.  
 ▶ Reject USAID’s proposed PVS and commission a review of USAID’s ATC requirements with a 
view to better recognizing the ways in which such certification and due-diligence requirements 
endanger local actors and compromise partnerships needed to counter terrorism.  
Al-Shabaab areas but until the suspension of aid, the WFP provided assistance to approximately 
one million people (out of the entire beneficiary population of 2.1 to 2.2 million) in those 
areas.871  In addition, according to CHRGJ’s interview with the WFP, the WFP’s floor of funding 
has “severely” diminished in the past twelve to fourteen months and has significantly reduced 
the WFP’s capacity to provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia generally.872  This drop can be 
attributed to many factors, but overall donor support has declined dramatically: historically the 
USG provided between forty to fifty percent of the WFP’s budget but last year support was less 
than ten percent.873 
According to the WFP, while this affects everyone in Somalia, the particular vulnerabilities of 
women and children (particularly girls) in crisis means that they feel the burden of the cuts.874 
While women and children suffer from these cuts, Somali women are also at the forefront of 
challenging Al-Shabaab’s restrictions on aid in areas under its control.875  This comports with 
the WFP’s view that women’s organizations in Somalia are of the “utmost importance” and that 
their empowerment and capacity building should be supported.876  According to the WFP, there 
is a need to acknowledge that working in contexts such as Somalia always implies risk (to staff, 
beneficiaries, and of possible misuse of international assistance to indirectly funding terrorist 
groups) and the key question is: “What would the international community accept based on 
risk appetite compared with the return?,” including in situations where humanitarian need is 
higher than the risk.877
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 ▶ Reform material support laws to encompass a humanitarian exemption (including 
enabling humanitarian negotiation, aid, and access to affected populations that 
complies with the principles of neutrality and impartiality), protect free speech and 
freedom of association; and enable peace-building and conflict-resolution efforts.  
 · The exemption should also extend beyond medical and religious materials to 
include, for example, essential supplies (food, water, clothing, and shelter) and 
health and medical services.  
 · This amendment should make humanitarian access consistent with the U.N. 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Guidelines on Humanitarian 
Negotiations with Armed Groups878 and enable distribution of aid consistent with 
the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement and 
NGOs in Disaster Relief, which prioritizes the humanitarian imperative, calculates 
aid priorities impartially and “on the basis of need alone,” and “recognize[s] the 
crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and…ensure[s] that 
this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes.”879  
 ▶ Adopt regulatory measures to introduce a “good faith” exemption to terrorism 
sanctions regimes so that USG and NGO efforts to prevent support and resources from 
going to terrorism are recognized and so that inadvertent assistance, or activities with 
designated entities  where there is no intent to further the illegal ends of a terrorist 
organization, are not penalized.  This would enable activities such as human rights training 
and conflict-resolution activities to fall outside the prohibition.  This can be achieved, for 
example, through rescinding Executive Order 13224 or reissuing a new Executive Order that 
takes into account specific concerns, such as charitable giving and humanitarian assistance and 
access.
81A  D e c A D e  L o s t
SECTiON V: GENDER AND TACTiCAL COUNTER-
TERRORiSM: iNTELLiGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEASURES AND COOPERATiON
Overview 
The USG’s NSS 2010 references the need to evolve intelligence capacities; promote cooperation between 
USG law enforcement and intelligence agencies and their foreign counterparts; and recognize the role of 
both intelligence and law enforcement in strengthening the USG’s “homeland security.”880  Similarly, the 
National Strategy for Counterterrorism highlights the role of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation in 
advancing counter-terrorism efforts.881 According to the S/CT, “[o]ver the past 10 years, the United States has 
made great strides in tactical counterterrorism—taking individual terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, 
and thwarting conspiracies.”882  These tactical intelligence and law enforcement measures are largely aimed at 
preventing, disrupting, and investigating terrorism threats and apprehending, interrogating, detaining, and 
prosecuting terrorism suspects.883  In the post-9/11 environment, investigatory and prosecutorial measures 
have taken on a more preventive orientation, in that the USG regularly engages in “arrests and prosecutions 
that occur before any dangerous plot can come to fruition.”884
As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, “[t]he arrest, detention, interrogation and subsequent treatment 
of terrorist suspects may involve, and has in the past involved, the violation of several human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.”885  Indeed, the USG has been responsible for serious human rights violations both 
abroad (including irregular and forced inter-State transfers [also known as the practice of “rendition” or 
“extraordinary rendition”],886 secret detention,887 prolonged and indefinite detention without trial [e.g., in 
Guantánamo Bay],888 and torture of terrorism suspects889) and within the United States, with disproportionate 
impacts on MASA communities (see below).  The Obama Administration has discontinued some of the 
most egregious of these practices.890  However, it has continued others in modified form,891 and failed to 
redress significant rights abuses under the Bush Administration.892  
While the impact of these intelligence and law enforcement activities on human rights is well known, the 
gender dimensions of their design and implementation are less understood and documented, particularly in 
the burgeoning area of pre-detention preventive and investigative efforts.  Accordingly, this Report examines 
a range of these pre-detention measures through a two-pronged approach: first, to describe where gender 
features in their design and implementation; and second, to assess the gender impacts that flow from these 
measures.  The Report then surveys a range of post-detention measures—the interrogation, detention, 
prosecution, rehabilitation, and release of terrorism suspects—where the gendered dimensions and primary 
and collateral impacts are marginally better documented but nonetheless require further exploration.  
Gender Features of Pre-Detention Preventive and investigatory 
Measures 
The USG undertakes a number of efforts to understand the drivers of violent extremism and to collect information 
regarding potential or ongoing terrorist activities to prevent violent extremism.  The role of gender and gender 
analysis in the design of these methods varies—from its complete absence to measures that are explicitly premised 
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on perceptions of the different roles of men and women.  The following examples highlight this range of gender 
integration in a number of prominent USG pre-detention preventive and investigatory counter-terrorism measures. 
Drivers  o f  Vio lent  E xtremism 
The USG devotes resources to understanding the process of violent extremism, including through dedicated 
research units at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the National Counterterrorism 
Center.893   For example, the DHS Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division’s Actionable Indicators and 
Countermeasures project “conducts social and behavioral science research to identify indicators that 
actors are moving toward extremist violence” which consists of three aspects: “community characteristics” 
(“conduct surveys and archival data analysis to examine the contexts of violent extremism”); “event and 
perpetrator characteristics” to “develop and analyze datasets focused on extremist violence and violent 
extremists”; and “countermeasure characteristics” (“use qualitative and quantitative methods to assess 
initiatives developed to support communities and counter violent extremists.”).894  In this project, according 
to CHRGJ’s interview with DHS, gender would likely be a variable in the datasets analyzed and the focus 
groups used to assess the perception and efficacy of “countermeasure characteristics” are sometimes divided 
by sex, but otherwise there is no explicit consideration of gender in the framework for assessing threats 
and prevention activities.895  In other USG initiatives or guidelines to counter violent extremism, views on 
gender equality are sometimes used as an indicator of extremism.  For example, the New York City Police 
Department’s report, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, appears to take this approach 
through including examples that cite discouraging women from attending community-center events and 
chastising a secular girlfriend for not being sufficiently devout as indicators of conservative religious and 
social views that take place during the second phase of “radicalization.”896
Sur vei l lance and Investigations 
In the post-9/11 environment, the USG has developed and increased its use of tools (such as surveillance) to 
identify and apprehend terrorism suspects.897  While such tools are ostensibly gender neutral, in effect these 
efforts focus on men and reflect conventional wisdom on the predominant role of men in terrorist activity 
and organizations.898  In contrast, these tools primarily approach women as being one step removed from 
terrorism: as influencers (including of terrorist behavior), family members of terror suspects, and informants. 
For example, post-9/11 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) terrorism investigations, including those that 
use FBI and paid informants in Muslim communities, primarily investigate males,899 but at times involve 
questioning of women based on a familial relationship with those suspects.900  In other instances, women 
are used as leverage to pressure male family members to become informants.901  In others still, women are 
approached to be informants outside of family contexts.  For example, an advocate at our U.S. Stakeholder 
Workshop noted her perception that the USG sees women as having “a unique role to play in anti-
radicalization,” and explained that post-9/11 law enforcement officials in Chicago asked some women to spy 
on their neighbors and to obtain information about other people (including, for example, their employers 
and the mothers of their children’s classmates).902 
In these ways, the USG and its allies have traditionally overlooked the separate or independent role of 
women and the prominence of gender narratives in some terrorist organizations.903  This owes to stereotypes 
that women lack volition to participate in terrorism904 and also reflects insufficient attention to the role of 
gender ideologies in terrorism recruitment.  For example, officials from ILEA noted that while there is an 
effort to increase awareness of women’s capacity to act as terrorists, ILEA’s trainings of law enforcement do 
not explicitly focus on this, although some case studies may include examples of women as terrorists. 905 
In Turkey, OPDAT also noted that based on the information that is shared with the USG, the Turkish 
National Police’s counter-radicalization programs do not consider the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) 
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use of gender equality as a tool to recruit women or provide sex-disaggregated tracking of the success 
rates of de-radicalization programs.906  This is the case despite estimates reported in December 2009 that 
women have perpetrated seventy-five percent of PKK attacks.907  Within the USG there is some increasing 
understanding that it needs to pay additional attention to the role of women and gender in terrorism,908 and, 
as noted by Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano in remarks in June 2011, instead of profiling 
(which she notes the USG has “no interest in”), the USG needs to be “working with a broad range of partners 
to gain a better understanding of the behaviors, the tactics, the techniques, the other indicators that could 
point to anticipated terrorist activity.”909  Further, in response to a question regarding whether DHS should 
focus its attention on Muslim men under thirty-five because this is the “category of individual who’s turned 
up most often as the suspect,” she said that this is not “good logic.”910
Communit y  Engagement Pro grams 
The USG has recently expanded its outreach and engagement efforts with communities “that are being 
targeted by terrorist recruiters,” which it understands to be Muslim communities.911  While at times the USG 
explicitly describes these activities in terms of counter violent extremism objectives, in other instances it either 
shies away from making this link and/or insists on the importance of avoiding securitization of its engagement 
with Muslim communities.912  This seemingly contradictory and uneven emphasis sets the backdrop for a 
number of flow-on gender impacts (discussed below).  As a preliminary observation, it is important to note 
that, irrespective of their stated objectives, according to CHRGJ’s interview with the FBI’s Community Relations 
Unit (CRU), community-engagement activities are not explicitly undertaken with a gender lens; for example, 
there is not an explicit focus on reaching out to women or considering gender in program design.913
In terms of the link between community engagement and countering violent extremism, on the one hand 
the USG explains that engagement empowers communities to become resilient to violent extremism 
and Al-Qaeda ideology914 and “build[s] trust and open[s] a constructive dialogue with American Arab, 
Muslim, Sikh, Somali, and South Asian communities, to name but a few.”915  Such activities include the 
FBI’s Community Outreach Program (to 
“build trust in communities…facilitating 
the overall mission of the FBI in keeping 
communities and the homeland safe”); 
FBI engagement with “national and local 
organizations in the United States that 
have public positions against terrorism 
and violent radicalization to further 
a positive image of law enforcement”; 
Community Relations Executive Seminar 
Training, or CREST (which is “often the 
starting point for bridging the gaps of 
trust…In the context of countering violent 
radicalization, a key step is to develop 
relationships within the community based 
on trust and to do so under non-stressful 
circumstances rather than in the aftermath 
of an incident”); Specialized Community 
Outreach to cities with the largest 
Somal i -American communities ;  and 
“youth programs to help us [the FBI] reach 
new groups of young people, particularly 
in Muslim communities.”916
The [FBI] Cincinnati Division—in partnership with the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for the 
Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio, along with the Columbus Police Department—
recently hosted a radicalization awareness presentation for more than 100 members of the 
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However, elsewhere, some within the USG reject characterizing these community-outreach activities as 
counter-terrorism measures.  For example, according to CHRGJ’s interview with the FBI CRU, the FBI’s 
community engagement does not have a nexus to countering violent extremism (in explicit contrast to, 
for example, the U.K.’s Prevent program until its recent revision);917 does not target the Muslim community, 
although relationships with some communities have “deepened” post-9/11 with closer attention to “where 
the threat emanates from”; does not differ from the FBI’s long-term approach to community engagement; 
and is unaffected by FBI surveillance activity, given that it is the FBI’s perception that the challenges in doing 
outreach to Muslim communities are no different from other communities.918  Further, the FBI CRU has 
emphasized that attention to communities and areas “where the threat emanates from” is undertaken:
[A]s an effort to build and maintain relationships in communities affected by certain threats, 
such as the Somali community, which has been affected by young men traveling overseas.  
We strongly believe that successful engagement in any community is based on open lines of 
communication and trust.  We are committed to our community partners and will continue 
to foster relationships built on true engagement and open dialogue.919  
Gender impacts of Pre-Detention Preventive and investigative 
Measures 
While the impacts—including human rights impacts—of USG pre-detention preventive and investigatory 
measures are somewhat well-known, the gender dimensions of these impacts is far less explored.  While more 
research is required to assess the full nature and extent of these gendered impacts, the following preliminary 
findings reveal four areas in which gendered impacts flow from such measures.  
 ▶ First, efforts to counter violent extremism that largely focus on males can encourage 
greater terrorist recruitment of women because they receive less scrutiny.920  This is 
consistent with the observations of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism notes, where: “ignoring 
women as potential terrorists undermines the ability of counter-terrorism measures to identify 
terrorism suspects and may serve to promote the recruitment of female terrorists.”921  In addition 
to undermining the efficacy of counter-terrorism measures, ignoring female terrorism also 
“circumscribes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures aimed at their reintegration…
Reintegration schemes that rely solely on gender stereotypes of women as victims or that exclude 
women from benefits provided to male ex-combatants are discriminatory and fail to stem 
terrorism.”922  
 ▶ Second, the use of individuals’ actual or assumed views on gender as a proxy for 
racial, ethnic, and religious profiling (as noted above in the NYPD’s Radicalization 
in the West : The Homegrown Threat) can be discriminatory, marginalizing and 
harmful.  As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism notes, where:
 
[C]ounter-terrorism measures use gender stereotypes as a proxy for profiling 
on the basis of race, national or ethnic origin or religion.…Such terrorist-
profiling practices are discriminatory because they equate gender inequality 
with persons of a certain race, national or ethnic origin or religion and 
predict that males from these groups are more likely to be terrorists.923   
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This results in “marginalizing individuals from targeted communities and subjecting them to greater 
discrimination and harassment by both private and public actors.”924  Specifically, these profiles reflect, 
and contribute to, the stereotype of Muslim men as misogynistic and extremist, which has extensive 
ramifications outside of the counter-terrorism context.  For example, an attorney and Arab-Muslim 
community rights advocate told CHRGJ that in the years following the events of September 11, 
2001 (particularly 2003 to 2006), city and state agencies, when responding to domestic violence 
calls involving Arab males, also ran national security checks during routine background checks, and 
in some instances involved Joint Terrorism Task Forces.925   She further noted that in some divorce 
and custodial proceedings involving Muslim men, their “religious and cultural background” means 
that an “automatic predisposition toward violence is also assumed” and that it is a “common tactic 
among attorneys,” particularly in divorce cases, to use these stereotypes about Muslim men, and 
that in cases where this tactic has not been challenged by attorneys as racist it has been effective.926
 ▶ Third, the increased use of surveillance and investigatory powers against MASA 
communities in the United States raises significant human rights concerns related 
to profiling and freedom of religion, association, and expression.927  As discussed above, 
while primarily targeting men, these measures have secondary effects on female family members 
(discussed further below) and female members of the MASA community more generally.  For 
example, the real or perceived targeting of MASA communities through a range of countering 
violent extremism measures (including FBI surveillance and, for example, the highly critiqued 
Congressional hearings on “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community 
and that Community’s Response” in March 2011928) renders these communities suspect to 
other Americans929 and may increase the susceptibility of individuals who are visibly members 
of these communities (such as Muslim women who wear headscarves) to attack.930  In addition, 
it may have a chilling effect on reporting of crimes in these communities, which undermines 
the overall safety and security of the community and leaves female victims of domestic violence 
particularly susceptible to abuse (see further below in Section VI).931  Further, specifically in 
relation to the recruitment of male informants and impact on female family members, women 
can be adversely impacted both when an individual refuses to become an informant (e.g., as a 
result of subsequent action taken against their or their relative’s immigration status932) or when 
a family member agrees to cooperate (e.g., as a result of being ostracized in their community933).
 ▶ Fourth, based on the U.K.’s experience with the Prevent strategy, the USG’s increased 
emphasis on community engagement strategies to counter violent extremism also 
potentially raises significant gender issues.  As discussed above, the USG’s approach to 
engagement with Muslim communities in the United States has been, on the one hand, to stress 
its significance to counter-terrorism efforts, and on the other, to indicate that its relationship with 
these communities will not be solely limited to national security matters.  In practice, however, 
it is unclear how these two objectives can be reconciled.  This is particularly the case in light of 
the recent release of the USG’s National Strategy for Counterterrorism, a strategy described by 
John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, as 
the “first counterterrorism strategy that designates the homeland as a primary area of emphasis 
in our counterterrorism efforts,” which “depends on strong partnerships between government 
and communities here at home, including Muslim and Arab Americans” and where a “key tenet” 
of the Administration’s upcoming approach for partnering with communities to prevent violent 
extremism “is that when it comes to protecting our country, Muslim Americans are not part of 
the problem, they’re part of the solution.”934 
As the USG finalizes its domestic policy on preventing violent extremism through community 
engagement, it is instructive to consider lessons from the U.K. Prevent strategy.  Until its 
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June 2011 reform, the Prevent strategy focused solely on Muslim communities and framed 
community cohesion, integration, and resilience activities as measures to prevent violent 
extremism.935  This core feature of the Prevent strategy securitized government engagement 
with, increased discrimination against, and allegedly surveilled, Muslim communities.936  
Accordingly, the new Prevent strategy issued in June 2011 notes “the view that the last Prevent 
strategy was disproportionate—in particular, that it stigmatised communities, suggested that 
they were collectively at risk of radicalisation and implied terrorism was a problem specific 
to Muslim communities,”937 and separates Prevent from programs to strengthen community 
integration,938 while still signaling its intent to focus on Al-Qaeda and similar groups.939  During 
a series of interviews in the United Kingdom in February 2011 with U.K. government officials 
and NGO representatives, CHRGJ learned of a number of gendered impacts resulting from the 
co-option of community engagement as a counter-terrorism tool.  For example, young women 
disproportionately bore the brunt of increased anti-Muslim racism and discrimination940 that 
flowed from such policies.  One NGO in Birmingham, U.K. also argued that in cases in which 
the U.K. government was engaging with Muslim women on a faith-related basis it caused 
confusion and resentment: “[W]hoever gets funded everybody else is thinking, ‘they have been 
funded because of this, that or the other’ and there is this conversation around Muslim women 
who are supported are women who wear hijab, not the women who do not wear hijab.”941  
Additional negative gender impacts resulted from U.K. government partnerships, including with 
non-violent extremists, where there was minimal vetting of funding recipients to determine 
whether the partnership was desirable from a gender equality perspective.942  Finally, channeling 
of money toward these types of organizations also diverted funding from some women’s groups 
and services.943  While, the USG’s policy toward community engagement to prevent violent 
extremism is still unknown and engagement is at a nascent stage such that the full extent of 
impacts is unclear, some communities and their advocates have already rejected such approaches: 
for example, in the words of one community advocate, the FBI’s engagement efforts “have only 
opened the doors to allow informants into the community.”944  This sentiment, along with 
the U.K. experience above, raises questions about both the desireability and the effectiveness 
of such engagement efforts that also occur alongside the increased use of surveillance and 
investigatory powers against MASA communities.
Gender impacts of interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution  
As with pre-detention measures, interrogation, prosecution, and detention to counter terrorism have predominantly 
targeted men—from CIA detention facilities,945 to Guantánamo Bay,946 to terrorism-related prosecutions in the 
United States since 9/11.947  There are also some limited examples of where women have been direct targets 
of these measures, at times apparently as terrorism suspects (most notably in the case of Aafia Siddiqui), but 
elsewhere because of their familial relationship with a suspect.  Gender discriminatory techniques have also 
been used to interrogate and torture both male and female detainees.  Alongside these primary effects, female 
family members have also experienced a range of collateral impacts of prosecution, detention, and interrogation 
measures that target their male relatives.  The discussion that follows first considers the direct or primary impacts 
that result from these measures and then the collateral impacts, particularly on female family members.  
Pr imar y  Imp act s 
Gender  D iscr iminator y  Interrog ation Techniques 
The USG has used a number of “gender-discriminatory interrogation techniques”948 on both male and female 
detainees.  As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights 
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and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism:
As part of its “war on terror”, the United 
States and its private contractors have 
employed interrogation techniques 
on male Muslim detainees in Iraq and 
elsewhere aimed at exploiting perceived 
notions of male Muslim homophobia (e.g., 
forced piling of naked male detainees, 
rape, and forced homosexual acts with 
other detainees) and inducing feelings of 
emasculation in detainees (e.g., enforced 
nudity, forced wearing of women’s 
underwear, smearing of fake menstrual 
blood on detainees).949  
In addition, in Iraq, sexual abuse has been 
documented against female detainees in U.S. 
detention facilities, including at Abu Ghraib,950 
and U.S.-trained Iraqi forces have reportedly 
tor tured female  susp ected insurgents . 951 
Individuals detained by the USG have also 
endured threats against them and their families 
as a means of extracting confessions.952  In one 
case, the USG reportedly threatened to harm the 
family of Mohamedou Ould Salahi, a Mauritanian 
citizen held in Guantánamo Bay since August 
2002, and falsely told Mr. Salahi that his mother 
was being sent to Guantánamo Bay and would 
be gang-raped.953  Other States have invoked the 
USG’s use of gendered interrogation techniques 
and torture to deflect attention from their own 
rights abuses.  For example, following Human Rights Watch’s extensive reporting on the torture of detainees 
at the Muthanna detention facility in Iraq (including rape and other sexual abuse),954 Prime Minister Maliki 
commented: “We will hold accountable anybody who was proven involved in such acts…America is the 
symbol of democracy, but then you have the abuses at Abu Ghraib.”955 
D etention o f  Female  Family  Memb ers  o f  Terror ism Susp ects 
Female relatives and children of U.S. terrorism suspects are also detained as a means of putting pressure on 
their male relatives.956  This is consistent with the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism’s observation that “women (and 
children) not suspected of terrorism-related offences are unlawfully detained and ill-treated to either gain 
information about male family members or to compel male terrorism suspects to provide information or 
confessions.”957  The USG is also alleged to have been involved in apprehending, transferring, and detaining 
females, including family members of terrorism suspects, where women were subjected to sexual abuse and 
other gender-specific forms of torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.958  Within the United 
States, family members of terrorism suspects also face a number of such impacts.  For example, the mother, 
sister, and father of Shahawar Matin Siraj (referred to as the Herald Square Bomber) were taken into custody 
A divorced mother of seven and an accountant in Baghdad, she was detained 
by the U.S. Government in Iraq, January to July 2004, and released without 
charge: “They put me in a room and they put my son in a cage in front of 
me.” The soldier said to her: “Confess that you know terrorists or I will send 
you to a place where they will rape you. They will do things to you that you 
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by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) the day after he was sentenced.959  His mother, Shahina, and 
sister, Saniya, spent the next eleven days in detention.960  Saniya noted: “The conditions were really bad…
We didn’t have any privacy and had to take showers in front of everyone else.  They separated us for two 
days.  My mom was crying and crying, yelling ‘Don’t go, don’t take her.’  She didn’t sleep the entire night.”961 
After their release, Shahina and Saniya discovered that their bank account had been seized and passports 
confiscated.962  Shahawar’s father was detained for the next six months, placing Shahina and Saniya in a 
desperate financial situation.963  The seizure of their identity cards meant Shahina and Saniya could not 
travel by plane to see Shahawar964 while he was being held in the Communications Management Unit 
(CMU) in Terre Haute, Indiana.965  They also cannot enter Federal buildings,966 so when Shahina attends court 
proceedings to support families in similar situations, she must wait outside.967
Box 7.  Female Terrorism Suspects: The Case of Aafia 
Siddiqui 
As discussed above, the vast majority of USG terrorism suspects are men; however, one 
prominent case involving a USG female terrorism suspect is that of Aafia Siddiqui—the only 
woman on the “FBI’s list of seven suspected al Qaeda operatives.”968  In March 2003, the FBI 
issued an alert indicating they were seeking Dr. Siddiqui for questioning.969  That same month 
she disappeared in Karachi, Pakistan, along with her three children (aged six months to six 
years).970  For the next five years, her fate and whereabouts were unknown, until, according to 
the FBI, the Afghan National Police located and detained her and her son on July 17, 2008, in 
Afghanistan.971  According to the FBI, on or about July 18, 2008, while Dr.  Siddiqui was being 
held in an Afghan police station, she picked up and fired a rifle at FBI and USG armed service 
officials.972  She was subsequently shot by a U.S. Army Warrant Officer, and later charged for 
assault and attempted murder.973  
Also in July 2008, reports surfaced that the USG was detaining Dr. Siddiqui at the Bagram Airbase 
Prison in Afghanistan.974  In 2011, the International Justice Network reported new evidence 
confirming that Dr. Siddiqui and her three children were abducted in 2003 with the “knowledge 
and cooperation of local authorities in Karachi, Pakistan, and subsequently interrogated by 
Pakistani military intelligence (ISI) as well as U.S. intelligence agencies, including the [FBI].”975  In 
Dr. Siddiqui’s trial in the Southern District of New York, she referenced being “tortured in a secret 
prison,” where she was forced to incriminate herself (such as by copying over suspicious-looking 
documents) and also endure threats of torture against herself and her children.976
Dr. Siddiqui was subsequently convicted and sentenced to eighty-six years in prison.977  Her two 
older children currently reside with her mother.978  Her youngest child reportedly died after her 
apprehension in 2003.979  Beyond the immediate impact that Dr. Siddiqui’s case has had on her and 
her family, it has fueled protests in Pakistan and furthered anti-U.S. sentiments in the country980 
and pervasive doubts remain about her fate and whereabouts between 2003 and 2008.981
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Government  Reprisal  and Risks  to  L ib er ty  and S ecur ity 
Family members of individuals detained and/or disappeared either by or with the involvement of the USG 
may suffer direct government reprisal and risks to their liberty and security.  As noted by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism, in general terms: 
Female family members of disappeared persons are exposed to similar risks to liberty and 
security because, as noted by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
“it is they who are most often at the forefront of the struggle to resolve the disappearances of 
members of their family, making them susceptible to intimidation, persecution and reprisals.”982
For example, Usra al-Hussein, the wife of Guantánamo detainee Jehad Diab, was arrested by Syrian State 
Security on July 31, 2008, and held in incommunicado detention without charge or trial until mid-July 2009, 
likely because of her efforts to communicate with an international organization about the conditions of her 
husband’s confinement.983  She was arrested again on January 2, 2010, apparently by State Security.984  In Amina 
Janjua’s case (who believes her husband is in detention in Pakistan and cannot be released because of pressure 
from the CIA985) (explained further below), Pakistani authorities have arrested her, her two children and other 
victims’ families, for her advocacy on behalf of her husband and other disappeared individuals.986  Similarly, 
female family members of detainees in Saudi Arabia, the majority of whom were arrested in sweeps following 
the attacks on 9/11, have been detained for calling for their male relatives’ release.987  Given these reprisals 
and threats against family members,988 it is not surprising that, as noted at our Africa Stakeholder Workshop, 
victims’ families are fearful to pursue a remedy and ask for assistance, including in cases involving the USG.989  
 
Gender  and Mater ia l  Support  Prosecutions 
According to the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), the:
[P]referred approach of states to date (including the UK government) has been to use the 
“indirect support” provisions of the blacklisting regime to criminalise the most basic of 
activities (such as sharing of food and other material resources) between the family members 
of those affected—that is, activities which women are often responsible for undertaking and so 
disproportionately targeted by the provisions.990   
While the gendered impacts of material support provisions in the asylum context are well documented,991 
and there have been some high-profile cases in the United States of women being prosecuted for material 
support (such as Colleen LaRose),992 more information is required to fully unpack the gender dimensions of 
USG federal prosecutions for material support and to assess the extent to which such prosecutions unduly 
penalize family relationships.
Gender  and D evelopment  o f  Foreign Prosecutor ia l  Capacity 
The OPDAT Counterterrorism Unit “assists DOJ in achieving its key strategic goal of countering terrorism, 
while also supporting efforts to build effective criminal justice sectors that respect the rule of law.”993  It 
does so partly through deploying Resident Legal Advisors (RLAs) to a number of USG counter-terrorism 
partner States.994  In Turkey, for example, OPDAT works “on methods to combat acts of violence supported 
or committed by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and other terrorist organizations”; assists the Turkish 
government in developing anti-terrorism legislation; and enhances its ability “to effectively investigate and 
prosecute criminal cases involving the freezing/seizing of assets, financial fraud, and public corruption.”995 
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OPDAT also has eight RLAs in Iraq.996  According to CHRGJ’s interview with the OPDAT Counterterrorism 
Unit, gender emerges in its work with prosecutors on litigation skills (e.g., through assisting prosecutors to 
ensure gender-sensitive preparation of witnesses and victims of terrorism).997  In developing anti-terrorism 
legislation, OPDAT seeks to be gender neutral (such as in the curriculum for capacity building) while 
also trying to avoid any issues that female participants may have with particular examples in the course 
material.998  OPDAT has noted that gender would be less of a concern in training on issues such as evidence 
collection.999  Both OPDAT and the S/CT note that programs focused on first responders to incidents of 
terrorism raise gender concerns,1000 meaning that women should be integrated in such programs given the 
extent to which they are victims of terrorism.1001
Gender  and Pr ison Programs
Domestically, the USG has a program that seeks to prevent prisoners in the United States from using jails to 
foster terrorism and enable terrorist recruitment, and has “designed a special rehabilitation programme that 
focuses on traditional methods to assist offenders in developing skills necessary for a successful reintegration 
into society.”1002  Indeed, post 9/11, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BoP) identified counter-terrorism as a strategic 
goal1003 and developed programs to identify and isolate individuals to further this objective.  First, in 2006 the 
BoP established the Counter-Terrorism Unit to “assist in identifying inmates involved in terrorist activities” and 
“monitor/analyze terrorist inmate communications.”1004  Second, in fiscal year 2007 the BoP also established the 
first CMU to “house inmates who, due to their current offense, conduct, or other verified information, require 
increased monitoring of communications with persons in the community.”1005  See Box 8 (Collateral Gender 
Impacts: Restrictive Family Access and Communication Management Units in the United States)
Internationally, the USG has operated (Iraq), supported (Indonesia), and populated (Saudi Arabia) rehabilitation 
initiatives designed to prevent terrorism detainees from committing terror acts after release.  Gender features in 
the design and implementation of some of these initiatives (primarily through engaging female family members 
of male terrorism suspects), but gender analysis and integration is absent from other programming aspects, 
including the programs’ emphasis on mainstreaming religious views and the exclusion of female detainees.
 ▶ Inclusion of female family members: In Iraq, the DoD Multi-National Force-Iraq Joint Task 
Force 134 Detainee Operations (Task Force 134) established a prisoner rehabilitation program 
that incorporates education, vocational training, civics, and “pay for work” programs to earn 
money for families, and encourages family visitation1006 on the basis that “the family structures 
are very strong in this country.  We want families to become accountable.”1007  The USG also 
funds Indonesia’s Detachment 88 program,1008 which “seeks to bring both the extremist and 
their families back into the fold of normal society”1009 through financial support to families 
(such as livelihood programs and paying for children’s school fees and wives’ employment),1010 
paying travel expenses for families seeking to visit detainees,1011 and funding prison weddings 
for detainees.1012  Finally, a number of Guantánamo returnees are subject to Saudi Arabia’s 
Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare (PRAC) program, which also emphasizes the role of the 
family1013 and “extended social network” in the rehabilitation process.1014  In PRAC, families are 
considered key to rehabilitation, and the government alleviates financial and domestic burdens 
on the family to secure its support and to mitigate the risk that family members will turn to 
extremism.1015  The government also encourages rehabilitated prisoners to marry (by paying for 
weddings, donating dowries, and covering other pre-marriage costs) and have children, “in part 
because it is understood that it is much less likely that young men will get into trouble once they 
become obligated with family responsibilities.”1016  While these schemes have sought to include 
female family members of detained individuals (with a potential positive social and economic 
impact on these women), further consideration is needed to assess the extent to which these 
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programs rely on gender and cultural stereotypes and how this determines both program 
effectiveness and the treatment of female family members.  For example, the Detachment 88 
program has been criticized for “rest[ing] on questionable assumptions, such as the idea that 
prisoners’ wives and families are necessarily in need of economic assistance, or that families are 
always pro-government and will honour their commitment to ensuring ‘good behavior.’”1017
 ▶ Exclusion of female terrorists: With the notable exception of the Iraq Task Force 134 
program,1018 the rehabilitative schemes discussed above have been less focused on women as 
terrorists themselves despite the active role of women in Saudi Arabia1019 and Indonesia1020 in 
terrorist organizations and activities.  For example, the PRAC program does not include female 
detainees,1021 confirming the view of one national security expert at our MENA Stakeholder 
Workshop, who explained that Saudi Arabia does not take women as seriously as men as 
terrorists.1022  Similarly, in Indonesia, all the detainees participating in the Detachment 88 
initiative are men.1023  As noted above, failure to include women in de-radicalization and 
rehabilitation schemes or to design rehabilitation schemes that address gender dynamics results 
in rehabilitative programs that do not reflect the needs of female ex-combatants and may 
“exclude women from benefits provided to male ex-combatants.”1024  
 ▶ Emphasis on mainstreaming religious views: Finally, the Iraq Task Force 134 prisoner 
rehabilitation program, Detachment 88, and PRAC each emphasize using “moderate” or “state 
sanctioned” Islam to compete with extremist ideologies.1025  For example, according to Major 
General Douglas Stone, who oversaw the Task Force 134 rehabilitation program, the objective of 
using “moderate Iraqi clerics” to tutor detainees is “[r]eligious enlightenment.”1026  The emphasis 
on moderating religious views to “de-radicalize” terrorists raises many  human rights concerns 
(e.g., with regard to freedom of religion and expression), including a concern that participants 
in the Stakeholder Workshops articulated regarding how the promotion of “moderate” religious 
views, where it is unclear what is encompassed by “moderate,” may not translate into respect for 
the rights of women and sexual minorities.1027  Indeed, these initiatives appear to be undertaken 
without consideration for whether in a particular context the promotion of “moderate” religious 
views includes the promotion of ideas that are antithetical to gender equality.  For example, 
in the Indonesian context it has been noted that reformed extremists hired to work with 
Detachment 88 detainees are often “only marginally less militant than those being lectured 
to.”1028
Col latera l  Impact s 
As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, “[c]ounter-terrorism measures have had impermissible gendered 
collateral effects that are often neither acknowledged nor compensated.”1029  The following provides an 
overview of these collateral impacts felt particularly by female family members of terrorism suspects who 
have been apprehended, rendered, interrogated and/or detained by or with the involvement of the USG.  
Undermined Economic ,  S ocia l ,  and Cultural  Rights
As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism: 
Enforced disappearances of male detainees in the name of countering terrorism have had “special 
resonance” for female family members, who bear the burden of anxiety, harassment, social exclusion 
92 A  D e c A D e  L o s t
and economic hardship occasioned by the loss of the male breadwinner.  Similar effects ensue from 
the prolonged detention without trial of male family members, the practice of extraordinary rendition, 
and forced deportations of male family members, undermining the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights, such as the right to adequate housing, and the right to family life.1030
  
As advocates at our Africa Stakeholder Workshop explained, families in Africa have become destitute when men 
are transferred to third countries and/or detained as terrorism suspects, including with USG involvement.1031 
This is also the case in various parts of the Middle East,1032 Asia,1033 and the United States.1034  Families of 
Guantánamo returnees have had to sell assets (including family homes and agricultural land) and borrow 
money1035 to survive, such that “families were forced to sell property, borrow money, and/or quit jobs in order 
to finance efforts to secure their freedom,” including through paying bribes to corrupt officials.1036  For example, 
Amina Janjua describes how her husband’s disappearance has had a devastating economic impact on her and 
her family: “As the fight for the release of my illegally detained husband grew tougher and tougher, so was my 
pocket becoming emptier and emptier.”1037  Her fight, on behalf of her family and hundreds of other families 
of missing persons through the Defence of Human Rights, a network of victim families she founded after 
her husband’s disappearance, continues despite the severe financial problems of most of the families in the 
network—which, in Ms. Janjua’s words, are so dire “that even the basic necessities of life…[a]re hard to meet.”1038 
In some countries, social restrictions on women compound financial difficulties experienced by female family 
members.  For example, in Saudi Arabia, wives of post-9/11 male terrorism detainees have difficulty enrolling 
their children in school, accessing the family’s savings, and finding employment (women can only work in 
sexually segregated workplaces) because these transactions require the presence of a male guardian.1039  
As with other families of disappeared and detained individuals, Ms. Janjua has described the psychological 
and emotional toll that the “heart-piercing grief ” of her husband’s disappearance has on her family.1040  She 
explains, “This is the worst thing to happen to anyone.  If someone dies you cry and people console you and 
after some time you come to terms with it but if someone disappears…it is the bitterest of agonies.”1041  In 
describing the impact that his USG-led rendition and secret detention has had on his family, former secret 
CIA detainee Mohammed Abdullah Saleh al-Asad similarly notes: “I worry that my wife and children suffered 
much more than I have.  Not knowing where your husband or father is, whether he is dead or alive, and why 
he was disappeared, is a horrible thing to experience.”1042  
Increase  in  Female  Economic  Activi ty  and A dvocacy
At all Stakeholder Workshops it was noted that since 9/11 there has been an increase in women’s involvement 
in human rights advocacy because of the disproportionate impact of counter-terrorism measures on men. 
For example, at the U.S. Stakeholder Workshop, one advocate explained that the post-9/11 environment 
has pushed some women to organize.1043  Others noted that over the past ten years, women have been the 
primary organizers in MASA communities in the United States, and that they have been advocating for 
family members and challenging cases of loved ones who are detained or convicted.1044  This new role may be 
empowering for some women, but the positive impact must be understood in light of government reprisal 
(see above), and the range of negative collateral impacts discussed above and below.  Similarly, advocates 
at our U.S. and Africa Stakeholder Workshops said that in some cases women have become increasingly 
economically active as a result of their male relative’s targeting because his detention or the stigma attached 
to being targeted has meant he can no longer support his family.1045  At the Africa Stakeholder Workshop, 
one advocate explained, “once men are dubbed terrorists, they can’t keep a regular job, and women have to 
head the household, which could be empowering if they did not get harassed by the government.”1046 
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Limited Family  Contact  with  Individuals  in  USG Custody 
The USG’s rules concerning families’ visitation and correspondence with detainees vary, but by and large are 
extremely limited.  For example, some family members have been able to communicate (albeit in a limited and 
regulated way) with detainees at Guantánamo Bay, but other “families believed their loved one was dead and 
learned what had befallen him only at the time of his release.”1047  In all Guantánamo detainee cases—some 
nearing a decade of confinement—family members have not been allowed to visit their relatives, a condition 
the International Committee of the Red Cross is in discussions with the Pentagon to try and change.1048  In 
contrast, the USG does allow face-to-face family visitation at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.1049  
Box 8. Collateral Gender impacts: Restrictive Family 
Access and Communication Management Units in the 
United States
In the United States, as mentioned above, some individuals, including those convicted of 
terrorism crimes and “prisoners who have…tried to recruit or radicalize others behind bars”1050 
are detained in CMUs (known as “terrorist” units) in Marion, Illinois, and Terre Haute, Indiana.1051 
The basis on which the BoP determines that an individual is seeking to recruit or radicalize other 
prisoners is unclear.  According to the Center for Constitutional Rights, the BoP does not “actually 
disclos[e] what it means when it accuses a prisoner of ‘recruitment and radicalization of other 
inmates’” and instead “unsubstantiated allegations have been used to justify disproportionably 
assigning Muslim prisoners” to CMUs.1052  Indeed, the majority of detainees in the CMUs are 
Muslim—at Marion, “approximately 72 percent of the population is Muslim, 1,200 percent 
higher than the national average of Muslim prisoners in federal prison facilities.  The Terre 
Haute CMU population is approximately two-thirds Muslim, an overrepresentation of 1,000 
percent.”1053  The location of these facilities—in Indiana and Illinois—has made it difficult for 
families who are across the country to visit detainees.1054  In addition, “[t]he CMUs’ visitation 
policy is in some ways even more restrictive than that of the BOP’s notorious ‘supermax’ prisons, 
where prisoners have over four times more time allotted for visits than prisoners in the CMU.”1055 
The conditions of confinement in CMUs severely restrict family contact: “[I]ndividuals detained 
in the CMUs are completely banned from any physical contact with visiting family members 
and friends.  Other types of communication are also severely limited, including interactions 
with other prisoners and phone calls with friends and family members.”1056  
Marginal ization and Stigmatization 
Many terrorism suspects and their families report instances of stigmatization and marginalization as a result of 
the suspect’s alleged or presumed connection to terrorism.  For example, in the United States, Zurata Duka, 
the mother of Eljvir, Dritan, and Shain Duka (three of five individuals commonly referred to as the “Fort Dix 
Five”) has described how she was evicted from her apartment following the terrorism charges against her sons 
(“[the landlord] said ‘get out of the apartment these are terrorists’”) and how the neighborhood she and her 
family “called home for more than a decade has become inhospitable to them.”1057  She also “[e]xpressed fear 
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of retaliation against herself, or even against 13-year-old Lejla [her granddaughter], for speaking out about the 
case.”1058  Speaking about her experience following the apprehension, indictment, and subsequent conviction 
of her son Josa Padilla,1059 Ms. Ortega-Lebron described how her family, including her grandchildren, was 
called the “Al-Qaeda family” and how the Muslim community was too afraid to speak out about these 
issues.1060  This stigma and fear affects service provision to, and community support of, returnees and their 
families.  For example, according to our MENA Stakeholder Workshop, in Yemen the stigma and isolation of 
Guantánamo returnees prevents NGOs from accessing them and makes other community members want to 
avoid them for fear that they will also be investigated.1061  
Enduring  Post-D etention Impact 
Collateral impacts on family members persist following release of their relatives.  For example, in discussing 
the enduring impacts of indefinite detention, including of Guantánamo detainees, Physicians for Human 
Rights notes that prolonged indefinite detention results in harmful psychological effects, including: “Enduring 
personality changes and permanent estrangement from family and community that compromises any hope 
of the detainee regaining a normal life following release.”1062  In some instances, there are concerns about 
how the psychological trauma of male returnees impacts their families.1063  In others, the impact of torture 
on male returnees also affects women, as they have to follow up on getting assistance for male relatives while 
also taking care of household responsibilities.1064  In addition, in many cases, the adverse economic impacts of 
detention and disappearance discussed above persist after male relatives are released.  For example, returnees 
from CIA secret detention, victims of USG rendition, and Guantánamo returnees have been unable to find 
jobs or resume careers because their detention has caused stigma, loss of reputation, concern about their 
capabilities, and accumulation of debt.1065  In some cases, family separation and destitution go hand in hand; 
for example, in one case,“[t]he family of…[a] destitute and unemployed respondent forced him to leave home, 
and his wife returned to her family for support.”1066  He explained, “I have a plastic bag holding my belongings 
that I carry with me all the time…[a]nd I sleep every night in a different mosque.  And that is my situation.”1067 
Moreover, in a number of cases, including those involving former Guantánamo detainees who have been 
resettled in Europe, returnees remain separated from and unable to see their families even after release.1068  In 
one case, former Guantánamo detainee Adel El-Gazzar was resettled in Slovakia in January 20101069 because the 
USG deemed it unsafe for him to return to his native Egypt for fear that he would be persecuted.1070  However, 
while living in Slovakia he saw no prospect of seeing his family again because of legal and financial constraints 
restricting their ability to travel.1071  As a result, despite the fear of persecution and fueled by his desire to end 
his family’s separation, he “became increasingly desperate to return home to look after his elderly mother, wife 
and children, whom he had not seen for 11 years.”1072  Given the recent transition in Egypt, Mr. Gazzar “felt 
confident enough in the ‘new’ regime to travel home,” but he was arrested on arrival at Cairo airport on June 
13, 2011.1073  His arrest was based on a sentence he received in absentia in 20021074 following a military court 
trial of a group of civilians—a practice that has been widely criticized, including by the USG.1075  Mr. Gazzar 
was permitted to see his wife and four children at the airport in Egypt for only about one hour before being 
arrested.1076  In a conversation with his attorney in the United States on June 16, 2011, he expressed that being 
in jail was worth it, because at least he gets family visits.1077  Finally, while many families hold out hope that 
their detained relatives will be able to return home, for those relatives of individuals who died while in USG 
custody, the separation is permanent.  The shroud of secrecy surrounding the circumstances of their relatives’ 
death, as has been the case when terrorism suspects die in U.S. custody,1078 exacerbates this loss.  
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RECOMMENDATiONS 
In designing and implementing pre-detention preventive and investigatory 
measures:
 ▶ Ensure measures are based on sound gender analysis that, for example, addresses the roles of 
women in terrorism; uses a gender lens to understand the drivers of violent extremism; and 
rejects the use of gender stereotypes as a proxy for profiling on the basis of race, national or 
ethnic origin, or religion.
 ▶ Ensure imminent release of the anticipated policy on community partnerships and preventing 
violent extremism to provide clarity and enhance transparency; reject an emphasis here (and 
elsewhere) on any particular racial or religious group that further securitizes relationships with, 
and increase discrimination against, these communities (with particular flow on effects for 
women in these communities); and require transparent partner selection and rigorous vetting 
requirements to ensure that partnerships do not undermine gender equality.  
To address direct or primary impacts of prosecution, detention, and interrogation 
efforts:
 ▶ Ensure USG prosecutorial and related assistance to third countries is gender-sensitive, 
including by ensuring that first responders to terrorism incidents are equipped to address the 
gender-specific needs of women and sexual minorities who are victims of terrorism.
 ▶ End the use of gender-discriminatory interrogation techniques that violate human rights.
 ▶ End and provide redress to all victims of USG torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment, rendition, disappearances, and indefinite detention in the name of countering 
terrorism.
 ▶ Prevent, investigate, and punish the unlawful detention and ill-treatment of women and children 
to produce information concerning male family members suspected of terrorism.
 ▶ Ensure family members are not penalized for lawfully investigating or protesting their relatives’ 
disappearance or detention.  
 ▶ Review and analyze USG federal material support prosecutions to ensure that material support 
laws do not unduly penalize family relationships.
 ▶ Ensure that USG-supported or USG-run prison de-radicalization programs that promote 
“moderate religious views” do not encourage views that are antithetical to gender equality 
or compromise other human rights, including those in relation to freedom of religion and 
expression.  
To address collateral impacts of prosecution, interrogation, detention, and 
disappearances:
 ▶ Provide redress to family members of victims of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, rendition, disappearances, and indefinite detention in the name of 
countering terrorism, including reparations for collateral gender-based human rights violations.
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 ▶ End unduly restrictive family visitation and communication practices in U.S. custody, including 
at Guantánamo Bay and in CMUs.   
 ▶ Ensure that countries that agree to resettle Guantánamo returnees afford the opportunity for 
family reunion.
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SECTiON Vi: GENDER, BORDER SECURiTizATiON, AND 
iMMiGRATiON ENFORCEMENT
Overview
U.S. counter-terrorism strategy emphasizes (1) strengthening border security both at home and abroad to 
circumscribe entry into the United States and (2) expanding enforcement of immigration law within the 
United States.  As the NSS 2010 explains, the USG “relies on our shared efforts to identify and interdict 
threats; deny hostile actors the ability to operate within our borders; maintain effective control of our 
physical borders; [and] safeguard lawful trade and travel into and out of the United States.”1079  It further 
asserts that “effective border security and immigration enforcement must keep the country safe and 
deter unlawful entry.”1080  The National Strategy for Counterterrorism also emphasizes the importance of 
“capabilities related to border protection and security [and] aviation security and screening” and explains 
that the USG has improved “aviation, maritime, and border-security capabilities and information sharing.”1081 
In practice these enhanced capabilities have translated into enhanced and controversial passenger 
vetting and screening procedures at airports;1082 expanded use of immigration detention and deportation, 
particularly of men from MASA communities;1083 overly broad definition and application of inadmissibility 
bars to the United States;1084 and the unprecedented empowerment of law enforcement agencies to enforce 
immigration rules.1085  Following the events of September 11, 2001, the United States has also paid increased 
attention to the linkages between terrorism and trafficking (drug trafficking and trafficking in persons),1086 
with the latter focusing on the extent to which trafficking enables terrorist mobility and finances terrorist 
organizations.1087
From a gender perspective, the USG’s enhanced border security and immigration enforcement measures 
incorporate a specific focus on gender, men, or women in three areas: in passenger vetting and airport 
screening procedures; the collection of Secure Flight Passenger Data; and the mass registration, detention, 
and removal of MASA males from the United States.  These gender dimensions are discussed below in 
the survey of how these measures cause differential and adverse impacts on women and men (including 
transgender individuals) in terms of (1) cross-border movement; (2) the failure to protect victims of 
trafficking and terrorism; and (3) the use of U.S. immigration law as counter-terrorism policy.  
Gendered impacts on Cross-Border Movement 
Pass enger  S creening and Vetting 
TS A S creening  Procedures 
TSA screening procedures have developed in ways that differentially impact men and women from minority 
religious communities.  This concern relates both to the nature of primary screening methods (metal 
detectors or advanced imaging technology [AIT] units1088) and the resort to, and nature of, secondary 
screening procedures, such as the “pat-down.”  In terms of when secondary screening is required, in October 
2010 the TSA announced it was in the process of implementing new “pat-down” procedures nationwide1089 
to be performed as a secondary screening “whenever a traveler sets off traditional metal detectors, wears 
bulky clothing, or chooses not to remove headwear,” and in some cases randomly.1090  In addition, there are 
earlier reports of mandatory secondary screening for those wearing a headscarf : for example, on January 
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5, 2010, TSA staff at Washington Dulles International Airport reportedly said to a traveler that secondary 
screening of anyone wearing a headscarf is required.1091  Mandatory secondary screening under these 
circumstances appears to depart from TSA’s 2007 “bulky clothing” policy, which on January 3, 2010, the 
TSA stated was still applicable, and pursuant to which screeners have discretion as to whether a passenger’s 
headwear is “bulky” and requires additional screening.1092  
Concerns about mandatory secondary screening on impermissible bases have continued with the 
introduction of AITs.  In March 2010, the TSA began using AIT units, commonly referred to as full-body 
scanners, in airports across the United States.1093  According to the TSA: “Advanced imaging technology 
safely screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including weapons, explosives and other 
objects concealed under layers of clothing without physical contact to help TSA keep the traveling public 
safe.”1094  However, Sikh men who wear the dastaar (turban) are reportedly always required to undergo 
secondary screening (either a pat-down and/or use of a metallic detector wand) on the basis that the “AIT is 
deficient in looking through folds/layers of the turban.”1095  While it is unclear if this policy would also apply 
to women who wear headscarves, these secondary screening procedures occur against a larger backdrop 
of concerns about TSA profiling of Muslim women wearing headscarves and Sikh men wearing turbans.1096 
Accordingly, community advocates have raised questions regarding why turbans and headscarves seem 
to be singled out for mandatory secondary screening when other clothing items that could readily hide 
non-metallic threat items are not.1097  In terms of the gender dimensions of the ways in which secondary 
screening is conducted, the TSA argues that:
[T]o protect passenger privacy and ensure anonymity, strict privacy safeguards are built into 
the procedures for use of the AIT.  For example, the officer who assists the passenger does not 
see the image that the technology produces, and the officer who views the image is remotely 
located in a secure resolution room and does not see the passenger.1098  
However, these explanations have not always provided assurance and a number of passengers have chosen 
not to be screened by AIT scanners, citing a range of concerns including privacy1099 and religious propriety.1100 
In addition, passengers that forgo AIT screening must undergo secondary screening via the new pat-down 
procedure referenced above.1101  While at a policy level, TSA guidelines require some gender sensitivity in 
conducting secondary screenings involving pat-downs (e.g., pat-downs can be done in private, screening 
officers are of the same gender,1102 and there are limits on the areas that can be patted down if secondary 
screening is required because of headwear),1103 the extent to which this is realized in practice is unclear,1104 
with community groups finding it necessary to issue travel advisories to remind individuals of their rights.1105 
Further, the pat-down procedure itself, which allows TSA officials to use the fronts instead of the backs of 
their hands,1106 has been roundly criticized for being overly invasive (e.g., a breast cancer survivor explained 
that the TSA made her take off her prosthetic breast and another passenger has described an agent searching 
inside her underwear),1107 and akin to “molestation” for both male and females.1108  Some religious groups 
have argued that the AIT scanners violate their religious edicts,1109 and some religious passengers indicate 
that they are forgoing air travel to avoid the invasive procedures.1110
The S ecure  Fl ight  Program
The Secure Flight program may encumber the movement of transgender individuals.  In October 2009, the 
TSA began requiring all airlines to request and collect Secure Flight Passenger Data, including, for the first time, 
passengers’ date of birth and gender, to help reduce the number of passengers misidentified as matches on 
terror watch lists.1111  While such efforts to reduce misidentification are key (see below on the No Fly List), an 
unintended side effect of this new requirement is to potentially complicate air travel for transgender individuals, 
many of whom do not have identity documents that match their current gender expression and who may have to 
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reveal their transgender identity at the airport and therefore potentially be subjected to “harassment, disrespect 
and discrimination by airline personnel, security, customs officials if they’re traveling internationally and other 
passengers.”1112  As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, “counter-terrorism measures that involve increased travel 
document security, such as stricter procedures for issuing, changing and verifying identity documents, risk unduly 
penalizing transgender persons whose personal appearance and data are subject to change.”1113  The TSA has 
reportedly reached out to transgender rights organizations to reduce the potential negative impacts of the Secure 
Flight program and has committed to providing training on transgender issues to airport employees.1114
The No Fly  L ist
The No Fly List may penalize and encumber female travelers because of their familial ties.  For the FBI 
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to include an individual on the No Fly List, he or she must be a “known or 
suspected terrorist [who] must present a threat to civil aviation or national security.”1115  Rights advocates 
have raised a number of concerns regarding the No Fly List, including that it unlawfully restricts the travel 
of U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents and violates due process.1116  In addition to these broader 
concerns, a number of gendered impacts also result from erroneous and over-inclusive listings.  For example, 
family members of individuals who are on the No Fly List will sometimes also be prevented from flying (in 
one case because tickets were booked together);1117 individuals may experience long travel delays as a result 
of their family member’s erroneous inclusion on the list (as parents whose children have the same or similar 
names to individuals on the No Fly List have experienced);1118 and entire families have sometimes been listed 
where there are no allegations of terrorism against all members.1119  As noted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, 
“inclusion of entire families on ‘no-fly’ lists…unduly penalizes family relationships.”1120  These impacts are 
compounded by difficulties in seeking redress through the DHS Security Traveler Redress Inquiry Program 
(DHS Trip) (including, for example, the challenges in being removed from the list).1121  
B order  S ecur it iz ation and Migrant s ,  Traf f icked Pers ons  and Refugees
The USG’s global effort to increase border security measures has undermined the human rights of migrants, 
refugees, and trafficked persons.  U.S. counter-terrorism strategy reflects a concern that “weak border 
controls” and porous borders abroad increase vulnerability to terrorist attack.1122  As such, its focus includes 
strengthening border security in locations such as the Egypt-Gaza Strip border,1123 around the Iraq border,1124 
in Malaysia,1125 and at the Somalia-Kenya border.1126  Human-rights advocates at our Asia Stakeholder 
Workshop noted that increased border security to counter terrorism is serving to demonize and criminalize 
migrant workers (e.g., in Malaysia); making cross-border movement more difficult and increasing reliance on 
and vulnerability to third parties such as smugglers to facilitate movement; criminalizing victims of trafficking 
involved in cross-border movement (see below); and resulting in the prioritization of law enforcement and 
national security over human rights.1127  At our Africa Stakeholder Workshop, advocates similarly noted that 
increased border security in Africa resulted in a range of rights infringements,1128 such as profiling of Somalis, 
including Kenyans of Somali origin, at the Ugandan and Kenyan borders.1129  It was noted that young Muslim 
men traveling internationally experienced the greatest problems, but that women may also be harassed, and 
that women experienced additional problems at the border because they have special problems proving 
their national origin or may be wearing visible signs of their faith (like a headscarf) that attract increased 
scrutiny.1130  It was noted that tightened border security in the name of countering terrorism, including 
through border closures, negatively impacted refugees, particularly women and children.1131  
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Failure to Protect: Material Support Bars and the Trafficking-
Terror Nexus 
S cop e and Appl ic ation of  Mater ia l  Supp ort  Bars
Under U.S. law, coerced and/or de minimus support to any non-State armed group is construed as “material 
support” to terrorism.1132  These over-broad material support provisions fail to recognize female vulnerability 
to coerced domestic service and sexual assault,1133 and have resulted in already-victimized female asylum 
seekers, refugees, and green-card applicants having their petitions and applications denied or placed 
on hold.1134  For example, in 2005, a Liberian woman seeking resettlement to the United States had her 
refugee resettlement application placed on hold when DHS asserted that her coerced domestic service to 
rebels that had raped and held her hostage constituted material support.1135  Further, extremely expansive 
interpretations of the term “material support” have been applied to unduly encompass the acts of women 
providing care or household services to their own family members.  For example, in one case, an Ethiopian 
woman had her U.S. asylum application placed on hold for three years because she brought her son, who 
was arrested for “political reasons,” food and drink while he was in jail in Ethiopia.1136  Similar re-victimization 
occurs when individuals who have paid ransom to terrorists for their own and/or their children’s release 
are denied relief.1137  Entire families feel the impact of the over-application of these provisions: under U.S. 
immigration law, spouses and children of persons that are inadmissible under these terrorism-related 
provisions are also rendered inadmissible.1138  
While the DoS and DHS have issued duress waivers on a case-by-case basis for asylum and refugee applicants 
who have provided coerced material support,1139 problems with the waiver system persist, including the 
burdensome nature of the process, the failure to provide status updates to applicants, lack of transparency, 
prolonged delay, and the inability of applicants to challenge a denial.1140  In March 2010, Senator Patrick 
Leahy introduced the Refugee Protection Act of 2010,1141 which excludes coerced acts from the definition 
of terrorist activity (and thus material support); narrows the definition of terrorist activity and terrorist 
organization in the INA, relieving concerns pertaining to de minimus support; and repeals inadmissibility 
bars for children and spouses for the acts of the parent/spouse.1142  While passage of this bill would help to 
ensure that victims of terrorism are not re-victimized through the U.S. refugee and asylum systems, the Bill, 
introduced in the Senate in March 2010 and referred to committee in May 2010, did not pass and has not 
yet been reintroduced.1143  
S ecur it ized Approaches  to  Traf f icking
While the fact that the USG links terrorism and trafficking is publicly known, the basis for, veracity of, and 
operational contours of this link are not.  In 2004, the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) 
was established by inter-agency charter to “address the separate but related issues of alien smuggling, 
trafficking in persons, and criminal support of clandestine terrorist travel.”1144  In 2006, the Center “completed 
an analysis of the linkage between trafficking in persons and terrorism, including the use of profits from 
trafficking in persons to finance terrorism”1145 for Congress, however these findings remain classified.1146 
USG officials interviewed for this Report nonetheless query the USG’s link between terrorism (and other 
organized crime) and trafficking in persons.1147  Regardless of the veracity of the terrorism-trafficking nexus, 
in practice, significant human rights issues flow from this link.
First, the terrorism-trafficking nexus prioritizes a law enforcement rather than human rights approach to 
trafficking that views trafficked persons first as potential criminals and national security threats, and second 
as human rights victims.1148  This can diminish service provision to trafficked persons and may also place 
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increased pressure on trafficked women to fulfill gender-based stereotypes about passivity to be seen as 
“true” victims.1149  These challenges occur against a backdrop in which advocates experience increasing 
difficulty in “securing assistance and resources from governments that are ‘preoccupied’ with fighting 
terrorism.”1150  Indeed, as one U.S. anti-trafficking advocate in our U.S. Stakeholder Workshop noted: “The 
T-visa for trafficked persons requires cooperation with law enforcement, but if local law enforcement is 
working on a case then ICE sometimes won’t sign off to certify cooperation because they are afraid the 
person may be a terrorist.”1151
 
Second, as noted above, strict border-control policies make migration more insecure and expensive, 
increasing migrants’ vulnerabilities to traffickers and other irregular forms of movement, and in some cases 
turning an act of smuggling into a case of trafficking.1152  As such, according to Transparency International 
Kenya, in the policing of the Kenya-Somalia border, it is not terrorists, criminals, or insurgents who are usually 
stopped, but rather:
While border security is meant to stop such people, it is instead the vulnerable who are 
disadvantaged.  It is the people who don’t have the means to cross, the refugees, that are the 
ones who have a very hard time at the border and those who the government seeks to keep out 
will not even use the designated border points.1153 
Third, as one participant in our Asia Stakeholder Workshop noted, the trafficking-terrorism nexus augments 
border control as a strategy for combating trafficking, which has detrimental impacts because “[s]ecurity 
approaches do not prioritize systemic changes that would decrease trafficking.  Security approaches prioritize 
anti-trafficking.  They do not prioritize safe migration or reduction of exploitation in workplaces which will 
systematically reduce trafficking.”1154  
Fourth, the terrorism-trafficking nexus increases the scope for violations by State actors against trafficked 
persons because a security approach to trafficking privileges cooperative anti-trafficking arrangements that 
are dominated by “coercive actors,” such as Ministries of Interior, who are often ill suited to identifying and 
providing assistance to trafficked persons.1155 
Gender impacts of immigration Enforcement to Counter Terrorism
D i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  F o c u s  o n 
Male  M ASA Immigrant s
The use of U.S . immigration law as a 
counter-terrorism measure in the United 
States has by and large explicitly and 
predominantly focused on males in MASA 
communities .  For example, the now-
suspended1156  National Security Entry 
and Exit Registration System (NSEERS) 
program sp eci f ica l ly  requi red male 
non-immigrants older than sixteen from 
“countries of interest” (mostly Muslim 
or Arab countries) to register with the 
then-INS.1157  The human rights impacts 
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owes to the staggering breadth of NSEERS: according to DHS, by September 2003, of the 83,519 men who 
registered domestically with NSEERS, 13,799 were issued with notices to appear and 2,870 were detained.1158 
The ACLU has also noted that post 9/11, MASA communities were subject to an extensive “preventive 
detention campaign” that “resulted in the secret detention and deportation of close to 1000 immigrants 
designated as ‘persons of interest’ in its investigation of the [9/11] attacks.”1159  However, these human rights 
impacts also derive from the inherently problematic features of such programs.  For example, NSEERS has 
been critiqued for the ways in which it discriminated against individuals on the basis of country of origin 
and religion; enabled deportation of individuals based on minor immigration infringements; and was also 
counterproductive to the goal of countering terrorism.1160  Gay, bisexual, and transgender men required to 
register for NSEERS (who, notably, cannot be sponsored for family-based immigration by their same-sex 
partners) were also “left fearful of long-term separation with one or both vulnerable to deportation, often 
back to countries that they had fled because of persecution or dangerous situations.”1161  Accordingly, in 
May 2008, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination called on the USG “to put an 
end to the National Entry and Exit Registration System [sic] (NSEERS) and to eliminate other forms of racial 
profiling against Arabs, Muslims and South Asians.”1162  Indeed, on April 27, 2011, DHS announced that it was 
relieving affected individuals from the requirement to register with NSEERS,1163 stating, “[a]s threats to the 
United States evolve, DHS seeks to identify specific individuals and actions that pose specific threats, rather 
than focusing on more general designations of groups of individuals, such as country of origin.”1164  
Col latera l  Impact s  on Female  Fami ly  Memb ers
As explained by an advocate at our U.S. Stakeholder Workshop, while NSEERS and other similar programs 
have largely targeted men (who, as a result, face most of the direct impacts), the collateral impacts on 
women are also present but just less visible, and may also be indirect, unintended, or hidden.1165  In 2003, 
the DOJ’s Office of the Inspector General released a highly critical report on the treatment of “September 
11 detainees” (INS-detained individuals who were arrested in connection with September 11 terrorism 
investigations),1166 noting the initial failure to provide access and information to family members and that 
restrictive policies also hindered family visitation for “even many months after September 11.”1167  Other 
reports reveal that the DOJ also “refused to release the names of or charges against these detainees and 
instituted a controversial policy of secret immigration hearings that were closed even to the press and family 
members.”1168  Many of the men who faced subsequent deportation pursuant to programs such as NSEERS 
left behind wives with heavy community, financial, familial, and emotional burdens, ranging from coping with 
psychological effects on children to increased economic insecurity to organizing on behalf of those most 
directly affected.1169  The children of gay, bisexual, and transgender men “are no less traumatized [than the 
children of heterosexual couples] by separation from their parents.”1170  Burdens on families were particularly 
acute where the deportee was the primary breadwinner, such that “if the father is removed from the country, 
the effect is either a broken family or the de facto deportation of the whole family.”1171  Accordingly, while 
immigrant rights advocates have welcomed the suspension of the NSEERS program, they also have called 
on DHS to repeal it entirely, and to remedy ongoing rights impacts resulting from the program, including by 
granting relief including for “adverse immigration consequences on thousands of families.”1172  
Communit y  Ins ecur it y 
After September 11, 2001, Section 287(g) of the INA, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, was used to increase the role and authority of local law enforcement 
officers in enforcing immigration law.1173  Section 287(g) has been accompanied by other efforts to increase 
law enforcement’s coordination with immigration authorities including through Arizona law SB 10701174 and 
the Secure Communities Program.1175  These developments have been critiqued for involving or facilitating 
racial profiling,1176 and leading to “[u]nnecessary or prolonged detention.”1177  This shift also raises a range of 
concerns with gender dimensions.  First, it has further deterred immigrant women from reporting crimes, 
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such as domestic violence and trafficking, because “they have a justifiable fear that their lack of immigration 
status will trump the criminal justice protections afforded crime victims under the law.”1178  One case 
that exemplifies this concern occurred in February 2009, when police officers responding to a domestic 
violence call asked that everyone at the scene provide proof of citizenship.1179  The caller, who had bruises 
on her neck, asked the officers to arrest her boyfriend, but instead they arrested her sister because she was 
unable to prove her citizenship.1180  Second, local enforcement of immigration increases fear and mistrust of 
police and may deter reporting of crimes more broadly, thus increasing insecurity within communities as a 
whole.1181  Third, local enforcement allows unscrupulous police officers and employers to more readily abuse 
and exploit immigrant women who may be more 
reticent to report such abuses for fear of adverse 
immigration consequences.1182  Indeed, women 
detained as a result of 287(g) interventions and 
women in immigration detention more broadly 
(discussed further below) have been treated 
egregiously.1183   
Female  Immigration D etention
The post-9/11 policy environment has contributed 
to the spike in the size of the female population 
in immigration detention facil ities .1185  Their 
conditions of confinement are egregious and 
include l imited access  to fami ly  members 
(particularly troubling, as studies indicate that the 
“majority of the women in custody are mothers 
of children under ten years of age”);1186 lack of 
communication and legal  representation; 1187 
detention in prison-like facilities because of the post-9/11 trend toward a penal approach to immigration;1188 
absence of adequate gender-appropriate and basic health care (including gynecological care, hormonal 
contraceptives, prenatal care, breast pumps, and sanitary pads);1189 and heightened risk of sexual assault and 
abuse.1190  These concerns may be amplified for women who are deemed to present a national security risk. 
For example, on November 7, 2007, ICE informed its field officers that when considering taking a nursing 
mother into custody, that “[a]bsent any statutory detention requirement or concerns such as national 
security, threats to public safety or other investigative interests, the nursing mother should be released…
and the Alternatives to Detention programs should be considered as an additional enforcement tool”.1191 
While ICE has proposed a number of policy changes, including preventive measures (e.g., only allowing 
same-sex detainee searches, and restricting when guards can move detainees of the opposite gender) 
and publishing a revised detention standard on sexual assault,1192 Human Rights Watch has also called for 
limiting unnecessary searches and informing victims of abuse-related crime about the availability of visas 
that would allow them to remain in the country.1193  
RECOMMENDATiONS 
To ensure that passenger screening and vetting procedures are non-discriminatory 
and do not unduly interfere with cross-border movement:
 ▶ Undertake an independent audit of TSA screening policy and practices to ensure that screeners do 
not profile on proscribed grounds, including on the basis of sex, race, ethnicity, nationality, or religion, 
“ T h e r e  a r e  c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  t h e 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o g r a m 
a s  w e l l  a s  i t s  i m p a c t  o n  f a m i l i e s , 
i m m i g r a n t  c o m m u n i t i e s  a n d  l a w 
e n f o r c e m e n t  i n  N e w  Yo r k … A s  a 
re s u l t ,  N e w  Yo r k  i s  s u s p e n d i n g  i t s 
p ar tic ip ation in  the pro gram.”
G o v er n o r  A n d re w  Cu o m o,  J u n e  1 ,  2 0 1 1 , 
exp la in ing that  New York State  ended it s 
p ar t ic ip ation in  the  S ecure  Communities 
Pro gram 1184
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and to clarify the exact scope of the TSA current secondary screening policy as it pertains to 
“bulky clothing” and headwear.  
 ▶ Ensure that relevant USG officials are adequately trained on, and apprised of, the TSA screening 
policy, and that passengers are given notice of the policy and their rights, including to be 
screened in private and by persons of their own gender.
 ▶ Review and narrow terror watch lists, such as the No Fly List, to ensure focus on those who 
are potentially dangerous to the United States.  This includes, at a minimum, ensuring that 
individuals are not listed or unduly penalized solely as a result of family ties to someone who 
has been identified as suspect.  
 ▶ Adequately train TSA officials and work with transgender rights organizations to mitigate the 
potential negative impacts of the Secure Flight program and similar initiatives, including on 
transgender individuals.  
 ▶ Reform or replace DHS TRIP with a mechanism that provides listed individuals with notice of 
the reasons for their listing, access to underlying evidence, and a meaningful opportunity to 
challenge their listing, and if successful, to be de-listed without excessive delay.  
To ensure that USG laws to counter terrorism do not re-victimize and penalize 
victims of terrorism and other human rights abuse:
 ▶ Reform material support and other terrorism-related inadmissibility bars to ensure that 
gender-based harms, such as coerced domestic service to terrorism, are recognized as rights 
violations and are not grounds for exclusion from the United States.  This could, for example, 
include reintroducing and enacting the Refugee Protection Act of 2010 and reforming the 
duress waiver process so that decisions are made without delay and with essential safeguards, 
including the meaningful opportunity to appeal.
 ▶ Release the HSTC’s 2006 analysis of the linkage between trafficking in persons and terrorism, 
along with information regarding related strategic assessments and anti-trafficking initiatives 
coordinated by HSTC or other USG entities and information regarding safeguards to ensure that 
the trafficking-terrorism linkage does not re-victimize trafficked persons.  
To prevent gender-based harms arising from local police enforcement of immigration 
laws:
 ▶ Take steps to end undue enforcement of immigration laws by police.  In the interim, ICE should 
increase oversight of local enforcement of immigration law, including through inspections of partner 
law enforcement agencies and requiring data collection and reporting to check that law enforcement 
is neither profiling individuals nor subjecting female immigrants to sexual or other abuse.
 ▶ Track patterns in reporting of crime by immigrants, including immigrant women, with a view 
to identifying where police enforcement of immigration law has deterred crime-reporting and 
compromised community safety.  Where such patterns are revealed, corrective measures are required.
To end and redress gender-specific effects of detention and deportation:
 ▶ Revoke immigration policies that wrongly target MASA communities (such as NSEERS) and 
105A  D e c A D e  L o s t
reject selective immigration enforcement practices.  Provide redress for immigration and other 
consequences that flow from these current and discontinued measures, including by granting 
relief for adverse immigration consequences.  
 ▶ Return immigration detention to its function to guard against flight risk and restrain dangerous 
individuals pending removal hearings, including by replacing mandatory detention with 
case-by-case determinations 
 ▶ Supplement and then implement existing gender-specific detention standards, including those 
that apply to national security detainees, that reflect the medical needs of female detainees, 
reduce their sexual abuse, and ensure accountability for rights violations.
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SECTiON Vii: GENDER, DiPLOMACY, AND STRATEGiC 
COMMUNiCATiON TO COUNTER TERRORiSM
Overview 
A hallmark of the Obama Administration’s counter-terrorism strategy is a shift to more preventive, strategic, 
and “non-coercive” approaches that seek to complement traditional tactical efforts involving intelligence, 
law enforcement, and military operations.1194  This strategic approach is most often referred to under the 
rubric of “countering violent extremism,” and its core goal is to “stop those most at risk of radicalization from 
becoming terrorists.”1195  The USG’s drive to reduce terrorist recruitment has three elements: “Delegitimizing 
the violent extremist narrative in order to diminish its ‘pull’; developing positive alternatives for youth 
vulnerable to radicalization to diminish the ‘push’ effect of grievances and unmet expectations; and building 
partner capacity to carry out these activities.”1196  This first element of de-legitimizing extremist narratives 
encompasses a range of public diplomacy efforts and includes components such as “counter-ideology 
initiatives” and “working with civil society to de-legitimize the al-Qa’ida narrative and, where possible, 
provid[ing] positive alternative narratives.”1197  
There are both domestic and international aspects to this strategy.  Domestically, the USG seeks to expand 
engagement with “the communities being targeted most directly by al Qaeda,” including through enhancing 
the role of state and local governments; increased support to local community initiatives to provide the 
“information and tools they need to build their own capacity to disrupt, challenge and counter propaganda, 
in both the real world and the virtual world”; and increased government efforts to “improve how we 
communicate with the American people about the threat of violent extremism in this country and what 
we’re doing to address it…[t]his includes dispelling the myths that have developed over the years, including 
misperceptions about our fellow Americans who are Muslim.”1198 
On the international side, the DoS leads overseas efforts through the newly-established inter-agency Center 
for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) which is designed to “coordinate, orient, and 
inform whole-of-government communications activities targeted against violent extremism to audiences 
abroad.”1199  The domestic and international strategies inevitably overlap because the USG and its partners 
(such as the U.K. government) are increasingly examining the links between diaspora communities and 
their countries of origin.1200  The modes of delivery for the USG’s strategic communications overseas include 
person-to-person engagement;1201 the “power of social media”1202 and increased online campaigns, including 
through the CSCC’s Digital Outreach Team;1203 local projects funded through the Ambassador’s Fund for 
Counterterrorism (e.g., a de-radicalization program in Indonesia, work with madrassas in Bangladesh, and 
“Empowering Women Against Religious Violence in India”);1204 “educational and cultural programs, libraries, 
publications and English teaching”;1205 radio programs such as “Greetings from America”;1206 “messaging from 
moderate leaders”;1207 and support to “Islamic schools” or madrassas (e.g., in Indonesia).1208  
Gender Dimensions: Audience, Messengers, and Message
In the USG’s strategic communication strategies to combat violent extremism, women feature as the audience 
of the narratives (both as potential terrorists and influencers of terrorist behavior); as deliverers of the message 
(primarily from the perspective of victims of terrorism and as mothers seeking to dissuade terrorist activity); 
and potentially in the counter-narrative content itself.
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Audience
 
In 2007, the USG indicated that some of its communication efforts had shifted away from “elite audiences and 
key opinion-makers to ones aimed at a broader audience, which includes potential recruits to terrorism.”1209 
Both the U.S. international and domestic strategies make clear that the audience is Muslim, but also stress 
that engagement with Muslim communities cannot be framed solely in terms of terrorism or counter-
terrorism.1210  According to CHRGJ’s interview with the CSCC, their CVE direct communication efforts focus 
not on those who are engaged in violent extremism but on those who are susceptible to it—this could 
include women who may be asked to support extremism and those who have a role in influencing others.1211 
On the latter, CSCC members suggested potential value in leveraging matriarchs and powerful mother 
figures to “influence family members to contribute to resiliency to radicalization.”1212  According to CSCC, 
while current USG CVE communications efforts have focused on specific audiences, they have not at this 
time dealt specifically with women as a distinct audience, in terms of engaging specifically with Al-Qaeda 
ideological efforts to recruit women to perform acts of terrorism or raise their sons as terrorists.1213
Credib le  Voices 
The USG’s counter-terrorism communication strategy stresses the need for “credible messengers”1214 or 
“Credible Voices” at the individual, community, and national levels.1215  This has an explicitly religious aspect 
and includes engaging “clerics and other influential voices with credibility in local communities”1216 on the 
basis that, according to the USG, “[o]f course, the most effective voices against al Qaeda’s warped worldview 
and interpretation of Islam are other Muslims.”1217  The USG Special Representative to Muslim Communities 
has similarly stated:
What we know for sure is that the most credible voices to be able to push back against that 
violent ideology are Muslims themselves…What our job should be is to work with these 
communities—with civil society—and governments around the world...so that they can push 
back and create an alternative narrative to the narrative of violent extremism…1218  
According to CHRGJ’s interview with the Office of the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, 
the Office has, for example, hosted “wisdom sessions” with thought leaders, including one that focused 
solely on Muslim women (all of whom were American) who discussed the need to change perceptions that 
non-Muslims have of Muslim women around the world so that they can get their voices heard and counter 
stereotypes.1219  The USG particularly emphasizes promoting “moderate” Muslim voices, which can include 
working with nations the USG considers to exhibit “moderate Islamic tradition,” such as Bangladesh,1220 or 
the “promotion  of  moderate  authors  and  textbooks  for  local schools” in North Africa and the Sahel to 
“generate  support  for  the  United  States  and  for  moderate  Islamic  viewpoints.”1221  The domestic and 
international aspects of the strategy intersect through activities such as the “Citizen Dialogue” program, 
through which the USG had by 2007 “sent out dozens of American Muslims to predominantly Muslim 
countries to engage with counterparts” as part of its commitment to “finding new ways to empower credible 
Muslim voices throughout the Muslim world.”1222  Both the U.S. international and domestic strategies 
also stress that the USG itself can “only go so far” as an overt credible voice and that local partners and 
particularly “non-traditional” ones should lead these efforts.1223 
In some specific ways, the USG’s outreach to “non-traditional” actors is strongly focused on women, although 
not at all on sexual minorities.  For example, according to the S/CT, amplifying women’s voices is a big part 
of enabling other voices to speak, and this includes working with female victims of terrorism to share their 
stories and supporting women’s leadership to develop counter-narratives in difficult environments, such 
as in Afghanistan.1224  For example, the S/CT describes the Afghanistan Leadership in Instability program as 
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providing leadership training for women in two components.  The first teaches basic leadership skills like 
standing up for yourself and public speaking and the second is focused on how to lead in an insurgency.1225 
According to the Office of the Special Representative to Muslim Communities, “women have to be part 
of the counter-narrative to extremism” because “to ignore their voices is to leave out half—and a very 
influential part—of the Muslim community.”1226  The USG, through the DoS, is also very supportive of, and 
raises awareness of, victim-run initiatives.1227  In addition, the USG has supported other countries’ efforts 
to incorporate women and gender equality in strategies to counter the ideology that underpins violent 
extremism.  For example, the USG has described Morocco’s training and use of mourchidates (female spiritual 
leaders) to promote moderate Islam as “pioneering”1228 and in 2009 held a visit with the mourchidates in the 
United States.1229  
Content  o f  Mess age
The goal of the USG’s communication strategy is to both undermine Al-Qaeda narratives and to provide 
an alternative by which the USG can “replace the radical narrative with something more hopeful and 
empowering.”1230  One core of the alternative message is to emphasize that the United States is not at war 
with Islam.1231  Another key plank of the USG’s counter-narrative strategy is to emphasize that the majority 
of Al-Qaeda’s victims are Muslim.1232  The gender of victims may feature in this message.1233  
Gender Outcomes: Space for Women’s and LGBTi Rights?
There are three key issues from a gender perspective that flow from the USG’s approach to strategic 
communications to combat terrorism: the risk of backlash, increased scope for problematic partnerships, 
and inadvertent reinforcement of gender stereotypes.  These impacts take place against a larger backdrop 
of concerns about the extent to which the USG’s emphasis on moderating religious views implicates various 
human rights, including freedom of religion,1234 as well as freedom of expression and association.
First, as the USG correctly notes, in countering violent extremism “[s]ome potential partners will not 
want any formal affiliation with the USG, because they fear it would undermine their legitimacy among 
constituents.”1235  As explained in Sections I, III, and IV, for women’s and LGBTI groups, overt, implied or 
imputed partnerships with Western governments or NGOs can not only undermine legitimacy but also 
fundamentally compromise safety.1236  For example, according to one women’s rights advocate in Yemen, 
her work is “constantly criticized, because it is seen as having a Western agenda” and “it is very difficult to 
convince ordinary women because we are suspected of either working with the government or the West.”1237 
Indeed, several aspects of the USG’s strategic communication strategy may inadvertently strengthen these 
pressures or extremist narratives and result in marginalizing voices within those communities.  In particular, 
the explicit focus on Muslims, and in particular “moderate” Muslim voices, is particularly problematic 
because it not only locates the problem of terrorism in Muslim communities (with flow on gendered 
effects),1238 but also equates religiosity or faith with violence and can suggest that the USG wants to engage 
only with those it considers to be “marginally religious.”1239  While the USG is rhetorically at pains to suggest 
that it does not view all Muslims as terrorists, until terminology such as “moderate” Muslim is rejected and, 
more importantly, matched by concrete action (what the USG has aptly described as either the “message of 
our deeds”1240 or “Diplomacy of Deeds”1241), it is will be impossible to turn back the tide of Islamophobia that 
undermines human rights or avoid the allegation that the USG is seeking to promote a particular version of 
Islam at home and abroad.1242  It is notable that the CSCC Digital Outreach team does not directly attempt 
to engage with the religious aspects of extremist narratives.1243  
Second, the USG’s approach to identifying “moderate” and “non-traditional” voices can potentially present 
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significant challenges for the rights of women and sexual minorities if it prioritizes partnerships inimical to 
human rights.  First, across all of CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshops there were concerns about how the USG 
defines and identifies “moderate” individuals, groups, or nations and the ways in which this may create or 
replicate local hierarchies.  For example, according to one women’s rights advocate from Bangladesh at 
CHRGJ’s Asia Stakeholder Workshop:
The USG needs to stop identifying Bangladesh as a moderate Muslim nation.  We are a majority 
Muslim country but not defined by being one kind of Muslim or another kind of Muslim…
the best way to engage with societies where there are poorer communities is to engage with 
everyone; to give everyone a stake in the system.  Otherwise, again it creates and brings up the 
question of definition of who is moderate…and allows people to occupy that space for their 
own purposes and to be interlocutors with the United States.1244 
A human rights advocate from Malaysia similarly echoed that engagement with moderate Islam is “where 
the problem starts…it goes back to the definition of moderate.”1245  The concern is that USG support of 
“moderate Islam” may privilege groups that in their local contexts do not espouse progressive views on 
gender equality.  In the words of one Palestinian LGBTI activist, “We have the same problems with ‘moderate 
Islam’ programs and empowering of religious figures.  ‘Moderate’ does not equal tolerant to human rights 
and LGBT rights.”1246  According to an advocate from Indonesia, “The promotion of moderate Islam leads 
to marginalization of individuals that are different,” such as LGBTI persons.1247  In relation to Bangladesh, it 
was felt that prioritizing the promotion of “moderate Islam” and strategies that seek to work with religious 
leaders to empower women’s rights (e.g., through arguing for women’s rights under Sharia’a law) would 
be a “regressive move” and disrupt local strategies that instead rely on human rights and constitutional 
arguments to protect women’s rights.1248 
In this vein, in 2010, the Special Representative to Muslim Communities was specifically asked about the 
USG’s engagement with religious actors, and how the USG would “plan on working with traditional gender 
values when promoting women’s rights.”1249  The response of the Special Representative was:
There are channels within the State department that work on women’s rights issues.  My office 
is not directly responsible for promoting human or women’s rights…We often conduct specific 
meetings with young women and female activists to hear what’s going on the ground and to be 
supportive by relaying their points of view to the US government.1250  
However, according to the Stakeholder Workshops, the preferred response in such circumstances is not to 
institutionally and rhetorically separate engaging religious actors from women’s rights—which relies on, and 
perpetuates a number of gender and religious stereotypes—but instead to promote a narrative that focuses 
on human rights, gender equality, justice, and the rule of law.  In the words of a human rights advocate from 
Malaysia at CHRGJ’s Stakeholder Workshop in Asia, “I have a problem with support of moderate Islam.  I 
would rather speak about justice and equality.”1251 
Second, within the USG there is ongoing debate about the extent to which it should engage former or 
reformed extremists as “credible voices” in its strategic communication work.1252  This debate is similar to that 
which has been exhaustively undertaken in the United Kingdom in the context of its strategies to prevent 
violent extremism.  As briefly mentioned above, until June 2011, the U.K.’s Prevent strategy explicitly relied 
on partnerships with non-violent extremists to combat violent extremism.1253  From a gender perspective, 
one of the critiques of this approach—now firmly rejected in the new Prevent strategy1254—was that “ethnic 
minority women may become more vulnerable because Prevent and cohesion policy puts more power and 
authority into the hands of religious leaders and interfaith networks.”1255  In addition to concerns that the 
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U.K. government was partnering with the wrong organizations, it was also argued that Prevent diverted 
funding from specialist women’s organizations to mainstream organizations with ramifications for Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BME) women.1256  These observations are particularly pertinent to the USG’s approach given 
that Quintan Wiktorowicz has recently been appointed to the National Security Council as Senior Director 
for Global Engagement after a period at the U.S. Embassy in the United Kingdom, where he examined the 
U.K.’s Prevent strategy and is a known proponent for a “broad-tent” approach that incorporates non-violent 
extremists into strategies that seek to counter violent extremism.1257
Third, the USG should be mindful that its strategies to incorporate women as “credible voices,” as audience, 
and in the content of messages do not unduly replicate gender stereotypes about women as victims or 
mothers that may inadvertently cripple their status as agents of change or fail to recognize that women are 
also capable of committing terrorist acts.1258
RECOMMENDATiONS
 ▶ The USG’s strategic approach to countering violent extremism should focus on 
all forms of violent extremism; reject terminology such as “moderate Muslim” 
that seemingly equates strong observance of faith with terrorism; and not define 
engagement with Muslim communities in the United States and abroad solely 
through a security lens.
 ▶ The USG’s approach to undercutting violent ideologies should be consistent with 
human rights protections pertaining to non-discrimination and freedom of religion, 
expression, and association while also recognizing the USG’s obligation to combat 
terrorism in all its forms.
 ▶ The USG should vet all partners and messages in its strategic communication 
strategies to ensure that it does not sponsor messages or institutionalize power 
dynamics that exclude women and sexual minorities, undermine gender equality, or 
de-legitimize local advocacy efforts to use international human rights as a means 
to secure rights enjoyment.  This includes avoiding sole reliance on stereotypes of women 
as mothers and victims, as well as rejecting partnerships that are considered to be effective for 
terrorism but in practice would be inimical to the rights of women and sexual minorities.
 ▶ To the extent that the USG seeks to engage with Muslim communities it should not 
see this as inherently separate from its activities on women’s rights and should 
instead promote narratives and practices that reflect the importance of human 
rights, rule of law, and tolerance as key to undermining terrorism.
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SECTiON Viii: MOViNG FORWARD: TOOLS FOR GENDER 
iNCLUSiON AND ASSESSMENT
Gender Matters in Evaluating Counter-Terrorism Efforts
This Report demonstrates that U.S. counter-terrorism measures, like all interventions related to complex 
human phenomena, have gendered impacts.  This is the case even when the measures are designed to be 
gender-neutral, when they explicitly target men alone, or when they appear so technical as to be removed 
from social dynamics like gender relations.  For this reason, the use of gender-specific tools are needed 
to identify, understand, and take into account the gender features and outcomes of the USG’s actions. 
Given the well-acknowledged limits of existing tools to measure the effectiveness of the USG’s efforts 
from a counter-terrorism perspective, known and tested gender-specific tools can assist to measure the 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes of counter-terrorism measures from a gender perspective and often from 
a counter-terrorism one (e.g., where a program seeks to address the role of gender in the drivers of violent 
extremism).  Both measurement efforts are essential because effective counter-terrorism measures should 
protect the whole population from terrorism, including particularly women and LGBTI individuals who are 
regularly its victims.  
Such tools should be used at every stage of an intervention—from planning to implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation—and can help elucidate the full range of gendered dimensions and impacts, by encouraging 
a focus on:
 ▶ How and when ideas about gender differences are built into counter-terrorism programming 
and whether such programming choices are based on sound judgments about the different 
needs of men and women, or about stereotyped views of the roles of men and women.
 ▶ How counter-terrorism measures may have both direct gendered effects and indirect gendered 
impacts.
 ▶ How gender and sexuality intersect with other forms of discrimination and marginalization such 
as race, ethnicity, religion, and class in the specific context in which counter-terrorism measures 
are being implemented.
 ▶ How the USG’s counter-terrorism measures impact discrimination on the basis of gender, 
gender identity and sexual orientation in both the private and public spheres.
 ▶ The extent to which the USG’s counter-terrorism measures alleviate or exacerbate the impacts 
of terrorism on communities, including women and sexual minorities.
 ▶ Whether and how counter-terrorism measures impact the relationships between men and 
women in a given setting.
 ▶ Whether stereotypes about gender or sexuality or sex-based discrimination are inadvertently 
reflected in the terminology, approach, or materials associated with a counter-terrorism measure 
or intervention.
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Use of Gender-Sensitive Tools to Evaluate Counter-Terrorism 
Efforts
The tools for undertaking these analyses are summarized briefly below, with some concrete suggestions 
as to how these can be applied in the context of measuring the outcomes of activities to counter violent 
extremism.    
O ver view of  G ender  To ols :  G enera l
Tools  to  Undertake  Gender  Analys is
 ▶ Gender analysis policies and frameworks.  Agencies that have recognized the importance 
of gender analysis to their work often create specific policies,1259 frameworks,1260 and technical 
assistance packages1261 for such analyses.  
 ▶ Gender assessments.  Commonly used by development agencies, including USAID, such 
program assessments identify and analyze relevant gender issues, formulate appropriate 
gender-related goals, and recommend effective programming approaches related to gender in 
a given context.1262  
 ▶ Gender mainstreaming guidelines.  Guidelines for staff to use in ensuring that gender 
analysis is employed in all programming; such guidelines provide helpful terminology, present 
methods, and often provide case studies.  This enables all actors to ensure that gender analysis 
is employed in all programming.1263  
Tools  to  Ensure  Gender  Inclusion
 ▶ Gender markers.  In 2009-2010, the international humanitarian assistance community 
launched a “gender marker,” through which individual programs funded by the international 
community are given a code of 0 to 2 denoting how successful the program’s design is at 
ensuring the advancement of gender equality.1264  This simple code has been successfully piloted 
in ten disasters and has led to measureable improvements by making programming more 
gender-sensitive.1265  
 ▶ Gender targets or set-asides.  Specifying a target number of women for inclusion in a 
sector, program or project—as beneficiaries, staff, or experts—can be an important motivator 
to ensure equal treatment and inclusion.1266  
Tools  to  Integrate  Gender  into  Programming Processes
 ▶ Gender checklists.  Checklists specifying steps to be taken during the program cycle and 
questions to be asked during the course of an agency’s regular business can be especially helpful 
as a simple way to ensure gender is addressed concretely.1267  
 ▶ On-call gender experts.  Agencies can ensure their operational and policy staff have access 
to gender expertise by hiring gender experts who ensure their work is promoting gender 
inclusion and equality.  
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 ▶ Gender-sensitive indicators.  Where agencies use indicators to monitor their performance 
or that of partners, they should be selected or designed to demonstrate gendered outputs, and 
to measure the gendered impact of programs or interventions.1268  
Tools  to  Monitor  and Assess  Gendered Impacts
 ▶ Sex-disaggregated data.1269  Government agencies use data to plan, implement, and evaluate 
their efforts and those of their partners.  Gender analysis is greatly hampered when such data is 
not disaggregated by sex as a matter of course.  
 ▶ Gender audits.  Gender audits are designed to assess how successful an agency has been in 
its internal efforts to mainstream gender into its procedures and processes.1270  Such audits can 
identify best practices as well as gaps, missed opportunities, and unmet needs for mainstreaming 
gender within an agency.  
 ▶ Gendered impact evaluations using state-of-the-art methods.  Demands for policy to 
be increasingly evidence-based have led to agency policies preferring experimental and quasi-
experimental impact evaluation design.1271   
G ender  To ols  as  Appl ied to  Counter-Terror ism
In Section II, the Report sets out in detail how the USG should overcome the gendered challenge of measuring 
the outcomes of development activities to counter-terrorism. See Box 4 (Measuring Counter-Terrorism 
Development Programming: The Gendered Challenge).  Many of those lessons can be extrapolated to other 
counter-terrorism measures, particularly those which are preventive in nature, and will not be repeated 
here.  In addition to those observations, some ways in which the tools above can be readily carried into the 
counter-terrorism or countering violent extremism context, include: 
 ▶ Using gender targets or set-asides to ensure that women partake in the USG’s national security 
assistance programs (e.g., trainings of law enforcement).
 ▶ Developing gender-sensitive indicators both generally (for example, through the forthcoming 
National Action Plan for UNSCR 1325) and specifically (such as in project solicitations for 
organizations to implement counter-terrorism or CVE projects).
 ▶ Applying gender audits to determine what additional resources and tools an agency may need 
to integrate gender into its counter-terrorism work.
 ▶ Tasking on-call gender-experts to provide gender assessments and tools designed specifically for 
counter-terrorism programming.  
 ▶ Undertaking gendered impact evaluations using state-of-the-art methods , such as evaluations 
that can test the causal connections between project interventions and their outcomes 
through random assignment to intervention and control groups, should be explored.  If gender 
is integrated into these approaches, and if qualitative data is used to supplement quantitative 
evaluation strategies, impact evaluations can be powerful tools for demonstrating what is most 
effective from both a gender and counter-terrorism perspective. 
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In addition, data collected and analyzed in counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism contexts 
should, as a rule, be disaggregated by sex to identify problems in targeting beneficiaries; highlight differential 
impacts on men and women; enable analysis of changes in gender dynamics over time; and provide corrective 
information about gendered assumptions in some circumstances.  These efforts are not without precedent. 
For example, pursuant to the U.K.’s revised Prevent strategy, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in 
the Home Office will “put in place a Case Management Information System to monitor data,” including the 
gender, race, religion/belief, and age, “of all individuals subject to Prevent interventions.”1272
While these tools above are essential, for many of the patterns uncovered in this Report, action to avoid 
gender discrimination and inequality is not always contingent on the use of highly-developed measurement 
and evaluation tools or completely new modes of analysis.  Instead, observing some very core starting 
points—from do no harm to the importance of consulting with affecting communities to rejecting 
stereotypes—alongside the more detailed recommendations and tools contained in this Report, will go a 
long way toward ensuring that rights are recognized, remedied and furthered rather than at best, ignored, 
and at worst, violated.  Accordingly, this Report calls for the USG to deploy all of the tools at its disposal 
to uncover, understand, and take into account the gender features and outcomes of its counterterrorism 
actions, and to end the silence that has shrouded women and sexual minorities to date.
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Master Sgt. Mona Venning, operations non-commissioned officer in charge at Third Army/U.S. Army Central’s G4, explains to the Yemeni women about the rules when Soldiers 
fight with pugel sticks. The 11 Yemeni women are the first women to be in the Yemeni Counter-Terrorism Unit. They visited Fort Jackson, S.C., March 21, to learn how men and 
women are integrated into training. Photo by Sgt. 1st Clvass Reeba Critser, Third Army/U.S. Army Central PAO, www.dvidshub.net
Front image captions
(from left to right)
U.S. Female Engagement Team meets with a women’s center contractor to discuss funding of projects to benefit local women in Charikar, Afghanistan.  Photo by Spc. Kristina Gupton, Combined Joint Task 
Force 101, www.dvidshub.net
DRUM: Desis Rising Up and Moving demonstrate outside the Flushing Public Library. Photo by Thomas Good / NLN.
Male participants in the G-Youth Project in Kenya search for career information at the Career Resource Center. Photo by Yussuf Ismail, Garissa Youth Project, Education Development Center, Inc.
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A Decade Lost: Locating Gender in U.S. Counter-Terrorism provides the first global account 
of how the U.S. government’s counter-terrorism efforts profoundly implicate and impact 
women and sexual minorities.  Over the last decade of the United States’ “War on Terror,” 
the way women and sexual minorities experience counter-terrorism has been invisible 
to policymakers and the human rights community alike.  A Decade Lost demonstrates 
that this failure cannot continue.  Drawing on regional consultations, interviews with U.S 
government and other stakeholders, and secondary research, A Decade Lost reveals the 
unique gender dimensions and impacts of U.S. counter-terrorism in the United States, Asia, 
Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa, and provides recommendations to ensure 
that women and sexual minorities are its beneficiaries rather than its casualties.  As the U.S. 
government leads a world-wide trend toward a holistic security strategy that mobilizes the 
3Ds—defense, diplomacy, and development—and increasingly emphasizes the importance 
of women in national security, the extent to which counter-terrorism efforts include and 
impact women and sexual minorities is set to rise.  With the ten-year anniversary of the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 approaching, now is the time for the U.S. government and 
nations the world-over to take stock of, redress, and deter the gender-based violations that 
occur in a world defined by terrorism and counter-terrorism and the squeezing of women 
and sexual minorities between the two.  A Decade Lost charts this way forward.
